OPINION BY CIRCUIT JUDGE KRAUSE: In 2011, after five years of employment as an employee assistance...

 
 
 
 

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OPINION BY CIRCUIT JUDGE KRAUSE: In 2011, after five years of employment as an employee assistance program consultant in Carilion's behavioral health unit, Appellant J. Neil DeMasters allegedly was fired for acting contrary to his employer's best interests." failing to take the "pro-employer side," and leaving his employer "in a compromised position," as a result of his support of a fellow employee's sexual harassment com- plaint and his criticism of the way the employer had han dled the investigation. DeMasters brought suit against Carilion Clinic.. claiming that he was terminated for engaging in protected activity, including opposing an unlawful employment practice, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court dis- missed DeMasters' complaint, primarily on the grounds that no individual activity in which DeMasters engaged by itself constituted protected oppositional conduct and that the so-called "manager rule," in any event, pre- vented an employee whose job responsibilities included reporting discrimination claims from seeking protec. tion under Title VIl's anti-retaliation provision. As we now hold that the proper test for analyzing oppositional conduct requires consideration of the employee's course of conduct as a whole and that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII jurisprudence, we will reverse and remand for DeMasters to proceed with his suit. DeMasters began working in July 2006 as an employee assistance program ("EAP) consultant for Carilion, a large healthcare organization that owns and operates several hospitals. In October 2008, DeMasters was consulted by John Doe, a Carilion employee who had been referred to the EAP for help. At this meeting, Doe revealed that his department manager had been harassing him for the last several months and described how his manager had masturbatda in front of him twice on hospital grounds, asked Doe for oral sex, and asked Doe to display his genitals. Doe also offered that he had physical evidence of the harassment After hearing Doe out, DeMasters opined that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment in violation of Carilion's sexual harassment policy and formulated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and facilitate the investigation of Doe's complaint. To assist Doe with this reporting and investigation, DeMasters suggested that Doe sign a release form that authorized DeMasters to communicate with Carilion's human resources ("HR") department directly on Doe's behalf. That same day. DeMasters put this plan in motion by contacting the HR department, relaying the substance of Doe's complaint, and thereby initiating the investigation of Doe's alleged sexual harassment. Once Carilion began to investigate the matter and took a statement from Doe, it fired the harasser and told Doe that this individual would never be allowed back on hospital property. A few days later, however, DeMasters received a dis- tressed call from Doe, who had learned that the harasser had been permitted by Doe's department director to come back to the hospital to collect his belongings. DeMasters then scheduled another meeting with Doe for the following day. At that meeting. Doe explained that he felt uncomfortable with the department direc- tor and was facing increasing hostility from co-workers aligned with the harasser. DeMasters convened a meeting of his EAP colleagues, who agreed that DeMasters should contact Carilion's HR department to offer suggestions as to how it might better handle the situation.. DeMasters followed through on this plan by calling and leaving a message for an HR representa- tive, who called him back the next day. In that conversation, after confirming that the HR representative was aware that Doe was being subjected to harassing behavior from his co-workers, De Masters offered to coach Carilion's HR department about better ways to respond to Doe's concerns. The HR representa- tive declined and stated that he would speak with the department director. However, several days later, Doe reported to DeMasters that his co-workers' behavior was getting worse, that he was dissatisfied with manage ment's, reaction to his complaint, and that he feared his harasser would come looking for him with a gun. *** De Masters ... reached out to Carilion's HR manager again to say that he felt that Carilion was not handling the case properly. DeMasters does not allege any subsequent contact with Doe or activity on Doe's behalf and apparently was unaware of the legal remedies pursued by Doe over the next two years. In 2010, however, one of Carilion's man- agers called DeMasters and informed him that Doe had filed a Title VII complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and was Rursu- ing a civil suit for sexual harassment against Carilion. In that conversation, the manager pressed DeMasters on his involvement with Doe's harassment complaint. DeMasters acknowledged that Doe had been to the EAP but did not reveal any details of DeMasters' own involve- ment with Does internal complaints. The manager told De Masters that he might expect to hear more from Carilion on the matter. That he did. Within a few weeks of Doe and Carilion reaching a settlement, DeMasters was called to a meeting with several of Carilion's man- agers, including the vice president of HR, the EAP department director, and corporate counsel. When De Masters asked at the outset if he could have coun- sel present, he was told that if he persisted he would be considered insubordinate and would be terminated. The Carilion managers then proceeded to ask DeMasters about Doe's sexual harassment complaint and specifi- cally, whether DeMasters told Doe that what happened to him was sexual harassment. When DeMasters acknowl- edged sharing his view that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment, the managers asked DeMasters why he had not taken the pro-employer side and if he understood the magnitude of the liability the company could face if one of its supervisors had engaged in harassment. The managers also told DeMasters that he had not protected Carilion's interests and that he had left Carilion "in a compromised position." The EAP department direc- tor likewise accused DeMasters of "failling) to protect Carilion" and "placing the entire operation at risk." Two days after this meeting. Carilion fired DeMasters. Carilion's letter to De Masters, explaining the reasons for his termination, stated that De Masters had "failſed) to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of Carilion Clinic." Separately, the EAP department director sent DeMasters a letter stating that he was being fired because he: (1) "made statements that could reasonably have led Doe) to conclude that he should file suit against Carilion": (2) "failed to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best inter- ests of Carilion Clinic": [and] (3) "made multiple state- ments that were contrary to his employer's best interests and that required disciplinary action." *** By way of further explanation, DeMasters' direct supervisor in the EAP told him that Carilion was angry at having to settle Doe's discrimination lawsuit and was looking to throw somebody under the bus." *** Title VII's Opposition Clause, by its terms, pro- hibits retaliation against an employee who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. The Supreme Court has defined "oppose" in this context by looking to its ordinary meaning: "to resistor antagonize.. to contend against: to confront; resist; withstand, .. to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion. This broad definition led the Court to conclude that the threshold for oppositional conduct is not oner- Qus, Instead, "[w]hen an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in .a form of employment discrimination, that communica- tien virtually always constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity. This Circuit, as well as the other Courts of Appeals, also has articulated an expansive view of what constitutes oppositional conduct, recognizing that it encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as staging informal protests and voicing ones gRİn- ions in order to bring attention to an employer's discrimi- natory activities." "An employee is protected when she opposes 'not only . employment actions actually unlawful under Title Vil but also employment actions (she) reasonably believes to be unlawful," and the Title VII violation to which the oppositional communication is directed "may be complete, or it may be in progress." We conclude from this review of the statute and case. law that we must examine the course of a plaintiff's con- duct through a panoramic lens, viewing the individual scenes in their broader context and judging the picture as a whole.. [T]he touchstone is whether the plaintiff's course of conduct as a whole (1) "communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in... a form of employment discrimination, and (2) concerns subject matter that is actually unlawful under Title VII or that the employee reasonably believes to be unlaw- ful." Applying these criteria to the allegations here, we are satisfied that DeMasters has alleged that he engaged in protected oppositional activity. First, the complaint describes a course of conduct by DeMasters that clearly and effectively conveyed to Carilion over several weeks his belief that Carilion was violating Title VII by sub- jecting Doe to unlawful conduct. As alleged, DeMasters became Doe's leading advocate and adviser from the day Doe first told DeMasters about his manager's harassing behavior, and DeMasters persisted in his advocacy on Doe's behalf as Carilion investigated the complaint. DeMasters generated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and to galvanize Carilion's internal investiga- tion, arranged for Doe to sign a release so that he could speak directly with HR on Doe's behalf, and relayed Doe's harassment complaint to HR, leading to the ter mination of the harasser. Upon learning that Doe was facing increasing hostility from co-workers who sym- pathized with the harasser, DeMasters consulted with his EAP colleagues and formulated another plan to try to draw Carilion's attention to the hostile workplace and to improve the situation. He then reached out to the HR department, ensured that an HR representative aware of the hostility confronting Doc, and offered EAP's ser- vices to coach the HR department on how to respond more effectively. And when Doe reported that the hostile environment was only intensifying, DeMasters shared his opinion that Carilion was mishandling the matter not only with Doe but also with Carilion's HR manager. The District Court concluded these allegations did not reflect protected activity because DeMasters, by "not complaining himself of workplace discrimination or other unlawful employment practices" and "[m]erely ferrying Doe's allegations to Carilion's human relations department," did not engage in "purposive conduct." We need not decide today on the vitality of a purposive[ness)" requirement, however, because, with the term "purposive properly construed, DeMasters' conduct would easily qualify in any event. The District Court took "purposive to mean that the protections of the Opposition Clause are limited to an employee who directly communicates to her employer her (own] experiences with (discrimination] in the workplace, and that the complaining employee must not only "intend. to relay (a co-worker's com- plaints" to his employer, but also must "voice his own opposition to any unlawful employment practice." It was mistaken. *** Here, no one could mistake DeMasters' alleged activities for "silent opposition." On the contrary. he asserts that he actively and deliberately communicated to Carilion both Doe's complaints and DeMasters' own opinion that these complaints were not properly handled. offered to share ideas about how they could be better handled, and, . made "persistent efforts to help (Doel initiate [his discrimination complaint and urge Human Resources to act upon that complaint." Thus, even assum- ing a threshold requirement that conduct be "purposive" to be protected under the Opposition Clause, DeMasters allegations easily clear that hurdle. Having concluded that DeMasters' alleged course of conduct, viewed as a whole, "communicate[d] to [his] employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . a form of employment discrimination," we now address the second part of our test-the subject matter to which this conduct was directed. Here, too, the complaint is suf: ficient DeMasters plausibly alleged that he directed his communications to practices that were "actually unlaw- ful" or that, at a minimum, he reasonably believed to be unlawful." i.e., the sexual harassment to which Doe grigi- nallx, was subjected and the emerging retaliatory hostile work environment to which Doe was later subjected as a result of Carilion's alleged mishandling of the matter. We also have no difficulty concluding that DeMasters sufficiently pleaded the third and only remaining con tested element-a causal connection between that protected activity and the termination of DeMasters employment. Two days before firing him, Carilion's management objected to DeMasters' conduct, confront- ing him at a meeting about why he had not taken the "pro-employer side, asking if he understood the liability the company could face if its supervisor had engaged in harassment, and asserting that he had not pro- tected Carilion's interests and had left it in a çomere: mised position." In the very letter that purported to justify his termination, Carilion reiterated that DeMasters had acted contrary to his employer's best interests, had made statements that could reasonably have led John Doe to conclude that he should file suit against Cailion," and had "failed to protect Carilion EAP's gient company." Even at oral argument, Carilion seemed to acknowledge that it retaliated against DeMasters for his opposition activity, with counsel conceding that DeMasters was fired because he "rocked the boat." Thus, accepting DeMasters' factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as we must on a motion to dismiss, DeMastess has pleaded both protected activity and a causal connection between that activity and the termination of his employment. DeMasters' complaint thus states a gaim for retalia- tion under the Opposition Clause unless, as the District Court held, the manager rule" strips De Masters of that protection. To that subject, we now turn. The "manager rule has been applied in some Circuits in the context of retaliation claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to require that an employee step outside his or her role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. It purports to address a concern that, if counseling and communicating complaints are part of a manager's regular duties, then "nearly every activity in the normal course of a man- ager's job would potentially be protected activity, and "[a]n otherwise typical at will employment relationship could quickly degrade into a litigation minefield." *** DeMasters and the EEOC argue that, whatever place it may have in FLSA jurisprudence, the manager rule does not apply to Title VII. We agree. Nothing in the language of Title VII indicates that the statutory protection accorded an employee's oppositional conduct turns on the employee's job description or that Congress intended to excise a large category of workers from its anti-retaliation protections. While the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the FISA both generally secure their substantive protections by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees." we also "must take care to respect any differences in language and purpose between Title VII and the FLSA" before adopting a rule from one to the other. Here, those differences counsel against importing the "manager rule" into Title VIL. The FLSA's anti-retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an employee "because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." In contrast, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter" Thus, the conduct protected by the FLSA is far more constricted than the broad range of conduct protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provision Carilion's policy arguments do not change our view. While Carilion harkens to .. a "litigation mine- field" without the manager rule," we find it much more troubling that, under Carilion's approach, the categories of employees best able to assist employees with discrimination claims--the personnel that make up EAP, HR, and legal departments-would receive no protection from Title VII if they oppose discrimination targeted at the employees they are duty-bound to protect. In rejecting the manager rule" in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, we join the only other Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue in a precedential opinion. In that case), the Sixth Circuit held that the fact that the plaintiff, who was an affirmative action official. may have had a contractual duty to advocate for women and minorities did not defeat a retaliation claim. *** We agree.. that the manager rule" would run] counter to the broad approach used when considering a claim for retaliation under (the opposition) clause, as well the spirit and purpose behind Title VII as a broad remedial measure." We therefore hold today that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII enforcement. Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CASE QUESTIONS 1. What were the legal issues in this case? What did the appeals court decide? 2. Which actions were taken by DeMasters? Why did they constitute protected activity under Title VII? 3. What is the managerial rule"? What is the argument for having such a rule? Is that argument at all convincing? Why does the appeals court decline to apply the rule in this case? 4. This decision focuses on the first element of a retaliation claim-whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Would the other elements of a retaliation claim be satisfied? Why or why not? 5. What are some practical implications of this case for human resources managers? OPINION BY CIRCUIT JUDGE KRAUSE: In 2011, after five years of employment as an employee assistance program consultant in Carilion's behavioral health unit, Appellant J. Neil DeMasters allegedly was fired for acting contrary to his employer's best interests." failing to take the "pro-employer side," and leaving his employer "in a compromised position," as a result of his support of a fellow employee's sexual harassment com- plaint and his criticism of the way the employer had han dled the investigation. DeMasters brought suit against Carilion Clinic.. claiming that he was terminated for engaging in protected activity, including opposing an unlawful employment practice, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court dis- missed DeMasters' complaint, primarily on the grounds that no individual activity in which DeMasters engaged by itself constituted protected oppositional conduct and that the so-called "manager rule," in any event, pre- vented an employee whose job responsibilities included reporting discrimination claims from seeking protec. tion under Title VIl's anti-retaliation provision. As we now hold that the proper test for analyzing oppositional conduct requires consideration of the employee's course of conduct as a whole and that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII jurisprudence, we will reverse and remand for DeMasters to proceed with his suit. DeMasters began working in July 2006 as an employee assistance program ("EAP) consultant for Carilion, a large healthcare organization that owns and operates several hospitals. In October 2008, DeMasters was consulted by John Doe, a Carilion employee who had been referred to the EAP for help. At this meeting, Doe revealed that his department manager had been harassing him for the last several months and described how his manager had masturbatda in front of him twice on hospital grounds, asked Doe for oral sex, and asked Doe to display his genitals. Doe also offered that he had physical evidence of the harassment After hearing Doe out, DeMasters opined that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment in violation of Carilion's sexual harassment policy and formulated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and facilitate the investigation of Doe's complaint. To assist Doe with this reporting and investigation, DeMasters suggested that Doe sign a release form that authorized DeMasters to communicate with Carilion's human resources ("HR") department directly on Doe's behalf. That same day. DeMasters put this plan in motion by contacting the HR department, relaying the substance of Doe's complaint, and thereby initiating the investigation of Doe's alleged sexual harassment. Once Carilion began to investigate the matter and took a statement from Doe, it fired the harasser and told Doe that this individual would never be allowed back on hospital property. A few days later, however, DeMasters received a dis- tressed call from Doe, who had learned that the harasser had been permitted by Doe's department director to come back to the hospital to collect his belongings. DeMasters then scheduled another meeting with Doe for the following day. At that meeting. Doe explained that he felt uncomfortable with the department direc- tor and was facing increasing hostility from co-workers aligned with the harasser. DeMasters convened a meeting of his EAP colleagues, who agreed that DeMasters should contact Carilion's HR department to offer suggestions as to how it might better handle the situation.. DeMasters followed through on this plan by calling and leaving a message for an HR representa- tive, who called him back the next day. In that conversation, after confirming that the HR representative was aware that Doe was being subjected to harassing behavior from his co-workers, De Masters offered to coach Carilion's HR department about better ways to respond to Doe's concerns. The HR representa- tive declined and stated that he would speak with the department director. However, several days later, Doe reported to DeMasters that his co-workers' behavior was getting worse, that he was dissatisfied with manage ment's, reaction to his complaint, and that he feared his harasser would come looking for him with a gun. *** De Masters ... reached out to Carilion's HR manager again to say that he felt that Carilion was not handling the case properly. DeMasters does not allege any subsequent contact with Doe or activity on Doe's behalf and apparently was unaware of the legal remedies pursued by Doe over the next two years. In 2010, however, one of Carilion's man- agers called DeMasters and informed him that Doe had filed a Title VII complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and was Rursu- ing a civil suit for sexual harassment against Carilion. In that conversation, the manager pressed DeMasters on his involvement with Doe's harassment complaint. DeMasters acknowledged that Doe had been to the EAP but did not reveal any details of DeMasters' own involve- ment with Does internal complaints. The manager told De Masters that he might expect to hear more from Carilion on the matter. That he did. Within a few weeks of Doe and Carilion reaching a settlement, DeMasters was called to a meeting with several of Carilion's man- agers, including the vice president of HR, the EAP department director, and corporate counsel. When De Masters asked at the outset if he could have coun- sel present, he was told that if he persisted he would be considered insubordinate and would be terminated. The Carilion managers then proceeded to ask DeMasters about Doe's sexual harassment complaint and specifi- cally, whether DeMasters told Doe that what happened to him was sexual harassment. When DeMasters acknowl- edged sharing his view that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment, the managers asked DeMasters why he had not taken the pro-employer side and if he understood the magnitude of the liability the company could face if one of its supervisors had engaged in harassment. The managers also told DeMasters that he had not protected Carilion's interests and that he had left Carilion "in a compromised position." The EAP department direc- tor likewise accused DeMasters of "failling) to protect Carilion" and "placing the entire operation at risk." Two days after this meeting. Carilion fired DeMasters. Carilion's letter to De Masters, explaining the reasons for his termination, stated that De Masters had "failſed) to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of Carilion Clinic." Separately, the EAP department director sent DeMasters a letter stating that he was being fired because he: (1) "made statements that could reasonably have led Doe) to conclude that he should file suit against Carilion": (2) "failed to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best inter- ests of Carilion Clinic": [and] (3) "made multiple state- ments that were contrary to his employer's best interests and that required disciplinary action." *** By way of further explanation, DeMasters' direct supervisor in the EAP told him that Carilion was angry at having to settle Doe's discrimination lawsuit and was looking to throw somebody under the bus." *** Title VII's Opposition Clause, by its terms, pro- hibits retaliation against an employee who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. The Supreme Court has defined "oppose" in this context by looking to its ordinary meaning: "to resistor antagonize.. to contend against: to confront; resist; withstand, .. to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion. This broad definition led the Court to conclude that the threshold for oppositional conduct is not oner- Qus, Instead, "[w]hen an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in .a form of employment discrimination, that communica- tien virtually always constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity. This Circuit, as well as the other Courts of Appeals, also has articulated an expansive view of what constitutes oppositional conduct, recognizing that it encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as staging informal protests and voicing ones gRİn- ions in order to bring attention to an employer's discrimi- natory activities." "An employee is protected when she opposes 'not only . employment actions actually unlawful under Title Vil but also employment actions (she) reasonably believes to be unlawful," and the Title VII violation to which the oppositional communication is directed "may be complete, or it may be in progress." We conclude from this review of the statute and case. law that we must examine the course of a plaintiff's con- duct through a panoramic lens, viewing the individual scenes in their broader context and judging the picture as a whole.. [T]he touchstone is whether the plaintiff's course of conduct as a whole (1) "communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in... a form of employment discrimination, and (2) concerns subject matter that is actually unlawful under Title VII or that the employee reasonably believes to be unlaw- ful." Applying these criteria to the allegations here, we are satisfied that DeMasters has alleged that he engaged in protected oppositional activity. First, the complaint describes a course of conduct by DeMasters that clearly and effectively conveyed to Carilion over several weeks his belief that Carilion was violating Title VII by sub- jecting Doe to unlawful conduct. As alleged, DeMasters became Doe's leading advocate and adviser from the day Doe first told DeMasters about his manager's harassing behavior, and DeMasters persisted in his advocacy on Doe's behalf as Carilion investigated the complaint. DeMasters generated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and to galvanize Carilion's internal investiga- tion, arranged for Doe to sign a release so that he could speak directly with HR on Doe's behalf, and relayed Doe's harassment complaint to HR, leading to the ter mination of the harasser. Upon learning that Doe was facing increasing hostility from co-workers who sym- pathized with the harasser, DeMasters consulted with his EAP colleagues and formulated another plan to try to draw Carilion's attention to the hostile workplace and to improve the situation. He then reached out to the HR department, ensured that an HR representative aware of the hostility confronting Doc, and offered EAP's ser- vices to coach the HR department on how to respond more effectively. And when Doe reported that the hostile environment was only intensifying, DeMasters shared his opinion that Carilion was mishandling the matter not only with Doe but also with Carilion's HR manager. The District Court concluded these allegations did not reflect protected activity because DeMasters, by "not complaining himself of workplace discrimination or other unlawful employment practices" and "[m]erely ferrying Doe's allegations to Carilion's human relations department," did not engage in "purposive conduct." We need not decide today on the vitality of a purposive[ness)" requirement, however, because, with the term "purposive properly construed, DeMasters' conduct would easily qualify in any event. The District Court took "purposive to mean that the protections of the Opposition Clause are limited to an employee who directly communicates to her employer her (own] experiences with (discrimination] in the workplace, and that the complaining employee must not only "intend. to relay (a co-worker's com- plaints" to his employer, but also must "voice his own opposition to any unlawful employment practice." It was mistaken. *** Here, no one could mistake DeMasters' alleged activities for "silent opposition." On the contrary. he asserts that he actively and deliberately communicated to Carilion both Doe's complaints and DeMasters' own opinion that these complaints were not properly handled. offered to share ideas about how they could be better handled, and, . made "persistent efforts to help (Doel initiate [his discrimination complaint and urge Human Resources to act upon that complaint." Thus, even assum- ing a threshold requirement that conduct be "purposive" to be protected under the Opposition Clause, DeMasters allegations easily clear that hurdle. Having concluded that DeMasters' alleged course of conduct, viewed as a whole, "communicate[d] to [his] employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . a form of employment discrimination," we now address the second part of our test-the subject matter to which this conduct was directed. Here, too, the complaint is suf: ficient DeMasters plausibly alleged that he directed his communications to practices that were "actually unlaw- ful" or that, at a minimum, he reasonably believed to be unlawful." i.e., the sexual harassment to which Doe grigi- nallx, was subjected and the emerging retaliatory hostile work environment to which Doe was later subjected as a result of Carilion's alleged mishandling of the matter. We also have no difficulty concluding that DeMasters sufficiently pleaded the third and only remaining con tested element-a causal connection between that protected activity and the termination of DeMasters employment. Two days before firing him, Carilion's management objected to DeMasters' conduct, confront- ing him at a meeting about why he had not taken the "pro-employer side, asking if he understood the liability the company could face if its supervisor had engaged in harassment, and asserting that he had not pro- tected Carilion's interests and had left it in a çomere: mised position." In the very letter that purported to justify his termination, Carilion reiterated that DeMasters had acted contrary to his employer's best interests, had made statements that could reasonably have led John Doe to conclude that he should file suit against Cailion," and had "failed to protect Carilion EAP's gient company." Even at oral argument, Carilion seemed to acknowledge that it retaliated against DeMasters for his opposition activity, with counsel conceding that DeMasters was fired because he "rocked the boat." Thus, accepting DeMasters' factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as we must on a motion to dismiss, DeMastess has pleaded both protected activity and a causal connection between that activity and the termination of his employment. DeMasters' complaint thus states a gaim for retalia- tion under the Opposition Clause unless, as the District Court held, the manager rule" strips De Masters of that protection. To that subject, we now turn. The "manager rule has been applied in some Circuits in the context of retaliation claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to require that an employee step outside his or her role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. It purports to address a concern that, if counseling and communicating complaints are part of a manager's regular duties, then "nearly every activity in the normal course of a man- ager's job would potentially be protected activity, and "[a]n otherwise typical at will employment relationship could quickly degrade into a litigation minefield." *** DeMasters and the EEOC argue that, whatever place it may have in FLSA jurisprudence, the manager rule does not apply to Title VII. We agree. Nothing in the language of Title VII indicates that the statutory protection accorded an employee's oppositional conduct turns on the employee's job description or that Congress intended to excise a large category of workers from its anti-retaliation protections. While the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the FISA both generally secure their substantive protections by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees." we also "must take care to respect any differences in language and purpose between Title VII and the FLSA" before adopting a rule from one to the other. Here, those differences counsel against importing the "manager rule" into Title VIL. The FLSA's anti-retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an employee "because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." In contrast, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter" Thus, the conduct protected by the FLSA is far more constricted than the broad range of conduct protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provision Carilion's policy arguments do not change our view. While Carilion harkens to .. a "litigation mine- field" without the manager rule," we find it much more troubling that, under Carilion's approach, the categories of employees best able to assist employees with discrimination claims--the personnel that make up EAP, HR, and legal departments-would receive no protection from Title VII if they oppose discrimination targeted at the employees they are duty-bound to protect. In rejecting the manager rule" in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, we join the only other Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue in a precedential opinion. In that case), the Sixth Circuit held that the fact that the plaintiff, who was an affirmative action official. may have had a contractual duty to advocate for women and minorities did not defeat a retaliation claim. *** We agree.. that the manager rule" would run] counter to the broad approach used when considering a claim for retaliation under (the opposition) clause, as well the spirit and purpose behind Title VII as a broad remedial measure." We therefore hold today that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII enforcement. Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CASE QUESTIONS 1. What were the legal issues in this case? What did the appeals court decide? 2. Which actions were taken by DeMasters? Why did they constitute protected activity under Title VII? 3. What is the managerial rule"? What is the argument for having such a rule? Is that argument at all convincing? Why does the appeals court decline to apply the rule in this case? 4. This decision focuses on the first element of a retaliation claim-whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Would the other elements of a retaliation claim be satisfied? Why or why not? 5. What are some practical implications of this case for human resources managers? OPINION BY CIRCUIT JUDGE KRAUSE: In 2011, after five years of employment as an employee assistance program consultant in Carilion's behavioral health unit, Appellant J. Neil DeMasters allegedly was fired for acting contrary to his employer's best interests." failing to take the "pro-employer side," and leaving his employer "in a compromised position," as a result of his support of a fellow employee's sexual harassment com- plaint and his criticism of the way the employer had han dled the investigation. DeMasters brought suit against Carilion Clinic.. claiming that he was terminated for engaging in protected activity, including opposing an unlawful employment practice, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court dis- missed DeMasters' complaint, primarily on the grounds that no individual activity in which DeMasters engaged by itself constituted protected oppositional conduct and that the so-called "manager rule," in any event, pre- vented an employee whose job responsibilities included reporting discrimination claims from seeking protec. tion under Title VIl's anti-retaliation provision. As we now hold that the proper test for analyzing oppositional conduct requires consideration of the employee's course of conduct as a whole and that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII jurisprudence, we will reverse and remand for DeMasters to proceed with his suit. DeMasters began working in July 2006 as an employee assistance program ("EAP) consultant for Carilion, a large healthcare organization that owns and operates several hospitals. In October 2008, DeMasters was consulted by John Doe, a Carilion employee who had been referred to the EAP for help. At this meeting, Doe revealed that his department manager had been harassing him for the last several months and described how his manager had masturbatda in front of him twice on hospital grounds, asked Doe for oral sex, and asked Doe to display his genitals. Doe also offered that he had physical evidence of the harassment After hearing Doe out, DeMasters opined that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment in violation of Carilion's sexual harassment policy and formulated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and facilitate the investigation of Doe's complaint. To assist Doe with this reporting and investigation, DeMasters suggested that Doe sign a release form that authorized DeMasters to communicate with Carilion's human resources ("HR") department directly on Doe's behalf. That same day. DeMasters put this plan in motion by contacting the HR department, relaying the substance of Doe's complaint, and thereby initiating the investigation of Doe's alleged sexual harassment. Once Carilion began to investigate the matter and took a statement from Doe, it fired the harasser and told Doe that this individual would never be allowed back on hospital property. A few days later, however, DeMasters received a dis- tressed call from Doe, who had learned that the harasser had been permitted by Doe's department director to come back to the hospital to collect his belongings. DeMasters then scheduled another meeting with Doe for the following day. At that meeting. Doe explained that he felt uncomfortable with the department direc- tor and was facing increasing hostility from co-workers aligned with the harasser. DeMasters convened a meeting of his EAP colleagues, who agreed that DeMasters should contact Carilion's HR department to offer suggestions as to how it might better handle the situation.. DeMasters followed through on this plan by calling and leaving a message for an HR representa- tive, who called him back the next day. In that conversation, after confirming that the HR representative was aware that Doe was being subjected to harassing behavior from his co-workers, De Masters offered to coach Carilion's HR department about better ways to respond to Doe's concerns. The HR representa- tive declined and stated that he would speak with the department director. However, several days later, Doe reported to DeMasters that his co-workers' behavior was getting worse, that he was dissatisfied with manage ment's, reaction to his complaint, and that he feared his harasser would come looking for him with a gun. *** De Masters ... reached out to Carilion's HR manager again to say that he felt that Carilion was not handling the case properly. DeMasters does not allege any subsequent contact with Doe or activity on Doe's behalf and apparently was unaware of the legal remedies pursued by Doe over the next two years. In 2010, however, one of Carilion's man- agers called DeMasters and informed him that Doe had filed a Title VII complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and was Rursu- ing a civil suit for sexual harassment against Carilion. In that conversation, the manager pressed DeMasters on his involvement with Doe's harassment complaint. DeMasters acknowledged that Doe had been to the EAP but did not reveal any details of DeMasters' own involve- ment with Does internal complaints. The manager told De Masters that he might expect to hear more from Carilion on the matter. That he did. Within a few weeks of Doe and Carilion reaching a settlement, DeMasters was called to a meeting with several of Carilion's man- agers, including the vice president of HR, the EAP department director, and corporate counsel. When De Masters asked at the outset if he could have coun- sel present, he was told that if he persisted he would be considered insubordinate and would be terminated. The Carilion managers then proceeded to ask DeMasters about Doe's sexual harassment complaint and specifi- cally, whether DeMasters told Doe that what happened to him was sexual harassment. When DeMasters acknowl- edged sharing his view that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment, the managers asked DeMasters why he had not taken the pro-employer side and if he understood the magnitude of the liability the company could face if one of its supervisors had engaged in harassment. The managers also told DeMasters that he had not protected Carilion's interests and that he had left Carilion "in a compromised position." The EAP department direc- tor likewise accused DeMasters of "failling) to protect Carilion" and "placing the entire operation at risk." Two days after this meeting. Carilion fired DeMasters. Carilion's letter to De Masters, explaining the reasons for his termination, stated that De Masters had "failſed) to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of Carilion Clinic." Separately, the EAP department director sent DeMasters a letter stating that he was being fired because he: (1) "made statements that could reasonably have led Doe) to conclude that he should file suit against Carilion": (2) "failed to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best inter- ests of Carilion Clinic": [and] (3) "made multiple state- ments that were contrary to his employer's best interests and that required disciplinary action." *** By way of further explanation, DeMasters' direct supervisor in the EAP told him that Carilion was angry at having to settle Doe's discrimination lawsuit and was looking to throw somebody under the bus." *** Title VII's Opposition Clause, by its terms, pro- hibits retaliation against an employee who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. The Supreme Court has defined "oppose" in this context by looking to its ordinary meaning: "to resistor antagonize.. to contend against: to confront; resist; withstand, .. to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion. This broad definition led the Court to conclude that the threshold for oppositional conduct is not oner- Qus, Instead, "[w]hen an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in .a form of employment discrimination, that communica- tien virtually always constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity. This Circuit, as well as the other Courts of Appeals, also has articulated an expansive view of what constitutes oppositional conduct, recognizing that it encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as staging informal protests and voicing ones gRİn- ions in order to bring attention to an employer's discrimi- natory activities." "An employee is protected when she opposes 'not only . employment actions actually unlawful under Title Vil but also employment actions (she) reasonably believes to be unlawful," and the Title VII violation to which the oppositional communication is directed "may be complete, or it may be in progress." We conclude from this review of the statute and case. law that we must examine the course of a plaintiff's con- duct through a panoramic lens, viewing the individual scenes in their broader context and judging the picture as a whole.. [T]he touchstone is whether the plaintiff's course of conduct as a whole (1) "communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in... a form of employment discrimination, and (2) concerns subject matter that is actually unlawful under Title VII or that the employee reasonably believes to be unlaw- ful." Applying these criteria to the allegations here, we are satisfied that DeMasters has alleged that he engaged in protected oppositional activity. First, the complaint describes a course of conduct by DeMasters that clearly and effectively conveyed to Carilion over several weeks his belief that Carilion was violating Title VII by sub- jecting Doe to unlawful conduct. As alleged, DeMasters became Doe's leading advocate and adviser from the day Doe first told DeMasters about his manager's harassing behavior, and DeMasters persisted in his advocacy on Doe's behalf as Carilion investigated the complaint. DeMasters generated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and to galvanize Carilion's internal investiga- tion, arranged for Doe to sign a release so that he could speak directly with HR on Doe's behalf, and relayed Doe's harassment complaint to HR, leading to the ter mination of the harasser. Upon learning that Doe was facing increasing hostility from co-workers who sym- pathized with the harasser, DeMasters consulted with his EAP colleagues and formulated another plan to try to draw Carilion's attention to the hostile workplace and to improve the situation. He then reached out to the HR department, ensured that an HR representative aware of the hostility confronting Doc, and offered EAP's ser- vices to coach the HR department on how to respond more effectively. And when Doe reported that the hostile environment was only intensifying, DeMasters shared his opinion that Carilion was mishandling the matter not only with Doe but also with Carilion's HR manager. The District Court concluded these allegations did not reflect protected activity because DeMasters, by "not complaining himself of workplace discrimination or other unlawful employment practices" and "[m]erely ferrying Doe's allegations to Carilion's human relations department," did not engage in "purposive conduct." We need not decide today on the vitality of a purposive[ness)" requirement, however, because, with the term "purposive properly construed, DeMasters' conduct would easily qualify in any event. The District Court took "purposive to mean that the protections of the Opposition Clause are limited to an employee who directly communicates to her employer her (own] experiences with (discrimination] in the workplace, and that the complaining employee must not only "intend. to relay (a co-worker's com- plaints" to his employer, but also must "voice his own opposition to any unlawful employment practice." It was mistaken. *** Here, no one could mistake DeMasters' alleged activities for "silent opposition." On the contrary. he asserts that he actively and deliberately communicated to Carilion both Doe's complaints and DeMasters' own opinion that these complaints were not properly handled. offered to share ideas about how they could be better handled, and, . made "persistent efforts to help (Doel initiate [his discrimination complaint and urge Human Resources to act upon that complaint." Thus, even assum- ing a threshold requirement that conduct be "purposive" to be protected under the Opposition Clause, DeMasters allegations easily clear that hurdle. Having concluded that DeMasters' alleged course of conduct, viewed as a whole, "communicate[d] to [his] employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . a form of employment discrimination," we now address the second part of our test-the subject matter to which this conduct was directed. Here, too, the complaint is suf: ficient DeMasters plausibly alleged that he directed his communications to practices that were "actually unlaw- ful" or that, at a minimum, he reasonably believed to be unlawful." i.e., the sexual harassment to which Doe grigi- nallx, was subjected and the emerging retaliatory hostile work environment to which Doe was later subjected as a result of Carilion's alleged mishandling of the matter. We also have no difficulty concluding that DeMasters sufficiently pleaded the third and only remaining con tested element-a causal connection between that protected activity and the termination of DeMasters employment. Two days before firing him, Carilion's management objected to DeMasters' conduct, confront- ing him at a meeting about why he had not taken the "pro-employer side, asking if he understood the liability the company could face if its supervisor had engaged in harassment, and asserting that he had not pro- tected Carilion's interests and had left it in a çomere: mised position." In the very letter that purported to justify his termination, Carilion reiterated that DeMasters had acted contrary to his employer's best interests, had made statements that could reasonably have led John Doe to conclude that he should file suit against Cailion," and had "failed to protect Carilion EAP's gient company." Even at oral argument, Carilion seemed to acknowledge that it retaliated against DeMasters for his opposition activity, with counsel conceding that DeMasters was fired because he "rocked the boat." Thus, accepting DeMasters' factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as we must on a motion to dismiss, DeMastess has pleaded both protected activity and a causal connection between that activity and the termination of his employment. DeMasters' complaint thus states a gaim for retalia- tion under the Opposition Clause unless, as the District Court held, the manager rule" strips De Masters of that protection. To that subject, we now turn. The "manager rule has been applied in some Circuits in the context of retaliation claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to require that an employee step outside his or her role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. It purports to address a concern that, if counseling and communicating complaints are part of a manager's regular duties, then "nearly every activity in the normal course of a man- ager's job would potentially be protected activity, and "[a]n otherwise typical at will employment relationship could quickly degrade into a litigation minefield." *** DeMasters and the EEOC argue that, whatever place it may have in FLSA jurisprudence, the manager rule does not apply to Title VII. We agree. Nothing in the language of Title VII indicates that the statutory protection accorded an employee's oppositional conduct turns on the employee's job description or that Congress intended to excise a large category of workers from its anti-retaliation protections. While the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the FISA both generally secure their substantive protections by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees." we also "must take care to respect any differences in language and purpose between Title VII and the FLSA" before adopting a rule from one to the other. Here, those differences counsel against importing the "manager rule" into Title VIL. The FLSA's anti-retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an employee "because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." In contrast, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter" Thus, the conduct protected by the FLSA is far more constricted than the broad range of conduct protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provision Carilion's policy arguments do not change our view. While Carilion harkens to .. a "litigation mine- field" without the manager rule," we find it much more troubling that, under Carilion's approach, the categories of employees best able to assist employees with discrimination claims--the personnel that make up EAP, HR, and legal departments-would receive no protection from Title VII if they oppose discrimination targeted at the employees they are duty-bound to protect. In rejecting the manager rule" in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, we join the only other Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue in a precedential opinion. In that case), the Sixth Circuit held that the fact that the plaintiff, who was an affirmative action official. may have had a contractual duty to advocate for women and minorities did not defeat a retaliation claim. *** We agree.. that the manager rule" would run] counter to the broad approach used when considering a claim for retaliation under (the opposition) clause, as well the spirit and purpose behind Title VII as a broad remedial measure." We therefore hold today that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII enforcement. Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CASE QUESTIONS 1. What were the legal issues in this case? What did the appeals court decide? 2. Which actions were taken by DeMasters? Why did they constitute protected activity under Title VII? 3. What is the managerial rule"? What is the argument for having such a rule? Is that argument at all convincing? Why does the appeals court decline to apply the rule in this case? 4. This decision focuses on the first element of a retaliation claim-whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Would the other elements of a retaliation claim be satisfied? Why or why not? 5. What are some practical implications of this case for human resources managers? OPINION BY CIRCUIT JUDGE KRAUSE: In 2011, after five years of employment as an employee assistance program consultant in Carilion's behavioral health unit, Appellant J. Neil DeMasters allegedly was fired for acting contrary to his employer's best interests." failing to take the "pro-employer side," and leaving his employer "in a compromised position," as a result of his support of a fellow employee's sexual harassment com- plaint and his criticism of the way the employer had han dled the investigation. DeMasters brought suit against Carilion Clinic.. claiming that he was terminated for engaging in protected activity, including opposing an unlawful employment practice, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court dis- missed DeMasters' complaint, primarily on the grounds that no individual activity in which DeMasters engaged by itself constituted protected oppositional conduct and that the so-called "manager rule," in any event, pre- vented an employee whose job responsibilities included reporting discrimination claims from seeking protec. tion under Title VIl's anti-retaliation provision. As we now hold that the proper test for analyzing oppositional conduct requires consideration of the employee's course of conduct as a whole and that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII jurisprudence, we will reverse and remand for DeMasters to proceed with his suit. DeMasters began working in July 2006 as an employee assistance program ("EAP) consultant for Carilion, a large healthcare organization that owns and operates several hospitals. In October 2008, DeMasters was consulted by John Doe, a Carilion employee who had been referred to the EAP for help. At this meeting, Doe revealed that his department manager had been harassing him for the last several months and described how his manager had masturbatda in front of him twice on hospital grounds, asked Doe for oral sex, and asked Doe to display his genitals. Doe also offered that he had physical evidence of the harassment After hearing Doe out, DeMasters opined that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment in violation of Carilion's sexual harassment policy and formulated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and facilitate the investigation of Doe's complaint. To assist Doe with this reporting and investigation, DeMasters suggested that Doe sign a release form that authorized DeMasters to communicate with Carilion's human resources ("HR") department directly on Doe's behalf. That same day. DeMasters put this plan in motion by contacting the HR department, relaying the substance of Doe's complaint, and thereby initiating the investigation of Doe's alleged sexual harassment. Once Carilion began to investigate the matter and took a statement from Doe, it fired the harasser and told Doe that this individual would never be allowed back on hospital property. A few days later, however, DeMasters received a dis- tressed call from Doe, who had learned that the harasser had been permitted by Doe's department director to come back to the hospital to collect his belongings. DeMasters then scheduled another meeting with Doe for the following day. At that meeting. Doe explained that he felt uncomfortable with the department direc- tor and was facing increasing hostility from co-workers aligned with the harasser. DeMasters convened a meeting of his EAP colleagues, who agreed that DeMasters should contact Carilion's HR department to offer suggestions as to how it might better handle the situation.. DeMasters followed through on this plan by calling and leaving a message for an HR representa- tive, who called him back the next day. In that conversation, after confirming that the HR representative was aware that Doe was being subjected to harassing behavior from his co-workers, De Masters offered to coach Carilion's HR department about better ways to respond to Doe's concerns. The HR representa- tive declined and stated that he would speak with the department director. However, several days later, Doe reported to DeMasters that his co-workers' behavior was getting worse, that he was dissatisfied with manage ment's, reaction to his complaint, and that he feared his harasser would come looking for him with a gun. *** De Masters ... reached out to Carilion's HR manager again to say that he felt that Carilion was not handling the case properly. DeMasters does not allege any subsequent contact with Doe or activity on Doe's behalf and apparently was unaware of the legal remedies pursued by Doe over the next two years. In 2010, however, one of Carilion's man- agers called DeMasters and informed him that Doe had filed a Title VII complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and was Rursu- ing a civil suit for sexual harassment against Carilion. In that conversation, the manager pressed DeMasters on his involvement with Doe's harassment complaint. DeMasters acknowledged that Doe had been to the EAP but did not reveal any details of DeMasters' own involve- ment with Does internal complaints. The manager told De Masters that he might expect to hear more from Carilion on the matter. That he did. Within a few weeks of Doe and Carilion reaching a settlement, DeMasters was called to a meeting with several of Carilion's man- agers, including the vice president of HR, the EAP department director, and corporate counsel. When De Masters asked at the outset if he could have coun- sel present, he was told that if he persisted he would be considered insubordinate and would be terminated. The Carilion managers then proceeded to ask DeMasters about Doe's sexual harassment complaint and specifi- cally, whether DeMasters told Doe that what happened to him was sexual harassment. When DeMasters acknowl- edged sharing his view that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment, the managers asked DeMasters why he had not taken the pro-employer side and if he understood the magnitude of the liability the company could face if one of its supervisors had engaged in harassment. The managers also told DeMasters that he had not protected Carilion's interests and that he had left Carilion "in a compromised position." The EAP department direc- tor likewise accused DeMasters of "failling) to protect Carilion" and "placing the entire operation at risk." Two days after this meeting. Carilion fired DeMasters. Carilion's letter to De Masters, explaining the reasons for his termination, stated that De Masters had "failſed) to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of Carilion Clinic." Separately, the EAP department director sent DeMasters a letter stating that he was being fired because he: (1) "made statements that could reasonably have led Doe) to conclude that he should file suit against Carilion": (2) "failed to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best inter- ests of Carilion Clinic": [and] (3) "made multiple state- ments that were contrary to his employer's best interests and that required disciplinary action." *** By way of further explanation, DeMasters' direct supervisor in the EAP told him that Carilion was angry at having to settle Doe's discrimination lawsuit and was looking to throw somebody under the bus." *** Title VII's Opposition Clause, by its terms, pro- hibits retaliation against an employee who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. The Supreme Court has defined "oppose" in this context by looking to its ordinary meaning: "to resistor antagonize.. to contend against: to confront; resist; withstand, .. to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion. This broad definition led the Court to conclude that the threshold for oppositional conduct is not oner- Qus, Instead, "[w]hen an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in .a form of employment discrimination, that communica- tien virtually always constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity. This Circuit, as well as the other Courts of Appeals, also has articulated an expansive view of what constitutes oppositional conduct, recognizing that it encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as staging informal protests and voicing ones gRİn- ions in order to bring attention to an employer's discrimi- natory activities." "An employee is protected when she opposes 'not only . employment actions actually unlawful under Title Vil but also employment actions (she) reasonably believes to be unlawful," and the Title VII violation to which the oppositional communication is directed "may be complete, or it may be in progress." We conclude from this review of the statute and case. law that we must examine the course of a plaintiff's con- duct through a panoramic lens, viewing the individual scenes in their broader context and judging the picture as a whole.. [T]he touchstone is whether the plaintiff's course of conduct as a whole (1) "communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in... a form of employment discrimination, and (2) concerns subject matter that is actually unlawful under Title VII or that the employee reasonably believes to be unlaw- ful." Applying these criteria to the allegations here, we are satisfied that DeMasters has alleged that he engaged in protected oppositional activity. First, the complaint describes a course of conduct by DeMasters that clearly and effectively conveyed to Carilion over several weeks his belief that Carilion was violating Title VII by sub- jecting Doe to unlawful conduct. As alleged, DeMasters became Doe's leading advocate and adviser from the day Doe first told DeMasters about his manager's harassing behavior, and DeMasters persisted in his advocacy on Doe's behalf as Carilion investigated the complaint. DeMasters generated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and to galvanize Carilion's internal investiga- tion, arranged for Doe to sign a release so that he could speak directly with HR on Doe's behalf, and relayed Doe's harassment complaint to HR, leading to the ter mination of the harasser. Upon learning that Doe was facing increasing hostility from co-workers who sym- pathized with the harasser, DeMasters consulted with his EAP colleagues and formulated another plan to try to draw Carilion's attention to the hostile workplace and to improve the situation. He then reached out to the HR department, ensured that an HR representative aware of the hostility confronting Doc, and offered EAP's ser- vices to coach the HR department on how to respond more effectively. And when Doe reported that the hostile environment was only intensifying, DeMasters shared his opinion that Carilion was mishandling the matter not only with Doe but also with Carilion's HR manager. The District Court concluded these allegations did not reflect protected activity because DeMasters, by "not complaining himself of workplace discrimination or other unlawful employment practices" and "[m]erely ferrying Doe's allegations to Carilion's human relations department," did not engage in "purposive conduct." We need not decide today on the vitality of a purposive[ness)" requirement, however, because, with the term "purposive properly construed, DeMasters' conduct would easily qualify in any event. The District Court took "purposive to mean that the protections of the Opposition Clause are limited to an employee who directly communicates to her employer her (own] experiences with (discrimination] in the workplace, and that the complaining employee must not only "intend. to relay (a co-worker's com- plaints" to his employer, but also must "voice his own opposition to any unlawful employment practice." It was mistaken. *** Here, no one could mistake DeMasters' alleged activities for "silent opposition." On the contrary. he asserts that he actively and deliberately communicated to Carilion both Doe's complaints and DeMasters' own opinion that these complaints were not properly handled. offered to share ideas about how they could be better handled, and, . made "persistent efforts to help (Doel initiate [his discrimination complaint and urge Human Resources to act upon that complaint." Thus, even assum- ing a threshold requirement that conduct be "purposive" to be protected under the Opposition Clause, DeMasters allegations easily clear that hurdle. Having concluded that DeMasters' alleged course of conduct, viewed as a whole, "communicate[d] to [his] employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . a form of employment discrimination," we now address the second part of our test-the subject matter to which this conduct was directed. Here, too, the complaint is suf: ficient DeMasters plausibly alleged that he directed his communications to practices that were "actually unlaw- ful" or that, at a minimum, he reasonably believed to be unlawful." i.e., the sexual harassment to which Doe grigi- nallx, was subjected and the emerging retaliatory hostile work environment to which Doe was later subjected as a result of Carilion's alleged mishandling of the matter. We also have no difficulty concluding that DeMasters sufficiently pleaded the third and only remaining con tested element-a causal connection between that protected activity and the termination of DeMasters employment. Two days before firing him, Carilion's management objected to DeMasters' conduct, confront- ing him at a meeting about why he had not taken the "pro-employer side, asking if he understood the liability the company could face if its supervisor had engaged in harassment, and asserting that he had not pro- tected Carilion's interests and had left it in a çomere: mised position." In the very letter that purported to justify his termination, Carilion reiterated that DeMasters had acted contrary to his employer's best interests, had made statements that could reasonably have led John Doe to conclude that he should file suit against Cailion," and had "failed to protect Carilion EAP's gient company." Even at oral argument, Carilion seemed to acknowledge that it retaliated against DeMasters for his opposition activity, with counsel conceding that DeMasters was fired because he "rocked the boat." Thus, accepting DeMasters' factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as we must on a motion to dismiss, DeMastess has pleaded both protected activity and a causal connection between that activity and the termination of his employment. DeMasters' complaint thus states a gaim for retalia- tion under the Opposition Clause unless, as the District Court held, the manager rule" strips De Masters of that protection. To that subject, we now turn. The "manager rule has been applied in some Circuits in the context of retaliation claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to require that an employee step outside his or her role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. It purports to address a concern that, if counseling and communicating complaints are part of a manager's regular duties, then "nearly every activity in the normal course of a man- ager's job would potentially be protected activity, and "[a]n otherwise typical at will employment relationship could quickly degrade into a litigation minefield." *** DeMasters and the EEOC argue that, whatever place it may have in FLSA jurisprudence, the manager rule does not apply to Title VII. We agree. Nothing in the language of Title VII indicates that the statutory protection accorded an employee's oppositional conduct turns on the employee's job description or that Congress intended to excise a large category of workers from its anti-retaliation protections. While the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the FISA both generally secure their substantive protections by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees." we also "must take care to respect any differences in language and purpose between Title VII and the FLSA" before adopting a rule from one to the other. Here, those differences counsel against importing the "manager rule" into Title VIL. The FLSA's anti-retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an employee "because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." In contrast, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter" Thus, the conduct protected by the FLSA is far more constricted than the broad range of conduct protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provision Carilion's policy arguments do not change our view. While Carilion harkens to .. a "litigation mine- field" without the manager rule," we find it much more troubling that, under Carilion's approach, the categories of employees best able to assist employees with discrimination claims--the personnel that make up EAP, HR, and legal departments-would receive no protection from Title VII if they oppose discrimination targeted at the employees they are duty-bound to protect. In rejecting the manager rule" in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, we join the only other Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue in a precedential opinion. In that case), the Sixth Circuit held that the fact that the plaintiff, who was an affirmative action official. may have had a contractual duty to advocate for women and minorities did not defeat a retaliation claim. *** We agree.. that the manager rule" would run] counter to the broad approach used when considering a claim for retaliation under (the opposition) clause, as well the spirit and purpose behind Title VII as a broad remedial measure." We therefore hold today that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII enforcement. Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CASE QUESTIONS 1. What were the legal issues in this case? What did the appeals court decide? 2. Which actions were taken by DeMasters? Why did they constitute protected activity under Title VII? 3. What is the managerial rule"? What is the argument for having such a rule? Is that argument at all convincing? Why does the appeals court decline to apply the rule in this case? 4. This decision focuses on the first element of a retaliation claim-whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Would the other elements of a retaliation claim be satisfied? Why or why not? 5. What are some practical implications of this case for human resources managers? OPINION BY CIRCUIT JUDGE KRAUSE: In 2011, after five years of employment as an employee assistance program consultant in Carilion's behavioral health unit, Appellant J. Neil DeMasters allegedly was fired for acting contrary to his employer's best interests." failing to take the "pro-employer side," and leaving his employer "in a compromised position," as a result of his support of a fellow employee's sexual harassment com- plaint and his criticism of the way the employer had han dled the investigation. DeMasters brought suit against Carilion Clinic.. claiming that he was terminated for engaging in protected activity, including opposing an unlawful employment practice, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court dis- missed DeMasters' complaint, primarily on the grounds that no individual activity in which DeMasters engaged by itself constituted protected oppositional conduct and that the so-called "manager rule," in any event, pre- vented an employee whose job responsibilities included reporting discrimination claims from seeking protec. tion under Title VIl's anti-retaliation provision. As we now hold that the proper test for analyzing oppositional conduct requires consideration of the employee's course of conduct as a whole and that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII jurisprudence, we will reverse and remand for DeMasters to proceed with his suit. DeMasters began working in July 2006 as an employee assistance program ("EAP) consultant for Carilion, a large healthcare organization that owns and operates several hospitals. In October 2008, DeMasters was consulted by John Doe, a Carilion employee who had been referred to the EAP for help. At this meeting, Doe revealed that his department manager had been harassing him for the last several months and described how his manager had masturbatda in front of him twice on hospital grounds, asked Doe for oral sex, and asked Doe to display his genitals. Doe also offered that he had physical evidence of the harassment After hearing Doe out, DeMasters opined that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment in violation of Carilion's sexual harassment policy and formulated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and facilitate the investigation of Doe's complaint. To assist Doe with this reporting and investigation, DeMasters suggested that Doe sign a release form that authorized DeMasters to communicate with Carilion's human resources ("HR") department directly on Doe's behalf. That same day. DeMasters put this plan in motion by contacting the HR department, relaying the substance of Doe's complaint, and thereby initiating the investigation of Doe's alleged sexual harassment. Once Carilion began to investigate the matter and took a statement from Doe, it fired the harasser and told Doe that this individual would never be allowed back on hospital property. A few days later, however, DeMasters received a dis- tressed call from Doe, who had learned that the harasser had been permitted by Doe's department director to come back to the hospital to collect his belongings. DeMasters then scheduled another meeting with Doe for the following day. At that meeting. Doe explained that he felt uncomfortable with the department direc- tor and was facing increasing hostility from co-workers aligned with the harasser. DeMasters convened a meeting of his EAP colleagues, who agreed that DeMasters should contact Carilion's HR department to offer suggestions as to how it might better handle the situation.. DeMasters followed through on this plan by calling and leaving a message for an HR representa- tive, who called him back the next day. In that conversation, after confirming that the HR representative was aware that Doe was being subjected to harassing behavior from his co-workers, De Masters offered to coach Carilion's HR department about better ways to respond to Doe's concerns. The HR representa- tive declined and stated that he would speak with the department director. However, several days later, Doe reported to DeMasters that his co-workers' behavior was getting worse, that he was dissatisfied with manage ment's, reaction to his complaint, and that he feared his harasser would come looking for him with a gun. *** De Masters ... reached out to Carilion's HR manager again to say that he felt that Carilion was not handling the case properly. DeMasters does not allege any subsequent contact with Doe or activity on Doe's behalf and apparently was unaware of the legal remedies pursued by Doe over the next two years. In 2010, however, one of Carilion's man- agers called DeMasters and informed him that Doe had filed a Title VII complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and was Rursu- ing a civil suit for sexual harassment against Carilion. In that conversation, the manager pressed DeMasters on his involvement with Doe's harassment complaint. DeMasters acknowledged that Doe had been to the EAP but did not reveal any details of DeMasters' own involve- ment with Does internal complaints. The manager told De Masters that he might expect to hear more from Carilion on the matter. That he did. Within a few weeks of Doe and Carilion reaching a settlement, DeMasters was called to a meeting with several of Carilion's man- agers, including the vice president of HR, the EAP department director, and corporate counsel. When De Masters asked at the outset if he could have coun- sel present, he was told that if he persisted he would be considered insubordinate and would be terminated. The Carilion managers then proceeded to ask DeMasters about Doe's sexual harassment complaint and specifi- cally, whether DeMasters told Doe that what happened to him was sexual harassment. When DeMasters acknowl- edged sharing his view that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment, the managers asked DeMasters why he had not taken the pro-employer side and if he understood the magnitude of the liability the company could face if one of its supervisors had engaged in harassment. The managers also told DeMasters that he had not protected Carilion's interests and that he had left Carilion "in a compromised position." The EAP department direc- tor likewise accused DeMasters of "failling) to protect Carilion" and "placing the entire operation at risk." Two days after this meeting. Carilion fired DeMasters. Carilion's letter to De Masters, explaining the reasons for his termination, stated that De Masters had "failſed) to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of Carilion Clinic." Separately, the EAP department director sent DeMasters a letter stating that he was being fired because he: (1) "made statements that could reasonably have led Doe) to conclude that he should file suit against Carilion": (2) "failed to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best inter- ests of Carilion Clinic": [and] (3) "made multiple state- ments that were contrary to his employer's best interests and that required disciplinary action." *** By way of further explanation, DeMasters' direct supervisor in the EAP told him that Carilion was angry at having to settle Doe's discrimination lawsuit and was looking to throw somebody under the bus." *** Title VII's Opposition Clause, by its terms, pro- hibits retaliation against an employee who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. The Supreme Court has defined "oppose" in this context by looking to its ordinary meaning: "to resistor antagonize.. to contend against: to confront; resist; withstand, .. to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion. This broad definition led the Court to conclude that the threshold for oppositional conduct is not oner- Qus, Instead, "[w]hen an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in .a form of employment discrimination, that communica- tien virtually always constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity. This Circuit, as well as the other Courts of Appeals, also has articulated an expansive view of what constitutes oppositional conduct, recognizing that it encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as staging informal protests and voicing ones gRİn- ions in order to bring attention to an employer's discrimi- natory activities." "An employee is protected when she opposes 'not only . employment actions actually unlawful under Title Vil but also employment actions (she) reasonably believes to be unlawful," and the Title VII violation to which the oppositional communication is directed "may be complete, or it may be in progress." We conclude from this review of the statute and case. law that we must examine the course of a plaintiff's con- duct through a panoramic lens, viewing the individual scenes in their broader context and judging the picture as a whole.. [T]he touchstone is whether the plaintiff's course of conduct as a whole (1) "communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in... a form of employment discrimination, and (2) concerns subject matter that is actually unlawful under Title VII or that the employee reasonably believes to be unlaw- ful." Applying these criteria to the allegations here, we are satisfied that DeMasters has alleged that he engaged in protected oppositional activity. First, the complaint describes a course of conduct by DeMasters that clearly and effectively conveyed to Carilion over several weeks his belief that Carilion was violating Title VII by sub- jecting Doe to unlawful conduct. As alleged, DeMasters became Doe's leading advocate and adviser from the day Doe first told DeMasters about his manager's harassing behavior, and DeMasters persisted in his advocacy on Doe's behalf as Carilion investigated the complaint. DeMasters generated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and to galvanize Carilion's internal investiga- tion, arranged for Doe to sign a release so that he could speak directly with HR on Doe's behalf, and relayed Doe's harassment complaint to HR, leading to the ter mination of the harasser. Upon learning that Doe was facing increasing hostility from co-workers who sym- pathized with the harasser, DeMasters consulted with his EAP colleagues and formulated another plan to try to draw Carilion's attention to the hostile workplace and to improve the situation. He then reached out to the HR department, ensured that an HR representative aware of the hostility confronting Doc, and offered EAP's ser- vices to coach the HR department on how to respond more effectively. And when Doe reported that the hostile environment was only intensifying, DeMasters shared his opinion that Carilion was mishandling the matter not only with Doe but also with Carilion's HR manager. The District Court concluded these allegations did not reflect protected activity because DeMasters, by "not complaining himself of workplace discrimination or other unlawful employment practices" and "[m]erely ferrying Doe's allegations to Carilion's human relations department," did not engage in "purposive conduct." We need not decide today on the vitality of a purposive[ness)" requirement, however, because, with the term "purposive properly construed, DeMasters' conduct would easily qualify in any event. The District Court took "purposive to mean that the protections of the Opposition Clause are limited to an employee who directly communicates to her employer her (own] experiences with (discrimination] in the workplace, and that the complaining employee must not only "intend. to relay (a co-worker's com- plaints" to his employer, but also must "voice his own opposition to any unlawful employment practice." It was mistaken. *** Here, no one could mistake DeMasters' alleged activities for "silent opposition." On the contrary. he asserts that he actively and deliberately communicated to Carilion both Doe's complaints and DeMasters' own opinion that these complaints were not properly handled. offered to share ideas about how they could be better handled, and, . made "persistent efforts to help (Doel initiate [his discrimination complaint and urge Human Resources to act upon that complaint." Thus, even assum- ing a threshold requirement that conduct be "purposive" to be protected under the Opposition Clause, DeMasters allegations easily clear that hurdle. Having concluded that DeMasters' alleged course of conduct, viewed as a whole, "communicate[d] to [his] employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . a form of employment discrimination," we now address the second part of our test-the subject matter to which this conduct was directed. Here, too, the complaint is suf: ficient DeMasters plausibly alleged that he directed his communications to practices that were "actually unlaw- ful" or that, at a minimum, he reasonably believed to be unlawful." i.e., the sexual harassment to which Doe grigi- nallx, was subjected and the emerging retaliatory hostile work environment to which Doe was later subjected as a result of Carilion's alleged mishandling of the matter. We also have no difficulty concluding that DeMasters sufficiently pleaded the third and only remaining con tested element-a causal connection between that protected activity and the termination of DeMasters employment. Two days before firing him, Carilion's management objected to DeMasters' conduct, confront- ing him at a meeting about why he had not taken the "pro-employer side, asking if he understood the liability the company could face if its supervisor had engaged in harassment, and asserting that he had not pro- tected Carilion's interests and had left it in a çomere: mised position." In the very letter that purported to justify his termination, Carilion reiterated that DeMasters had acted contrary to his employer's best interests, had made statements that could reasonably have led John Doe to conclude that he should file suit against Cailion," and had "failed to protect Carilion EAP's gient company." Even at oral argument, Carilion seemed to acknowledge that it retaliated against DeMasters for his opposition activity, with counsel conceding that DeMasters was fired because he "rocked the boat." Thus, accepting DeMasters' factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as we must on a motion to dismiss, DeMastess has pleaded both protected activity and a causal connection between that activity and the termination of his employment. DeMasters' complaint thus states a gaim for retalia- tion under the Opposition Clause unless, as the District Court held, the manager rule" strips De Masters of that protection. To that subject, we now turn. The "manager rule has been applied in some Circuits in the context of retaliation claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to require that an employee step outside his or her role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. It purports to address a concern that, if counseling and communicating complaints are part of a manager's regular duties, then "nearly every activity in the normal course of a man- ager's job would potentially be protected activity, and "[a]n otherwise typical at will employment relationship could quickly degrade into a litigation minefield." *** DeMasters and the EEOC argue that, whatever place it may have in FLSA jurisprudence, the manager rule does not apply to Title VII. We agree. Nothing in the language of Title VII indicates that the statutory protection accorded an employee's oppositional conduct turns on the employee's job description or that Congress intended to excise a large category of workers from its anti-retaliation protections. While the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the FISA both generally secure their substantive protections by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees." we also "must take care to respect any differences in language and purpose between Title VII and the FLSA" before adopting a rule from one to the other. Here, those differences counsel against importing the "manager rule" into Title VIL. The FLSA's anti-retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an employee "because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." In contrast, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter" Thus, the conduct protected by the FLSA is far more constricted than the broad range of conduct protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provision Carilion's policy arguments do not change our view. While Carilion harkens to .. a "litigation mine- field" without the manager rule," we find it much more troubling that, under Carilion's approach, the categories of employees best able to assist employees with discrimination claims--the personnel that make up EAP, HR, and legal departments-would receive no protection from Title VII if they oppose discrimination targeted at the employees they are duty-bound to protect. In rejecting the manager rule" in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, we join the only other Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue in a precedential opinion. In that case), the Sixth Circuit held that the fact that the plaintiff, who was an affirmative action official. may have had a contractual duty to advocate for women and minorities did not defeat a retaliation claim. *** We agree.. that the manager rule" would run] counter to the broad approach used when considering a claim for retaliation under (the opposition) clause, as well the spirit and purpose behind Title VII as a broad remedial measure." We therefore hold today that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII enforcement. Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CASE QUESTIONS 1. What were the legal issues in this case? What did the appeals court decide? 2. Which actions were taken by DeMasters? Why did they constitute protected activity under Title VII? 3. What is the managerial rule"? What is the argument for having such a rule? Is that argument at all convincing? Why does the appeals court decline to apply the rule in this case? 4. This decision focuses on the first element of a retaliation claim-whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Would the other elements of a retaliation claim be satisfied? Why or why not? 5. What are some practical implications of this case for human resources managers? OPINION BY CIRCUIT JUDGE KRAUSE: In 2011, after five years of employment as an employee assistance program consultant in Carilion's behavioral health unit, Appellant J. Neil DeMasters allegedly was fired for acting contrary to his employer's best interests." failing to take the "pro-employer side," and leaving his employer "in a compromised position," as a result of his support of a fellow employee's sexual harassment com- plaint and his criticism of the way the employer had han dled the investigation. DeMasters brought suit against Carilion Clinic.. claiming that he was terminated for engaging in protected activity, including opposing an unlawful employment practice, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court dis- missed DeMasters' complaint, primarily on the grounds that no individual activity in which DeMasters engaged by itself constituted protected oppositional conduct and that the so-called "manager rule," in any event, pre- vented an employee whose job responsibilities included reporting discrimination claims from seeking protec. tion under Title VIl's anti-retaliation provision. As we now hold that the proper test for analyzing oppositional conduct requires consideration of the employee's course of conduct as a whole and that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII jurisprudence, we will reverse and remand for DeMasters to proceed with his suit. DeMasters began working in July 2006 as an employee assistance program ("EAP) consultant for Carilion, a large healthcare organization that owns and operates several hospitals. In October 2008, DeMasters was consulted by John Doe, a Carilion employee who had been referred to the EAP for help. At this meeting, Doe revealed that his department manager had been harassing him for the last several months and described how his manager had masturbatda in front of him twice on hospital grounds, asked Doe for oral sex, and asked Doe to display his genitals. Doe also offered that he had physical evidence of the harassment After hearing Doe out, DeMasters opined that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment in violation of Carilion's sexual harassment policy and formulated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and facilitate the investigation of Doe's complaint. To assist Doe with this reporting and investigation, DeMasters suggested that Doe sign a release form that authorized DeMasters to communicate with Carilion's human resources ("HR") department directly on Doe's behalf. That same day. DeMasters put this plan in motion by contacting the HR department, relaying the substance of Doe's complaint, and thereby initiating the investigation of Doe's alleged sexual harassment. Once Carilion began to investigate the matter and took a statement from Doe, it fired the harasser and told Doe that this individual would never be allowed back on hospital property. A few days later, however, DeMasters received a dis- tressed call from Doe, who had learned that the harasser had been permitted by Doe's department director to come back to the hospital to collect his belongings. DeMasters then scheduled another meeting with Doe for the following day. At that meeting. Doe explained that he felt uncomfortable with the department direc- tor and was facing increasing hostility from co-workers aligned with the harasser. DeMasters convened a meeting of his EAP colleagues, who agreed that DeMasters should contact Carilion's HR department to offer suggestions as to how it might better handle the situation.. DeMasters followed through on this plan by calling and leaving a message for an HR representa- tive, who called him back the next day. In that conversation, after confirming that the HR representative was aware that Doe was being subjected to harassing behavior from his co-workers, De Masters offered to coach Carilion's HR department about better ways to respond to Doe's concerns. The HR representa- tive declined and stated that he would speak with the department director. However, several days later, Doe reported to DeMasters that his co-workers' behavior was getting worse, that he was dissatisfied with manage ment's, reaction to his complaint, and that he feared his harasser would come looking for him with a gun. *** De Masters ... reached out to Carilion's HR manager again to say that he felt that Carilion was not handling the case properly. DeMasters does not allege any subsequent contact with Doe or activity on Doe's behalf and apparently was unaware of the legal remedies pursued by Doe over the next two years. In 2010, however, one of Carilion's man- agers called DeMasters and informed him that Doe had filed a Title VII complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and was Rursu- ing a civil suit for sexual harassment against Carilion. In that conversation, the manager pressed DeMasters on his involvement with Doe's harassment complaint. DeMasters acknowledged that Doe had been to the EAP but did not reveal any details of DeMasters' own involve- ment with Does internal complaints. The manager told De Masters that he might expect to hear more from Carilion on the matter. That he did. Within a few weeks of Doe and Carilion reaching a settlement, DeMasters was called to a meeting with several of Carilion's man- agers, including the vice president of HR, the EAP department director, and corporate counsel. When De Masters asked at the outset if he could have coun- sel present, he was told that if he persisted he would be considered insubordinate and would be terminated. The Carilion managers then proceeded to ask DeMasters about Doe's sexual harassment complaint and specifi- cally, whether DeMasters told Doe that what happened to him was sexual harassment. When DeMasters acknowl- edged sharing his view that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment, the managers asked DeMasters why he had not taken the pro-employer side and if he understood the magnitude of the liability the company could face if one of its supervisors had engaged in harassment. The managers also told DeMasters that he had not protected Carilion's interests and that he had left Carilion "in a compromised position." The EAP department direc- tor likewise accused DeMasters of "failling) to protect Carilion" and "placing the entire operation at risk." Two days after this meeting. Carilion fired DeMasters. Carilion's letter to De Masters, explaining the reasons for his termination, stated that De Masters had "failſed) to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of Carilion Clinic." Separately, the EAP department director sent DeMasters a letter stating that he was being fired because he: (1) "made statements that could reasonably have led Doe) to conclude that he should file suit against Carilion": (2) "failed to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best inter- ests of Carilion Clinic": [and] (3) "made multiple state- ments that were contrary to his employer's best interests and that required disciplinary action." *** By way of further explanation, DeMasters' direct supervisor in the EAP told him that Carilion was angry at having to settle Doe's discrimination lawsuit and was looking to throw somebody under the bus." *** Title VII's Opposition Clause, by its terms, pro- hibits retaliation against an employee who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. The Supreme Court has defined "oppose" in this context by looking to its ordinary meaning: "to resistor antagonize.. to contend against: to confront; resist; withstand, .. to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion. This broad definition led the Court to conclude that the threshold for oppositional conduct is not oner- Qus, Instead, "[w]hen an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in .a form of employment discrimination, that communica- tien virtually always constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity. This Circuit, as well as the other Courts of Appeals, also has articulated an expansive view of what constitutes oppositional conduct, recognizing that it encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as staging informal protests and voicing ones gRİn- ions in order to bring attention to an employer's discrimi- natory activities." "An employee is protected when she opposes 'not only . employment actions actually unlawful under Title Vil but also employment actions (she) reasonably believes to be unlawful," and the Title VII violation to which the oppositional communication is directed "may be complete, or it may be in progress." We conclude from this review of the statute and case. law that we must examine the course of a plaintiff's con- duct through a panoramic lens, viewing the individual scenes in their broader context and judging the picture as a whole.. [T]he touchstone is whether the plaintiff's course of conduct as a whole (1) "communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in... a form of employment discrimination, and (2) concerns subject matter that is actually unlawful under Title VII or that the employee reasonably believes to be unlaw- ful." Applying these criteria to the allegations here, we are satisfied that DeMasters has alleged that he engaged in protected oppositional activity. First, the complaint describes a course of conduct by DeMasters that clearly and effectively conveyed to Carilion over several weeks his belief that Carilion was violating Title VII by sub- jecting Doe to unlawful conduct. As alleged, DeMasters became Doe's leading advocate and adviser from the day Doe first told DeMasters about his manager's harassing behavior, and DeMasters persisted in his advocacy on Doe's behalf as Carilion investigated the complaint. DeMasters generated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and to galvanize Carilion's internal investiga- tion, arranged for Doe to sign a release so that he could speak directly with HR on Doe's behalf, and relayed Doe's harassment complaint to HR, leading to the ter mination of the harasser. Upon learning that Doe was facing increasing hostility from co-workers who sym- pathized with the harasser, DeMasters consulted with his EAP colleagues and formulated another plan to try to draw Carilion's attention to the hostile workplace and to improve the situation. He then reached out to the HR department, ensured that an HR representative aware of the hostility confronting Doc, and offered EAP's ser- vices to coach the HR department on how to respond more effectively. And when Doe reported that the hostile environment was only intensifying, DeMasters shared his opinion that Carilion was mishandling the matter not only with Doe but also with Carilion's HR manager. The District Court concluded these allegations did not reflect protected activity because DeMasters, by "not complaining himself of workplace discrimination or other unlawful employment practices" and "[m]erely ferrying Doe's allegations to Carilion's human relations department," did not engage in "purposive conduct." We need not decide today on the vitality of a purposive[ness)" requirement, however, because, with the term "purposive properly construed, DeMasters' conduct would easily qualify in any event. The District Court took "purposive to mean that the protections of the Opposition Clause are limited to an employee who directly communicates to her employer her (own] experiences with (discrimination] in the workplace, and that the complaining employee must not only "intend. to relay (a co-worker's com- plaints" to his employer, but also must "voice his own opposition to any unlawful employment practice." It was mistaken. *** Here, no one could mistake DeMasters' alleged activities for "silent opposition." On the contrary. he asserts that he actively and deliberately communicated to Carilion both Doe's complaints and DeMasters' own opinion that these complaints were not properly handled. offered to share ideas about how they could be better handled, and, . made "persistent efforts to help (Doel initiate [his discrimination complaint and urge Human Resources to act upon that complaint." Thus, even assum- ing a threshold requirement that conduct be "purposive" to be protected under the Opposition Clause, DeMasters allegations easily clear that hurdle. Having concluded that DeMasters' alleged course of conduct, viewed as a whole, "communicate[d] to [his] employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . a form of employment discrimination," we now address the second part of our test-the subject matter to which this conduct was directed. Here, too, the complaint is suf: ficient DeMasters plausibly alleged that he directed his communications to practices that were "actually unlaw- ful" or that, at a minimum, he reasonably believed to be unlawful." i.e., the sexual harassment to which Doe grigi- nallx, was subjected and the emerging retaliatory hostile work environment to which Doe was later subjected as a result of Carilion's alleged mishandling of the matter. We also have no difficulty concluding that DeMasters sufficiently pleaded the third and only remaining con tested element-a causal connection between that protected activity and the termination of DeMasters employment. Two days before firing him, Carilion's management objected to DeMasters' conduct, confront- ing him at a meeting about why he had not taken the "pro-employer side, asking if he understood the liability the company could face if its supervisor had engaged in harassment, and asserting that he had not pro- tected Carilion's interests and had left it in a çomere: mised position." In the very letter that purported to justify his termination, Carilion reiterated that DeMasters had acted contrary to his employer's best interests, had made statements that could reasonably have led John Doe to conclude that he should file suit against Cailion," and had "failed to protect Carilion EAP's gient company." Even at oral argument, Carilion seemed to acknowledge that it retaliated against DeMasters for his opposition activity, with counsel conceding that DeMasters was fired because he "rocked the boat." Thus, accepting DeMasters' factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as we must on a motion to dismiss, DeMastess has pleaded both protected activity and a causal connection between that activity and the termination of his employment. DeMasters' complaint thus states a gaim for retalia- tion under the Opposition Clause unless, as the District Court held, the manager rule" strips De Masters of that protection. To that subject, we now turn. The "manager rule has been applied in some Circuits in the context of retaliation claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to require that an employee step outside his or her role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. It purports to address a concern that, if counseling and communicating complaints are part of a manager's regular duties, then "nearly every activity in the normal course of a man- ager's job would potentially be protected activity, and "[a]n otherwise typical at will employment relationship could quickly degrade into a litigation minefield." *** DeMasters and the EEOC argue that, whatever place it may have in FLSA jurisprudence, the manager rule does not apply to Title VII. We agree. Nothing in the language of Title VII indicates that the statutory protection accorded an employee's oppositional conduct turns on the employee's job description or that Congress intended to excise a large category of workers from its anti-retaliation protections. While the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the FISA both generally secure their substantive protections by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees." we also "must take care to respect any differences in language and purpose between Title VII and the FLSA" before adopting a rule from one to the other. Here, those differences counsel against importing the "manager rule" into Title VIL. The FLSA's anti-retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an employee "because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." In contrast, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter" Thus, the conduct protected by the FLSA is far more constricted than the broad range of conduct protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provision Carilion's policy arguments do not change our view. While Carilion harkens to .. a "litigation mine- field" without the manager rule," we find it much more troubling that, under Carilion's approach, the categories of employees best able to assist employees with discrimination claims--the personnel that make up EAP, HR, and legal departments-would receive no protection from Title VII if they oppose discrimination targeted at the employees they are duty-bound to protect. In rejecting the manager rule" in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, we join the only other Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue in a precedential opinion. In that case), the Sixth Circuit held that the fact that the plaintiff, who was an affirmative action official. may have had a contractual duty to advocate for women and minorities did not defeat a retaliation claim. *** We agree.. that the manager rule" would run] counter to the broad approach used when considering a claim for retaliation under (the opposition) clause, as well the spirit and purpose behind Title VII as a broad remedial measure." We therefore hold today that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII enforcement. Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CASE QUESTIONS 1. What were the legal issues in this case? What did the appeals court decide? 2. Which actions were taken by DeMasters? Why did they constitute protected activity under Title VII? 3. What is the managerial rule"? What is the argument for having such a rule? Is that argument at all convincing? Why does the appeals court decline to apply the rule in this case? 4. This decision focuses on the first element of a retaliation claim-whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Would the other elements of a retaliation claim be satisfied? Why or why not? 5. What are some practical implications of this case for human resources managers? OPINION BY CIRCUIT JUDGE KRAUSE: In 2011, after five years of employment as an employee assistance program consultant in Carilion's behavioral health unit, Appellant J. Neil DeMasters allegedly was fired for acting contrary to his employer's best interests." failing to take the "pro-employer side," and leaving his employer "in a compromised position," as a result of his support of a fellow employee's sexual harassment com- plaint and his criticism of the way the employer had han dled the investigation. DeMasters brought suit against Carilion Clinic.. claiming that he was terminated for engaging in protected activity, including opposing an unlawful employment practice, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court dis- missed DeMasters' complaint, primarily on the grounds that no individual activity in which DeMasters engaged by itself constituted protected oppositional conduct and that the so-called "manager rule," in any event, pre- vented an employee whose job responsibilities included reporting discrimination claims from seeking protec. tion under Title VIl's anti-retaliation provision. As we now hold that the proper test for analyzing oppositional conduct requires consideration of the employee's course of conduct as a whole and that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII jurisprudence, we will reverse and remand for DeMasters to proceed with his suit. DeMasters began working in July 2006 as an employee assistance program ("EAP) consultant for Carilion, a large healthcare organization that owns and operates several hospitals. In October 2008, DeMasters was consulted by John Doe, a Carilion employee who had been referred to the EAP for help. At this meeting, Doe revealed that his department manager had been harassing him for the last several months and described how his manager had masturbatda in front of him twice on hospital grounds, asked Doe for oral sex, and asked Doe to display his genitals. Doe also offered that he had physical evidence of the harassment After hearing Doe out, DeMasters opined that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment in violation of Carilion's sexual harassment policy and formulated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and facilitate the investigation of Doe's complaint. To assist Doe with this reporting and investigation, DeMasters suggested that Doe sign a release form that authorized DeMasters to communicate with Carilion's human resources ("HR") department directly on Doe's behalf. That same day. DeMasters put this plan in motion by contacting the HR department, relaying the substance of Doe's complaint, and thereby initiating the investigation of Doe's alleged sexual harassment. Once Carilion began to investigate the matter and took a statement from Doe, it fired the harasser and told Doe that this individual would never be allowed back on hospital property. A few days later, however, DeMasters received a dis- tressed call from Doe, who had learned that the harasser had been permitted by Doe's department director to come back to the hospital to collect his belongings. DeMasters then scheduled another meeting with Doe for the following day. At that meeting. Doe explained that he felt uncomfortable with the department direc- tor and was facing increasing hostility from co-workers aligned with the harasser. DeMasters convened a meeting of his EAP colleagues, who agreed that DeMasters should contact Carilion's HR department to offer suggestions as to how it might better handle the situation.. DeMasters followed through on this plan by calling and leaving a message for an HR representa- tive, who called him back the next day. In that conversation, after confirming that the HR representative was aware that Doe was being subjected to harassing behavior from his co-workers, De Masters offered to coach Carilion's HR department about better ways to respond to Doe's concerns. The HR representa- tive declined and stated that he would speak with the department director. However, several days later, Doe reported to DeMasters that his co-workers' behavior was getting worse, that he was dissatisfied with manage ment's, reaction to his complaint, and that he feared his harasser would come looking for him with a gun. *** De Masters ... reached out to Carilion's HR manager again to say that he felt that Carilion was not handling the case properly. DeMasters does not allege any subsequent contact with Doe or activity on Doe's behalf and apparently was unaware of the legal remedies pursued by Doe over the next two years. In 2010, however, one of Carilion's man- agers called DeMasters and informed him that Doe had filed a Title VII complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and was Rursu- ing a civil suit for sexual harassment against Carilion. In that conversation, the manager pressed DeMasters on his involvement with Doe's harassment complaint. DeMasters acknowledged that Doe had been to the EAP but did not reveal any details of DeMasters' own involve- ment with Does internal complaints. The manager told De Masters that he might expect to hear more from Carilion on the matter. That he did. Within a few weeks of Doe and Carilion reaching a settlement, DeMasters was called to a meeting with several of Carilion's man- agers, including the vice president of HR, the EAP department director, and corporate counsel. When De Masters asked at the outset if he could have coun- sel present, he was told that if he persisted he would be considered insubordinate and would be terminated. The Carilion managers then proceeded to ask DeMasters about Doe's sexual harassment complaint and specifi- cally, whether DeMasters told Doe that what happened to him was sexual harassment. When DeMasters acknowl- edged sharing his view that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment, the managers asked DeMasters why he had not taken the pro-employer side and if he understood the magnitude of the liability the company could face if one of its supervisors had engaged in harassment. The managers also told DeMasters that he had not protected Carilion's interests and that he had left Carilion "in a compromised position." The EAP department direc- tor likewise accused DeMasters of "failling) to protect Carilion" and "placing the entire operation at risk." Two days after this meeting. Carilion fired DeMasters. Carilion's letter to De Masters, explaining the reasons for his termination, stated that De Masters had "failſed) to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of Carilion Clinic." Separately, the EAP department director sent DeMasters a letter stating that he was being fired because he: (1) "made statements that could reasonably have led Doe) to conclude that he should file suit against Carilion": (2) "failed to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best inter- ests of Carilion Clinic": [and] (3) "made multiple state- ments that were contrary to his employer's best interests and that required disciplinary action." *** By way of further explanation, DeMasters' direct supervisor in the EAP told him that Carilion was angry at having to settle Doe's discrimination lawsuit and was looking to throw somebody under the bus." *** Title VII's Opposition Clause, by its terms, pro- hibits retaliation against an employee who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. The Supreme Court has defined "oppose" in this context by looking to its ordinary meaning: "to resistor antagonize.. to contend against: to confront; resist; withstand, .. to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion. This broad definition led the Court to conclude that the threshold for oppositional conduct is not oner- Qus, Instead, "[w]hen an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in .a form of employment discrimination, that communica- tien virtually always constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity. This Circuit, as well as the other Courts of Appeals, also has articulated an expansive view of what constitutes oppositional conduct, recognizing that it encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as staging informal protests and voicing ones gRİn- ions in order to bring attention to an employer's discrimi- natory activities." "An employee is protected when she opposes 'not only . employment actions actually unlawful under Title Vil but also employment actions (she) reasonably believes to be unlawful," and the Title VII violation to which the oppositional communication is directed "may be complete, or it may be in progress." We conclude from this review of the statute and case. law that we must examine the course of a plaintiff's con- duct through a panoramic lens, viewing the individual scenes in their broader context and judging the picture as a whole.. [T]he touchstone is whether the plaintiff's course of conduct as a whole (1) "communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in... a form of employment discrimination, and (2) concerns subject matter that is actually unlawful under Title VII or that the employee reasonably believes to be unlaw- ful." Applying these criteria to the allegations here, we are satisfied that DeMasters has alleged that he engaged in protected oppositional activity. First, the complaint describes a course of conduct by DeMasters that clearly and effectively conveyed to Carilion over several weeks his belief that Carilion was violating Title VII by sub- jecting Doe to unlawful conduct. As alleged, DeMasters became Doe's leading advocate and adviser from the day Doe first told DeMasters about his manager's harassing behavior, and DeMasters persisted in his advocacy on Doe's behalf as Carilion investigated the complaint. DeMasters generated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and to galvanize Carilion's internal investiga- tion, arranged for Doe to sign a release so that he could speak directly with HR on Doe's behalf, and relayed Doe's harassment complaint to HR, leading to the ter mination of the harasser. Upon learning that Doe was facing increasing hostility from co-workers who sym- pathized with the harasser, DeMasters consulted with his EAP colleagues and formulated another plan to try to draw Carilion's attention to the hostile workplace and to improve the situation. He then reached out to the HR department, ensured that an HR representative aware of the hostility confronting Doc, and offered EAP's ser- vices to coach the HR department on how to respond more effectively. And when Doe reported that the hostile environment was only intensifying, DeMasters shared his opinion that Carilion was mishandling the matter not only with Doe but also with Carilion's HR manager. The District Court concluded these allegations did not reflect protected activity because DeMasters, by "not complaining himself of workplace discrimination or other unlawful employment practices" and "[m]erely ferrying Doe's allegations to Carilion's human relations department," did not engage in "purposive conduct." We need not decide today on the vitality of a purposive[ness)" requirement, however, because, with the term "purposive properly construed, DeMasters' conduct would easily qualify in any event. The District Court took "purposive to mean that the protections of the Opposition Clause are limited to an employee who directly communicates to her employer her (own] experiences with (discrimination] in the workplace, and that the complaining employee must not only "intend. to relay (a co-worker's com- plaints" to his employer, but also must "voice his own opposition to any unlawful employment practice." It was mistaken. *** Here, no one could mistake DeMasters' alleged activities for "silent opposition." On the contrary. he asserts that he actively and deliberately communicated to Carilion both Doe's complaints and DeMasters' own opinion that these complaints were not properly handled. offered to share ideas about how they could be better handled, and, . made "persistent efforts to help (Doel initiate [his discrimination complaint and urge Human Resources to act upon that complaint." Thus, even assum- ing a threshold requirement that conduct be "purposive" to be protected under the Opposition Clause, DeMasters allegations easily clear that hurdle. Having concluded that DeMasters' alleged course of conduct, viewed as a whole, "communicate[d] to [his] employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . a form of employment discrimination," we now address the second part of our test-the subject matter to which this conduct was directed. Here, too, the complaint is suf: ficient DeMasters plausibly alleged that he directed his communications to practices that were "actually unlaw- ful" or that, at a minimum, he reasonably believed to be unlawful." i.e., the sexual harassment to which Doe grigi- nallx, was subjected and the emerging retaliatory hostile work environment to which Doe was later subjected as a result of Carilion's alleged mishandling of the matter. We also have no difficulty concluding that DeMasters sufficiently pleaded the third and only remaining con tested element-a causal connection between that protected activity and the termination of DeMasters employment. Two days before firing him, Carilion's management objected to DeMasters' conduct, confront- ing him at a meeting about why he had not taken the "pro-employer side, asking if he understood the liability the company could face if its supervisor had engaged in harassment, and asserting that he had not pro- tected Carilion's interests and had left it in a çomere: mised position." In the very letter that purported to justify his termination, Carilion reiterated that DeMasters had acted contrary to his employer's best interests, had made statements that could reasonably have led John Doe to conclude that he should file suit against Cailion," and had "failed to protect Carilion EAP's gient company." Even at oral argument, Carilion seemed to acknowledge that it retaliated against DeMasters for his opposition activity, with counsel conceding that DeMasters was fired because he "rocked the boat." Thus, accepting DeMasters' factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as we must on a motion to dismiss, DeMastess has pleaded both protected activity and a causal connection between that activity and the termination of his employment. DeMasters' complaint thus states a gaim for retalia- tion under the Opposition Clause unless, as the District Court held, the manager rule" strips De Masters of that protection. To that subject, we now turn. The "manager rule has been applied in some Circuits in the context of retaliation claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to require that an employee step outside his or her role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. It purports to address a concern that, if counseling and communicating complaints are part of a manager's regular duties, then "nearly every activity in the normal course of a man- ager's job would potentially be protected activity, and "[a]n otherwise typical at will employment relationship could quickly degrade into a litigation minefield." *** DeMasters and the EEOC argue that, whatever place it may have in FLSA jurisprudence, the manager rule does not apply to Title VII. We agree. Nothing in the language of Title VII indicates that the statutory protection accorded an employee's oppositional conduct turns on the employee's job description or that Congress intended to excise a large category of workers from its anti-retaliation protections. While the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the FISA both generally secure their substantive protections by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees." we also "must take care to respect any differences in language and purpose between Title VII and the FLSA" before adopting a rule from one to the other. Here, those differences counsel against importing the "manager rule" into Title VIL. The FLSA's anti-retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an employee "because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." In contrast, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter" Thus, the conduct protected by the FLSA is far more constricted than the broad range of conduct protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provision Carilion's policy arguments do not change our view. While Carilion harkens to .. a "litigation mine- field" without the manager rule," we find it much more troubling that, under Carilion's approach, the categories of employees best able to assist employees with discrimination claims--the personnel that make up EAP, HR, and legal departments-would receive no protection from Title VII if they oppose discrimination targeted at the employees they are duty-bound to protect. In rejecting the manager rule" in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, we join the only other Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue in a precedential opinion. In that case), the Sixth Circuit held that the fact that the plaintiff, who was an affirmative action official. may have had a contractual duty to advocate for women and minorities did not defeat a retaliation claim. *** We agree.. that the manager rule" would run] counter to the broad approach used when considering a claim for retaliation under (the opposition) clause, as well the spirit and purpose behind Title VII as a broad remedial measure." We therefore hold today that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII enforcement. Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CASE QUESTIONS 1. What were the legal issues in this case? What did the appeals court decide? 2. Which actions were taken by DeMasters? Why did they constitute protected activity under Title VII? 3. What is the managerial rule"? What is the argument for having such a rule? Is that argument at all convincing? Why does the appeals court decline to apply the rule in this case? 4. This decision focuses on the first element of a retaliation claim-whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Would the other elements of a retaliation claim be satisfied? Why or why not? 5. What are some practical implications of this case for human resources managers? OPINION BY CIRCUIT JUDGE KRAUSE: In 2011, after five years of employment as an employee assistance program consultant in Carilion's behavioral health unit, Appellant J. Neil DeMasters allegedly was fired for acting contrary to his employer's best interests." failing to take the "pro-employer side," and leaving his employer "in a compromised position," as a result of his support of a fellow employee's sexual harassment com- plaint and his criticism of the way the employer had han dled the investigation. DeMasters brought suit against Carilion Clinic.. claiming that he was terminated for engaging in protected activity, including opposing an unlawful employment practice, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court dis- missed DeMasters' complaint, primarily on the grounds that no individual activity in which DeMasters engaged by itself constituted protected oppositional conduct and that the so-called "manager rule," in any event, pre- vented an employee whose job responsibilities included reporting discrimination claims from seeking protec. tion under Title VIl's anti-retaliation provision. As we now hold that the proper test for analyzing oppositional conduct requires consideration of the employee's course of conduct as a whole and that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII jurisprudence, we will reverse and remand for DeMasters to proceed with his suit. DeMasters began working in July 2006 as an employee assistance program ("EAP) consultant for Carilion, a large healthcare organization that owns and operates several hospitals. In October 2008, DeMasters was consulted by John Doe, a Carilion employee who had been referred to the EAP for help. At this meeting, Doe revealed that his department manager had been harassing him for the last several months and described how his manager had masturbatda in front of him twice on hospital grounds, asked Doe for oral sex, and asked Doe to display his genitals. Doe also offered that he had physical evidence of the harassment After hearing Doe out, DeMasters opined that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment in violation of Carilion's sexual harassment policy and formulated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and facilitate the investigation of Doe's complaint. To assist Doe with this reporting and investigation, DeMasters suggested that Doe sign a release form that authorized DeMasters to communicate with Carilion's human resources ("HR") department directly on Doe's behalf. That same day. DeMasters put this plan in motion by contacting the HR department, relaying the substance of Doe's complaint, and thereby initiating the investigation of Doe's alleged sexual harassment. Once Carilion began to investigate the matter and took a statement from Doe, it fired the harasser and told Doe that this individual would never be allowed back on hospital property. A few days later, however, DeMasters received a dis- tressed call from Doe, who had learned that the harasser had been permitted by Doe's department director to come back to the hospital to collect his belongings. DeMasters then scheduled another meeting with Doe for the following day. At that meeting. Doe explained that he felt uncomfortable with the department direc- tor and was facing increasing hostility from co-workers aligned with the harasser. DeMasters convened a meeting of his EAP colleagues, who agreed that DeMasters should contact Carilion's HR department to offer suggestions as to how it might better handle the situation.. DeMasters followed through on this plan by calling and leaving a message for an HR representa- tive, who called him back the next day. In that conversation, after confirming that the HR representative was aware that Doe was being subjected to harassing behavior from his co-workers, De Masters offered to coach Carilion's HR department about better ways to respond to Doe's concerns. The HR representa- tive declined and stated that he would speak with the department director. However, several days later, Doe reported to DeMasters that his co-workers' behavior was getting worse, that he was dissatisfied with manage ment's, reaction to his complaint, and that he feared his harasser would come looking for him with a gun. *** De Masters ... reached out to Carilion's HR manager again to say that he felt that Carilion was not handling the case properly. DeMasters does not allege any subsequent contact with Doe or activity on Doe's behalf and apparently was unaware of the legal remedies pursued by Doe over the next two years. In 2010, however, one of Carilion's man- agers called DeMasters and informed him that Doe had filed a Title VII complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and was Rursu- ing a civil suit for sexual harassment against Carilion. In that conversation, the manager pressed DeMasters on his involvement with Doe's harassment complaint. DeMasters acknowledged that Doe had been to the EAP but did not reveal any details of DeMasters' own involve- ment with Does internal complaints. The manager told De Masters that he might expect to hear more from Carilion on the matter. That he did. Within a few weeks of Doe and Carilion reaching a settlement, DeMasters was called to a meeting with several of Carilion's man- agers, including the vice president of HR, the EAP department director, and corporate counsel. When De Masters asked at the outset if he could have coun- sel present, he was told that if he persisted he would be considered insubordinate and would be terminated. The Carilion managers then proceeded to ask DeMasters about Doe's sexual harassment complaint and specifi- cally, whether DeMasters told Doe that what happened to him was sexual harassment. When DeMasters acknowl- edged sharing his view that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment, the managers asked DeMasters why he had not taken the pro-employer side and if he understood the magnitude of the liability the company could face if one of its supervisors had engaged in harassment. The managers also told DeMasters that he had not protected Carilion's interests and that he had left Carilion "in a compromised position." The EAP department direc- tor likewise accused DeMasters of "failling) to protect Carilion" and "placing the entire operation at risk." Two days after this meeting. Carilion fired DeMasters. Carilion's letter to De Masters, explaining the reasons for his termination, stated that De Masters had "failſed) to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of Carilion Clinic." Separately, the EAP department director sent DeMasters a letter stating that he was being fired because he: (1) "made statements that could reasonably have led Doe) to conclude that he should file suit against Carilion": (2) "failed to perform or act in a manner that is consistent with the best inter- ests of Carilion Clinic": [and] (3) "made multiple state- ments that were contrary to his employer's best interests and that required disciplinary action." *** By way of further explanation, DeMasters' direct supervisor in the EAP told him that Carilion was angry at having to settle Doe's discrimination lawsuit and was looking to throw somebody under the bus." *** Title VII's Opposition Clause, by its terms, pro- hibits retaliation against an employee who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. The Supreme Court has defined "oppose" in this context by looking to its ordinary meaning: "to resistor antagonize.. to contend against: to confront; resist; withstand, .. to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion. This broad definition led the Court to conclude that the threshold for oppositional conduct is not oner- Qus, Instead, "[w]hen an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in .a form of employment discrimination, that communica- tien virtually always constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity. This Circuit, as well as the other Courts of Appeals, also has articulated an expansive view of what constitutes oppositional conduct, recognizing that it encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as staging informal protests and voicing ones gRİn- ions in order to bring attention to an employer's discrimi- natory activities." "An employee is protected when she opposes 'not only . employment actions actually unlawful under Title Vil but also employment actions (she) reasonably believes to be unlawful," and the Title VII violation to which the oppositional communication is directed "may be complete, or it may be in progress." We conclude from this review of the statute and case. law that we must examine the course of a plaintiff's con- duct through a panoramic lens, viewing the individual scenes in their broader context and judging the picture as a whole.. [T]he touchstone is whether the plaintiff's course of conduct as a whole (1) "communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in... a form of employment discrimination, and (2) concerns subject matter that is actually unlawful under Title VII or that the employee reasonably believes to be unlaw- ful." Applying these criteria to the allegations here, we are satisfied that DeMasters has alleged that he engaged in protected oppositional activity. First, the complaint describes a course of conduct by DeMasters that clearly and effectively conveyed to Carilion over several weeks his belief that Carilion was violating Title VII by sub- jecting Doe to unlawful conduct. As alleged, DeMasters became Doe's leading advocate and adviser from the day Doe first told DeMasters about his manager's harassing behavior, and DeMasters persisted in his advocacy on Doe's behalf as Carilion investigated the complaint. DeMasters generated a plan with Doe to report the harassment and to galvanize Carilion's internal investiga- tion, arranged for Doe to sign a release so that he could speak directly with HR on Doe's behalf, and relayed Doe's harassment complaint to HR, leading to the ter mination of the harasser. Upon learning that Doe was facing increasing hostility from co-workers who sym- pathized with the harasser, DeMasters consulted with his EAP colleagues and formulated another plan to try to draw Carilion's attention to the hostile workplace and to improve the situation. He then reached out to the HR department, ensured that an HR representative aware of the hostility confronting Doc, and offered EAP's ser- vices to coach the HR department on how to respond more effectively. And when Doe reported that the hostile environment was only intensifying, DeMasters shared his opinion that Carilion was mishandling the matter not only with Doe but also with Carilion's HR manager. The District Court concluded these allegations did not reflect protected activity because DeMasters, by "not complaining himself of workplace discrimination or other unlawful employment practices" and "[m]erely ferrying Doe's allegations to Carilion's human relations department," did not engage in "purposive conduct." We need not decide today on the vitality of a purposive[ness)" requirement, however, because, with the term "purposive properly construed, DeMasters' conduct would easily qualify in any event. The District Court took "purposive to mean that the protections of the Opposition Clause are limited to an employee who directly communicates to her employer her (own] experiences with (discrimination] in the workplace, and that the complaining employee must not only "intend. to relay (a co-worker's com- plaints" to his employer, but also must "voice his own opposition to any unlawful employment practice." It was mistaken. *** Here, no one could mistake DeMasters' alleged activities for "silent opposition." On the contrary. he asserts that he actively and deliberately communicated to Carilion both Doe's complaints and DeMasters' own opinion that these complaints were not properly handled. offered to share ideas about how they could be better handled, and, . made "persistent efforts to help (Doel initiate [his discrimination complaint and urge Human Resources to act upon that complaint." Thus, even assum- ing a threshold requirement that conduct be "purposive" to be protected under the Opposition Clause, DeMasters allegations easily clear that hurdle. Having concluded that DeMasters' alleged course of conduct, viewed as a whole, "communicate[d] to [his] employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . a form of employment discrimination," we now address the second part of our test-the subject matter to which this conduct was directed. Here, too, the complaint is suf: ficient DeMasters plausibly alleged that he directed his communications to practices that were "actually unlaw- ful" or that, at a minimum, he reasonably believed to be unlawful." i.e., the sexual harassment to which Doe grigi- nallx, was subjected and the emerging retaliatory hostile work environment to which Doe was later subjected as a result of Carilion's alleged mishandling of the matter. We also have no difficulty concluding that DeMasters sufficiently pleaded the third and only remaining con tested element-a causal connection between that protected activity and the termination of DeMasters employment. Two days before firing him, Carilion's management objected to DeMasters' conduct, confront- ing him at a meeting about why he had not taken the "pro-employer side, asking if he understood the liability the company could face if its supervisor had engaged in harassment, and asserting that he had not pro- tected Carilion's interests and had left it in a çomere: mised position." In the very letter that purported to justify his termination, Carilion reiterated that DeMasters had acted contrary to his employer's best interests, had made statements that could reasonably have led John Doe to conclude that he should file suit against Cailion," and had "failed to protect Carilion EAP's gient company." Even at oral argument, Carilion seemed to acknowledge that it retaliated against DeMasters for his opposition activity, with counsel conceding that DeMasters was fired because he "rocked the boat." Thus, accepting DeMasters' factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as we must on a motion to dismiss, DeMastess has pleaded both protected activity and a causal connection between that activity and the termination of his employment. DeMasters' complaint thus states a gaim for retalia- tion under the Opposition Clause unless, as the District Court held, the manager rule" strips De Masters of that protection. To that subject, we now turn. The "manager rule has been applied in some Circuits in the context of retaliation claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to require that an employee step outside his or her role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. It purports to address a concern that, if counseling and communicating complaints are part of a manager's regular duties, then "nearly every activity in the normal course of a man- ager's job would potentially be protected activity, and "[a]n otherwise typical at will employment relationship could quickly degrade into a litigation minefield." *** DeMasters and the EEOC argue that, whatever place it may have in FLSA jurisprudence, the manager rule does not apply to Title VII. We agree. Nothing in the language of Title VII indicates that the statutory protection accorded an employee's oppositional conduct turns on the employee's job description or that Congress intended to excise a large category of workers from its anti-retaliation protections. While the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the FISA both generally secure their substantive protections by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees." we also "must take care to respect any differences in language and purpose between Title VII and the FLSA" before adopting a rule from one to the other. Here, those differences counsel against importing the "manager rule" into Title VIL. The FLSA's anti-retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an employee "because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." In contrast, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter" Thus, the conduct protected by the FLSA is far more constricted than the broad range of conduct protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provision Carilion's policy arguments do not change our view. While Carilion harkens to .. a "litigation mine- field" without the manager rule," we find it much more troubling that, under Carilion's approach, the categories of employees best able to assist employees with discrimination claims--the personnel that make up EAP, HR, and legal departments-would receive no protection from Title VII if they oppose discrimination targeted at the employees they are duty-bound to protect. In rejecting the manager rule" in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, we join the only other Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue in a precedential opinion. In that case), the Sixth Circuit held that the fact that the plaintiff, who was an affirmative action official. may have had a contractual duty to advocate for women and minorities did not defeat a retaliation claim. *** We agree.. that the manager rule" would run] counter to the broad approach used when considering a claim for retaliation under (the opposition) clause, as well the spirit and purpose behind Title VII as a broad remedial measure." We therefore hold today that the manager rule" has no place in Title VII enforcement. Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CASE QUESTIONS 1. What were the legal issues in this case? What did the appeals court decide? 2. Which actions were taken by DeMasters? Why did they constitute protected activity under Title VII? 3. What is the managerial rule"? What is the argument for having such a rule? Is that argument at all convincing? Why does the appeals court decline to apply the rule in this case? 4. This decision focuses on the first element of a retaliation claim-whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Would the other elements of a retaliation claim be satisfied? Why or why not? 5. What are some practical implications of this case for human resources managers?

Answer rating: 100% (QA)

1 DeMasters was an EAP consultant for Carilion and in this capacity came to know firsthand from an employee about how he was harassed by his department manager and reported this information to HR As p... View the full answer