Are all the (identical) customers of the nonlinear price- discriminating monopoly in panel a of figure worse off than they would be if the firm set a single (uniform) price (panel b)? What if the consumers were not identical?
Answer to relevant QuestionsAssume that the quantity- discriminating monopoly in panel a of Figure 10.4 can set three prices, depending on the quantity a consumer purchases. The firm’s profit is p = p1Q1 + p2(Q2 - Q1) + p3(Q3 - Q2) – mQ3,where p1 ...Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p = 120 – 2q, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the ...Paradise Cruises has a monopoly in renting luxury yachts for sailing in the Caribbean Sea. In winter its monthly inverse demand function is p = 200 – q. In summer the inverse demand function is p = 200 – 2q. Paradise has ...What is the homogeneous- good duopoly’s Nash- Cournot equilibrium if the market demand function is Q = 1,000 – 1,000p and each firm’s marginal cost is $ 0.28 per unit?Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demandp = 150 - q1 - q2.Each firm has a marginal cost of $ 60 per unit. What is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium?
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