Consider the reporting a crime game under incomplete information. Two players act simultaneously. Player 1 gets a
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Consider the reporting a crime game under incomplete information. Two players act simultaneously. Player 1 gets a payoff of v if the crime is reported and 0 if it is not reported. It costs the player 1 c to report the crime (and nothing not to report the crime). Payer 2 can be of two possible types. He is type 1 with probability q. A type 1 of player 2 has the same preferences as player 1. However, a type 2 of player 2 gets no benefit from reporting the crime, but he would still incur a cost c from reporting the crime (0 < c < v).
a) Represent the above game as an extensive form game of imperfect information in which Nature moves first.
b) Find all equilibria of this game
Related Book For
Microeconomics An Intuitive Approach with Calculus
ISBN: 978-0538453257
1st edition
Authors: Thomas Nechyba
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