Gruber (2000) found evidence that the elasticity of labor supply with respect to disability insurance (DI) benefits is considerably smaller than the estimates of the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to UI benefits. Why might moral hazard be less of an issue in the DI program than in the UI program?
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