Please help with Question 5 A-D below:

sade it to collude? 5. Two major networks are competing for viewer rat- ings in the 8:00-9:00 p.m. and 9:00-10:00 p.m. slots on a given weeknight. Each has two shows to fill these time periods and is juggling its lineup. Each can choose to put its "bigger" show first or to place it second in the 9:00-10:00 p.m. slot. The combination of decisions leads to the following "ratings points" results: NETWORK 2 First Second WOT First 20, 30 18, 18 NETWORK 1 Second 15, 15 30, 10 a. Find the Nash equilibria for this game, assuming that both networks make their decisions at the same time.518 PART 3 Market Structure and Competitive St b. If each network is risk-averse and uses a maximin strategy, what will be the resulting equilibrium? c. What will be the equilibrium if Network 1 makes its selection first? If Network 2 goes first? d. Suppose the network managers meet to coordinate schedules and Network 1 promises to schedule its big show first. Is this promise credible? What would be the likely outcome? 6. Two competing firms are each planning to introduce