Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928)
Plaintiff was standing on a railroad platform. A man, carrying a small unidentifiable package, jumped aboard a railroad car. A guard on the car, trying to help him board the train, dislodged the package from his arm. The package contained fireworks, which exploded when they fell. The explosion caused scales at the other end of the platform to fall, injuring plaintiff. The issue in this case was whether Plaintiff had a cause of action for negligence. The majority opinion (Justice Cardozo) approaches the question from the perspective of duty of care, stating that the plaintiff must show that "as to him" the negligent act was dangerous. Since this couldn't be done, the case was dismissed. The dissent (Andrews) takes a different view and approaches the issue from the perspective of proximate cause. Justice Andrews states that the duty of care required for negligence should not be a duty owed to individual persons, but a duty owed to society to protect it from unnecessary danger. The question of liability thus becomes a question of proximate cause, rather than duty of care. Proximate cause, he says, depends in each case upon many considerations. In general, however, proximate cause means that because of public policy, or a rough set of justice, the law will refuse to extend liability beyond a certain series of events.
1. Why did Justice Andrews dissent from the majority opinion?
2. According to Justice Andrews, what is proximate cause?