So far we have looked at organizations as having two aspects. First, we have considered organizations as hierarchical collections of individuals who are connected to one another and to the organization by contractual agreements and formally defined hierarchies of authority. We have called this aspect of the organization the rational organization. Overlying the rational organization’s formal lines of authority is a second system, which we have called the political organization: the network of power relationships, coalitions, and informal lines of communication through which individuals seek to achieve their goals and what they see as the goals of the organization.
It is possible to conceive of organizations as consisting of yet a third, quite different kind of system. Recent thinkers have suggested that organizations can and should be thought of as networks of relationships in which “connected selves” form webs of ongoing personal relation- ships with other “connected selves.” In this model of the organization, the focus of employees is not on the pursuit of power, profit or personal goals, but on the caring inter- personal relationships that exist among the individuals within the organization and those external individuals with whom the organization interacts. We encounter this aspect of the organization when we become mutual friends with the people with whom we work, come to care for them, look out for their well-being, and seek to deepen and preserve these caring relationships. Employers, too, may grow close to their employees, deepening their relation- ships with employees and coming to seek ways of caring for the particular needs of these particular individuals and of developing their potential. When a fire destroyed the main plant of Malden Mills, for example, CEO Aaron Feuerstein refused to lay off the idled workers, but continued to pay them from his own pocket even though they were not working. He said that they were “part of the enterprise, not a cost center to be cut. They’ve been with me for a long time. We’ve been good to each other, and there’s a deep realization of that.” The members of an organization may befriend even their clients and customers, truly caring for them and genuinely seeking the well-being of those particular clients with whom they deal. Such caring for the well-being of clients can be most evident in organizations of professionals that provide services for their clients, such as hospitals, schools, law firms, and consulting firms that have ongoing relationships with the people they serve.
This aspect of organizational life is not adequately described by the contractual relationships that underlie the rational model of the organization, nor by the power relation- ships that underlie the political model. Perhaps, this aspect of the organization is best described as the caring model of the organization, because its dominant realities are those that are emphasized by an ethic of care: interpersonal relationships.

Jeanne M. Liedtka described the caring organization as an organization, or part of an organization, as an entity in which the following qualities appear.
1. Focus is not on how best to improve profits or quality, but on caring for the persons that make up the organization.
2. Caring is not something done as an instrumental means to enhance quality or profits but as an end undertaken for its own sake.
3. Caring is directed at particular individuals at a subjective level and is something in which each becomes engrossed.
4. Caring aims at enhancing the growth of those who are cared for by moving them to develop and use their full capacities to fulfill the needs and aspirations that they have defined for themselves.97
Although organizations such as W. L. Gore are rare, still most organizations, to a greater or lesser extent, have aspects of the caring organization. In some organizations, such as W. L. Gore, the caring organization dominates the rational and political aspects of the organization. In most others, however, the contractual and political aspects are more prominent. Yet, in many there are at least some employees and managers who respond to the demands of caring by nurturing the relationships they have with one another and by attending to the concrete and particular needs of fellow employees and of their customers. In the contractual model, the key ethical issues arise from the potential for violations of the contractual relation. In the political model, the key ethical issues arise from the potential for the misuse of power.
How should these kinds of moral issues be resolved? Unfortunately, at this time the answers are not clear.
Research and thinking on the caring organization and caring in organizations is so recent that no clear consensus has emerged on how issues such as these should be resolved. We have come here to the very edges of current thinking about ethics and organizations.

Safety violations had plagued the Upper Big Branch mine for some time.
At the center of the storm of criticism that engulfed the company after the mine explosion was CEO Blankenship. The families of several miners accused him of putting profits ahead of safety. Born in 1950, Blankenship grew up in Stopover, Kentucky, a poor village made up mostly of shacks and trailer homes. His mother divorced his father shortly after he was born, and Blankenship ended up being raised by his mother. A childhood friend of his said, “He was a very competitive kid—he didn’t like to fail . . . He was always trying to figure out what he could get away with.” In high school, Blankenship played baseball and was elected president of his class. When he graduated, he enrolled in Marshall University in Huntington, where he majored in accounting and managed to graduate within three years. Afterward, he worked as an accountant for the Keebler Company, married, and had two children. Then, in 1982, the Massey Energy Company contacted Blankenship and offered him a job in one of its subsidiaries, named Rawl. He accepted the offer and, two years later, he was named president of Rawl. Blankenship continued his rise up the company’s ranks until, in 1992, he was named CEO and chair of the entire company.
Families of the dead miners accused Blankenship of “always cutting corners on safety, pushing for more coal.”12 Blankenship vehemently denied this accusation:
From the day I became a member of Massey’s leadership team 20 years ago, I have made safety my number one priority. . . . The result has been a 90 percent reduction in our lost time acci- dent rate, which has been better—often dramatically better— than the industry average for 17 of the last 19 years. So let me state for the record—Massey does not place profits over safety. We never have, and we never will.13
Ethics and the Employee 385 While Blankenship acknowledged that Massey Energy had
received a large number of safety citations, this was not unusual, he said, for a coal company: itself
Violations are unfortunately a normal part of the mining process. . . . There are violations at every coal mine in America, and Upper Big Branch was a mine that had violations. . . . I think the fact that MSHA, the state, and our fire bosses and the best engineers that you can find were all in and around this mine, and all believed it to be safe in the circumstances it was in, speaks for itself as far as any suspicion that the mine was improperly operated.14
In a startling move, Blankenship also suggested that MSHA might have been responsible for the deaths of the 29 miners:
Against the advice of our own experts, MSHA required several changes since September 2009 that made the ventilation plan significantly more complex. This change in ventilation significantly reduced the volume of fresh air to the face of the longwall mining operation during this period. . . . We opposed the changes because our own engineers believed they made the mine less safe, not because they were more costly or because they interfered with production.
During congressional hearings, however, survivors of the explosion and relatives of those who had died testified that conditions in the mine were not always up to standards, and that the miners felt too threatened to raise objections.
While many people blamed the company for the deaths of the miners, some critics also faulted MSHA, the federal agency that is supposed to protect miners. For one thing, the agency was understaffed and its inspectors were overworked. In addition, a government audit of the agency released the week before the mine explosion said that more than half of the agency’s inspectors failed to attend required training courses and the agency neither kept track of their attendance nor did it sanction them.
Critics also pointed out that regulations passed in 2007 hampered MSHA’s ability to sanction mining companies. Mining companies, Massey Energy in particular, regularly challenged the citations of MSHA inspectors, a process that required MSHA to submit the challenge to a panel of judges called the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (MSHRC). However, because MSHRC did not have enough judges to review the challenges in a timely fashion, years often passed before companies were forced to address the citations.19
Although MSHA had the authority to close down a mine if the mine had a substantial number of citations, it had not been able to close the Upper Big Branch mine.20 On December 6, 2007, MSHA had sent a letter to Rick Hodge, superintendent of the Upper Big Branch mine, stating that the mine had accumulated so many violations that it would be closed down if it received any more “Significant and Substantial” violations. The letter read:
In accordance with Section 104(e) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 and 30CFR Part 104, the Mine Safety and Health Administration has conducted a pattern of violation (POV) screening of compliance records for the Upper Big Branch Mine . . . for the 24 months ending September 30, 2007. A POV screening is used to determine if Section 104(e) is applicable to a particular mine. If implemented, Section 104(e) requires all subsequent violations designated as Significant and Substantial be issued as closure orders with all persons withdrawn from the
While many people blamed the company for the deaths of the miners, some critics also faulted MSHA, the federal agency that is supposed to protect miners. For one thing, the agency was understaffed and its inspectors were overworked. In addition, a government audit of the agency released the week before the mine explosion said that more than half of the agency’s inspectors failed to attend required training courses and the agency neither kept track of their attendance nor did it sanction them.
Critics also pointed out that regulations passed in 2007 hampered MSHA’s ability to sanction mining companies. Mining companies, Massey Energy in particular, regularly challenged the citations of MSHA inspectors, a process that required MSHA to submit the challenge to a panel of judges called the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (MSHRC). However, because MSHRC did not have enough judges to review the challenges in a timely fashion, years often passed before companies were forced to address the citations.19
Although MSHA had the authority to close down a mine if the mine had a substantial number of citations, it had not been able to close the Upper Big Branch mine.20 On December 6, 2007, MSHA had sent a letter to Rick Hodge, superintendent of the Upper Big Branch mine, stating that the mine had accumulated so many violations that it would be closed down if it received any more “Significant and Substantial” violations. The letter read:
In accordance with Section 104(e) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 and 30CFR Part 104, the Mine Safety and Health Administration has conducted a pattern of violation (POV) screening of compliance records for the Upper Big Branch Mine . . . for the 24 months ending September 30, 2007. A POV screening is used to determine if Section 104(e) is applicable to a particular mine. If implemented, Section 104(e) requires all subsequent violations designated as Significant and Substantial be issued as closure orders with all persons withdrawn from the
While many people blamed the company for the deaths of the miners, some critics also faulted MSHA, the federal agency that is supposed to protect miners. For one thing, the agency was understaffed and its inspectors were overworked. In addition, a government audit of the agency released the week before the mine explosion said that more than half of the agency’s inspectors failed to attend required training courses and the agency neither kept track of their attendance nor did it sanction them.
Critics also pointed out that regulations passed in 2007 hampered MSHA’s ability to sanction mining companies. Mining companies, Massey Energy in particular, regularly challenged the citations of MSHA inspectors, a process that required MSHA to submit the challenge to a panel of judges called the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (MSHRC). However, because MSHRC did not have enough judges to review the challenges in a timely fashion, years often passed before companies were forced to address the citations.19
Although MSHA had the authority to close down a mine if the mine had a substantial number of citations, it had not been able to close the Upper Big Branch mine.20 On December 6, 2007, MSHA had sent a letter to Rick Hodge, superintendent of the Upper Big Branch mine, stating that the mine had accumulated so many violations that it would be closed down if it received any more “Significant and Substantial” violations. The letter read:
In accordance with Section 104(e) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 and 30CFR Part 104, the Mine Safety and Health Administration has conducted a pattern of violation (POV) screening of compliance records for the Upper Big Branch Mine . . . for the 24 months ending September 30, 2007. A POV screening is used to determine if Section 104(e) is applicable to a particular mine. If implemented, Section 104(e) requires all subsequent violations designated as Significant and Substantial be issued as closure orders with all persons withdrawn from the
While many people blamed the company for the deaths of the miners, some critics also faulted MSHA, the federal agency that is supposed to protect miners. For one thing, the agency was understaffed and its inspectors were overworked. In addition, a government audit of the agency released the week before the mine explosion said that more than half of the agency’s inspectors failed to attend required training courses and the agency neither kept track of their attendance nor did it sanction them.
Critics also pointed out that regulations passed in 2007 hampered MSHA’s ability to sanction mining companies. Mining companies, Massey Energy in particular, regularly challenged the citations of MSHA inspectors, a process that required MSHA to submit the challenge to a panel of judges called the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (MSHRC). However, because MSHRC did not have enough judges to review the challenges in a timely fashion, years often passed before companies were forced to address the citations.19
Although MSHA had the authority to close down a mine if the mine had a substantial number of citations, it had not been able to close the Upper Big Branch mine.20 On December 6, 2007, MSHA had sent a letter to Rick Hodge, superintendent of the Upper Big Branch mine, stating that the mine had accumulated so many violations that it would be closed down if it received any more “Significant and Substantial” violations. The letter read:
In accordance with Section 104(e) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 and 30CFR Part 104, the Mine Safety and Health Administration has conducted a pattern of violation (POV) screening of compliance records for the Upper Big Branch Mine . . . for the 24 months ending September 30, 2007. A POV screening is used to determine if Section 104(e) is applicable to a particular mine. If implemented, Section 104(e) requires all subsequent violations designated as Significant and Substantial be issued as closure orders with all persons withdrawn from the affected area, except those necessary to correct the violation. An operator can be removed from Section 104(e) sanctions only after an inspection of the entire operation results in no Significant and Substantial violations. This letter is your notification that a potential pattern of violation exists at the Upper Big Branch Mine.21
After receiving the letter, however, officials of Massey Energy challenged several of the citations on which it was based. They also corrected enough of the significant and substantial violations the mine had received during the previous 24 months to allow its total violations to fall below the level needed to force its closure. Consequently, although MSHA had frequently closed down sections of the mine when it demanded the company remedy a particular ventilation problem, it never forced the entire mine to shut down and make significant changes.

Compare and contrast the rational model of the organization with the political model and the caring model. Would you agree with the following statement: "The rational model of the organization assumes that the corporation is based on consent, while the political model assumes that the corporation is based on power, and the caring model assumes that the corporation is based on interpersonal relationships"?

Why or why not?

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AGREE An organization comes into existence when explicit procedures are established to coordinate th... View the full answer