A troublesome issue concerning the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is the extent to which law enforcement officers may use trickery during an interrogation to induce a suspect to incriminate himself or herself. For example, in one case two officers questioned Charles McFarland, who was incarcerated in a state prison, about his connection to a handgun that had been used to shoot two other officers. McFarland was advised of his rights but was not asked whether he was willing to waive those rights. Instead, to induce McFarland to speak, the officers deceived him into believing that “[n]obody is going to give you charges.”McFarland made incriminating admissions and was indicted for possessing a handgun as a convicted felon.

(a) Review Case 9.3, Miranda v. Arizona, on pages 200 and 201 in this chapter. Should McFarland’s statements be suppressed—that is, not be treated as admissible evidence at trial—because he was not asked whether he was willing to waive his rights prior to making his self-incriminating statements? Does Miranda apply to McFarland’s situation?

(b) Do you think that it is fair for the police to resort to trickery and deception to bring those who have committed crimes to justice? Why or why not? What rights or public policies must be balanced in deciding this issue?