Question: In the Managerial Solution safety game could cheap talk lead
In the Managerial Solution safety game, could cheap talk lead both firms to invest in safety? Why or why not? What is the minimum fine that the government could levy on firms that do not invest in safety that would lead to a Nash equilibrium in which both firms invest?
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