1. What facts did Hartland rely on to assert the anticipatory repudiation of the contract?

2. What is the measure of damages for a breach of a construction contract? Calculate what is owed Hartland excluding attorneys’ fees and interest.

3. Why is prejudgment and postjudgment interest appropriate in a breach of contract lawsuit? In 1985, Hartland Developers, Inc., agreed to build an airplane hangar for Robert Tips of San Antonio for $300,000, payable in three installments of $100,000, with the final payment due upon the completion of the building and the issuance of a certificate of completion by the engineer representing Tips. The evidence shows that Tips’s representative Mr. Lavelle instructed Hartland to cease work on the building because Tips could no longer afford to make payments.

Hartland ceased work as instructed before the completion of the building, having been paid $200,000 at that time. He sued Tips for breach of contract. On May 6, 1996, the trial court allowed Hartland the amount owing on the contract, $100,000, less the cost of completing the building according to the contract, $65,000, plus attorneys’ fees and prejudgment and postjudgment interest. Tips appealed. JUDICIAL OPINION

HARDBERGER, C. J.…

Substantial Performance

Tips claims that the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Hartland had substantially performed under the agreement.…

We agree with Tips that Hartland had not substantially performed under the contract. However, we find this point irrelevant to the resolution of this case. Substantial performance is a doctrine that allows breaching parties who have substantially completed their obligations to recover on a contract.

WHITE & SUMMERS, CONTRACTS § 11–18(b) (3rd ed 1987). Hartland was not a breaching party. A contractor can recover on a contract when the failure to substantially perform is the fault of the other party. A party injured by the anticipatory breach of another may elect to sue for damages under the contract,… (if owner repudiates construction contract, contractor may sue in damages or for restitution);

Taylor Pub. Co. v Systems Marketing Inc. 686 S. W.2d 213, 217 (when party obligated to make fixed payment absolutely repudiates the agreement, the obligee is entitled to recover [in an] action for damages and receive the present value of the payments payable under the agreement).

The trial judge based his damage assessment on anticipatory repudiation of contract. The evidence that Tips’s representative, Lavelle, instructed Hartland to cease work on the project because Tips no longer could afford to make payments was sufficient to support this finding. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v Lenape Resources Corp., 870 S.W.2d 286, 302 (Tex App.—San Antonio 1993) (anticipatory repudiation occurs when a party repudiates a contract before time for performance), affd in part, rev’d in part, 925 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1996). ……………………………..