Question: Why is manager effort usually unobservable to the firm s owners
Why is manager effort usually unobservable to the firm’s owners? What problem of information asymmetry results? If the manager receives a straight salary, what is the effect of this information asymmetry on the manager’s effort in a single- period contract?
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