The issue in this case is whether a deed from the late Eura Mae Redmon to her three children, W. C. Sewell, Billy Sewell, and appellee Melba Taylor, was a conveyance to them as tenants in common or as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Chancellor held that Mrs. Redmon intended for her children to take the property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. We reverse and remand.

The deed in question was executed by Mrs. Redmon on January 14, 1993. The conveyance was made to the three grantees ‘‘jointly and severally, and unto their heirs, assigns and successors forever,’’ with the grantor retaining a life estate. W. C. Sewell and Billy Sewell died on November 18, 1993, and May 11, 1995, respectively. Mrs. Redmon died on February 17, 1997. Shortly thereafter, appellee filed a complaint in White County Chancery Court seeking a declaration that her mother had intended to convey the property to the grantees as joint tenants, thereby making appellee, by virtue of her brothers’ deaths, sole owner of the property. Appellants, who are descendants of W. C. and Billy Sewell, opposed the complaint on the ground that the deed created a tenancy in common among the grantees.

The case went to trial, and the chancellor, upon hearing extrinsic evidence of Mrs. Redmon’s intent, found that she meant to convey the property to her children as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. * * * It is from that order that this appeal has been brought.

Appellants and appellee agree that the term ‘‘jointly and severally’’ as used to describe an estate in property is ambiguous * * *. Appellants contend that, under Arkansas law, a deed to two or more persons presumptively creates a tenancy in common unless the deed expressly creates a joint tenancy. They cite Ark. Code Ann. §18–12–603, which reads as follows: ‘‘Every interest in real estate granted or devised to two (2) or more persons, other than executors and trustees as such, shall be in tenancy in common unless expressly declared in the grant or devise to be a joint tenancy.’’ According to appellants, the very existence of an ambiguity within the deed means that, under the statute, a tenancy in common has been created. Appellee, on the other hand, points to the well-established rule that, when faced with an ambiguity in a deed, the trial court may determine the intent of the grantor by looking to extraneous circumstances to decide what was really intended by the language in the deed. [Citations.] Because, appellee argues, the chancellor in this case had strong evidence before him that Mrs. Redmon intended to create a joint tenancy in her children, his finding should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. [Citations.]

The extrinsic evidence considered by the chancellor in this case weighs in favor of appellee. That evidence consisted of appellee’s testimony that her mother had informed her attorney that she wanted the deed drafted so that, if one of her children died, the property would belong to the other two children, and so on; that shortly after the death of W. C. Sewell, Mrs. Redmon executed a new will leaving her property to Billy Sewell and appellee and leaving nothing to W. C.’s children; that Mrs. Redmon had set up bank accounts payable upon her death to her children, and, after W. C. and Billy died, deleted their names leaving the name of the surviving child; and that Mrs. Redmon was upset before her death upon learning that there was a problem with the deed. However, we hold that the considerations expressed in Ark. Code Ann. §18–12–603 override the rule of construction urged by appellee.

Section 18–12–603 is a statute like one of many throughout the country. At common law, joint tenancy was favored and, where possible, that estate was held to exist. [Citation.] However, in Arkansas, and in many other states, statutes have been adopted which presumptively construe an instrument to create a tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy. [Citations.] These statutes do not prohibit joint tenancies but merely provide for a construction against a joint tenancy if the intention to create it is not clear. [Citations.] A statute such as section 18–12–603 is not an expression of a public policy against joint tenancies but is merely a choice by the legislature of a rule of construction that selects one of two possible interpretations of a provision otherwise ambiguous. [Citation.]

Ordinarily, a statute such as section 18–12–603 does not require the actual use of the words ‘‘joint tenancy.’’ [Citation.] * * * Survivorship is the distinctive characteristic of a joint tenancy. [Citation.] Where, from the four corners of an instrument, a court can interpret the intention of the grantor or testator as creating a survivorship estate, the court will deem the estate to be a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. [Citations.]

Nothing appears from the four corners of the deed in this case to indicate Mrs. Redmon’s intent to convey a survivorship interest, unless that intention is to be found in the term ‘‘jointly and severally.’’ Appellants do not cite, nor have we discovered through our own research, any Arkansas case in which a grant of ownership was made to two or more parties ‘‘jointly and severally.’’ As the chancellor noted below, ‘‘jointly and severally’’ are words of tort, not property. They have no meaning in the world of estates. In the context of an ownership interest, such a term is a legal anomaly; several ownership is, by definition, a denial of joint ownership. [Citation.] However, two cases from other jurisdictions are persuasive. In [citation], the court interpreted a will that had devised property to two devisees ‘‘jointly and severally.’’ The court held that, in light of a statute similar to ours, no joint tenancy was created. * * *

In [citation], property was deeded to two grantees ‘‘jointly.’’ The Missouri court, relying on a statute virtually identical to ours, held that a joint tenancy was not created by the use of such language. * * *

If use of the word ‘‘jointly’’ is not sufficient to create a joint tenancy, the term ‘‘jointly and severally,’’ with its elusive connotation, cannot do so either. * * *

Appellee argues that, given the deed’s ambiguity, our focus should be on the intent of the grantor as gleaned not only from the instrument itself but from the extrinsic evidence presented at trial. However, evidence of the grantor’s intention cannot prevail over the statute. To allow that would be to render section 18–12–603 meaningless.

***

Reversed and remanded.