This is a complete information game Player 1 can either steal or not. If they do,...

 

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This is a complete information game Player 1 can either steal or not. If they do, the game is done and Player 1 gets .1 and Player 2 0. If Player one does not steal then player 2 decides the amount of effort e 0 Let (e) be the quantity of a good that player 2 produces by exerting effort Assume Je and de < 0 a >0. 1 Player 1 gets - Player 1's payoff= (note: a (0, 1) (1 - )(e) Player 2 keeps (e) and has to pay Player 2's payoff a(e) - e 1. Let (e)=e. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium 2. Construct player 1 and player 2's payoffs as a function of This is a complete information game Player 1 can either steal or not. If they do, the game is done and Player 1 gets .1 and Player 2 0. If Player one does not steal then player 2 decides the amount of effort e 0 Let (e) be the quantity of a good that player 2 produces by exerting effort Assume Je and de < 0 a >0. 1 Player 1 gets - Player 1's payoff= (note: a (0, 1) (1 - )(e) Player 2 keeps (e) and has to pay Player 2's payoff a(e) - e 1. Let (e)=e. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium 2. Construct player 1 and player 2's payoffs as a function of