# Question: Reconsider the example of a traveling salesman problem shown in

Reconsider the example of a traveling salesman problem shown in Fig. 14.4.

(a) When the sub-tour reversal algorithm was applied to this problem in Sec. 14.1, the first iteration resulted in a tie for which of two sub-tour reversals (reversing 3-4 or 4-5) provided the largest decrease in the distance of the tour, so the tie was broken arbitrarily in favor of the first reversal. Determine what would have happened if the second of these reversals (reversing 4-5) had been chosen instead.

(a) When the sub-tour reversal algorithm was applied to this problem in Sec. 14.1, the first iteration resulted in a tie for which of two sub-tour reversals (reversing 3-4 or 4-5) provided the largest decrease in the distance of the tour, so the tie was broken arbitrarily in favor of the first reversal. Determine what would have happened if the second of these reversals (reversing 4-5) had been chosen instead.

## Relevant Questions

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