5. Individual Problems 16-5 Your pharmaceutical firm is seeking to open up new international markets by...

 

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5. Individual Problems 16-5 Your pharmaceutical firm is seeking to open up new international markets by partnering with various local distributors. The different distributors within a country are stronger with different market segments (hospitals, retail pharmacies, etc.) but also have substantial overlap. In Egypt, you calculate that the annual value created by one distributor is $180 million per year, but would be $240 million if two distributors carried your product line. Assuming a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture $ independent of each other; therefore, you conduct separate negotiations with each.) Argentina also has two distributors that add value equivalent to the value added by the two distributors in Egypt, but both are run by the government. Assuming a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture $ million of this deal. (Hint: The two distributors are Assuming a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture $ million of this deal. In Argentina, if you do not reach an agreement with the government distributors, you can set up a less efficient Internet-based distribution system that would generate $60 million in value to you. million of this deal. Grade It Now Save & Continue Continue without saving 5. Individual Problems 16-5 Your pharmaceutical firm is seeking to open up new international markets by partnering with various local distributors. The different distributors within a country are stronger with different market segments (hospitals, retail pharmacies, etc.) but also have substantial overlap. In Egypt, you calculate that the annual value created by one distributor is $180 million per year, but would be $240 million if two distributors carried your product line. Assuming a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture $ independent of each other; therefore, you conduct separate negotiations with each.) Argentina also has two distributors that add value equivalent to the value added by the two distributors in Egypt, but both are run by the government. Assuming a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture $ million of this deal. (Hint: The two distributors are Assuming a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture $ million of this deal. In Argentina, if you do not reach an agreement with the government distributors, you can set up a less efficient Internet-based distribution system that would generate $60 million in value to you. million of this deal. Grade It Now Save & Continue Continue without saving

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saution 1st scenario the marginal value of the second distributor is normall... View the full answer