We have three voters and four alternatives. The individual preference lists are as follows: Voter 1:...

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We have three voters and four alternatives. The individual preference lists are as follows: Voter 1: d cab Voter 2: b d ac Voter 3: c a bd Suppose that the social choice procedure being used is sequential pairwise voting with a fixed agenda, and that you have agenda-setting power (that is, you get to choose the order). What order should you choose if you want alternative c to be the social choice? Oc vs. b, then winner vs. d, then winner vs. a. Oa vs. c, then winner vs. d, then winner vs. b. Od vs. b, then winner vs. c, then winner vs. a. O a vs. b, then winner vs. c, then winner vs. d. No agenda yields c as the winner. We have three voters and four alternatives. The individual preference lists are as follows: Voter 1: d cab Voter 2: b d ac Voter 3: c a bd Suppose that the social choice procedure being used is sequential pairwise voting with a fixed agenda, and that you have agenda-setting power (that is, you get to choose the order). What order should you choose if you want alternative c to be the social choice? Oc vs. b, then winner vs. d, then winner vs. a. Oa vs. c, then winner vs. d, then winner vs. b. Od vs. b, then winner vs. c, then winner vs. a. O a vs. b, then winner vs. c, then winner vs. d. No agenda yields c as the winner.

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You are correct There is no agenda order that will guarantee alternative c as the winner using seque... View the full answer