1. Which argument, the majority’s or the dissent, do you find more compelling?

2. What implications does this case have for hiring practices in parts of the United States where aliens are prevalent?

3. If Espinoza could show that this policy, while arguably “facially neutral,” actually impacts people of Mexican origin differently than people of American origin, wouldn't Espinoza have a claim for disparate impact?

Issue: Whether a requirement that an employee be of a certain citizenship, rather than national origin, violates Title VII?

Facts: Cecilia Espinoza, a lawful Mexican alien, applied for a position at Farah Manufacturing’s San Antonio Division. She was denied the position, however, as a result of Farah’s policy to hire only American citizens. The issue to be decided by the court is whether Title VII’s proscription against discrimination on the basis of national origin protects against discrimination on the basis of citizenship.

Decision: The court first defines national origin as referring to the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came. The court then discusses why it appears compelling that Congress did not intent to include citizenship by that term. Congress, itself, engages in discrimination on the basis of citizenship. The court does, however, state that a citizenship requirement may be prohibited where it has the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin (i.e. adverse impact). Farah’s policy did not appear to do this.

Dissent: Justice Douglas, arguing for the dissent, claims that it is strange that a state cannot discriminate against a lawful alien in connection with practicing law but an employer is allowed to discriminate on the basis of citizenship. The important point raised by the dissent is that alienage results only from being born outside the United States, so it is de facto discrimination against people on the basis of national origin where you discriminate on the basis of citizenship.