Question: Joe in Question 5 3 marries Susan who is also an
Joe in Question 5.3 marries Susan, who is also an enthusiastic golfer. Susan wants to join the Northlands Club. The manager believes that Susan’s inverse demand function is p = 100 – 2q. The manager has a policy of offering each member of a married couple the same two- part prices, so he offers them both a new deal. What two- part pricing deal maximizes the club’s profit? Will this new pricing have a higher or lower access fee and per- unit fee than in Joe’s original deal? How much more would the club make if it charged Susan and Joe separate prices?
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