An acquiring firm, A, seeks to buy a target firm, T. The acquiring firm has better managers. The value of the target firm, if acquired by A, is $ 100 million. The value of the target firm under its current management is only $ 80 million. However, the managers of T can impose a poison pill that would reduce the value of firm T to the acquirer by amount P without providing any benefit to shareholders of T. What is the minimum value of P that would prevent A from acquiring T? What is the cost of this poison pill to shareholders of the two firms?
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