Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement (lease) with defendant T-Bar S Corporation (T-Bar) in May of 1992, whereby plaintiff agreed to lease certain cash register equipment (equipment) to T-Bar. Under the lease, T-Bar agreed to monthly rental payments of $289.13 each for a total of 48 months. Defendants George and Sharon Talbott (appellants) were the officers of T-Bar and personally guaranteed payment of all amounts due under the lease.

   After making 18 of the monthly payments, appellants and T-Bar defaulted on the lease in December of 1993. On 28 February 1994, plaintiff mailed a certified letter to appellants and T-Bar, return receipt requested, advising them that the lease was in default and, pursuant to the terms of the lease, plaintiff was accelerating the remaining payments due under the lease. They further advised appellants and T-Bar that if the entire amount due of $8,841.06 was not received within 7 days, plaintiff would seek to recover the balance due plus interest and reasonable attorneys’ fees, as well as possession of the equipment. The record shows that appellants and T-Bar each received this letter on 1 March 1994.

   On 10 March 1994, plaintiff mailed a certified letter and ‘‘Notice of Public Sale of Repossessed Leased Equipment’’ (notice of sale) to appellants and T-Bar at the same address, again return receipt requested. This letter advised appellants and T-Bar that plaintiff had taken possession of the equipment and was conducting a public sale pursuant to the terms of the lease. Although the date on the notice of sale stated that the sale was to be held on 23 March 1994, the sale was actually scheduled to be held on 25 March 1994. This letter and notice of sale were returned to plaintiffs ‘‘unclaimed’’ on 29 March 1994.

   Plaintiffs conducted a public sale of the equipment on 25 March 1994 and no one appeared on behalf of appellants or T-Bar. There being no other bidders, plaintiff purchased the equipment at the sale for $2,000.00.

   On 4 October 1994, plaintiff leased some of the same equipment to another company at a rate calculated to be $212.67 for 36 months. Plaintiff then filed this action on 6 October 1994 seeking to recover the balance due under the lease, minus the net proceeds from the 25 March 1994 public sale, plus interest and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Appellants filed an answer and counterclaim on 27 July 1995. Plaintiff then filed a motion for summary judgment against appellants on 8 July 1996. * * * 

   After a hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment on 15 January 1997 in favor of plaintiff on its complaint and appellants’ counterclaims and entered judgment against appellants for the sum of $7,223.56 plus interest and attorneys’ fees of $1,083.54.

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   * * * Since both parties agree that the transaction at issue in this case is not a security interest, but rather is a lease, Article 2A controls.

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   In their appeal, appellants contend that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff because there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether: (1) the liquidated damages clause contained in Paragraph 13 of the lease is reasonable in light of the then-anticipated harm caused by default; * * *

   As to appellants’ first contention, the official commentary to Article 2A states that ‘‘in recognition of the diversity of the transactions to be governed [and] the sophistication of many of the parties to these transactions * * *, freedom of contract has been preserved.’’ [UCC §] 2A–102 Official Comment. Also, under general contract principles, when the parties to a transaction deal with each other at arms length and without the exercise by one of the parties of superior bargaining power, the parties will be bound by their agreement. [Citation.]

   Article 2A recognizes that ‘‘[m]any leasing transactions are predicated on the parties’ ability to agree to an appropriate amount of damages or formula for damages in the event of default or other act or omission.’’ [UCC §] 2A–504 Official Comment. [UCC §] 2A–504 states, in pertinent part:

(1) Damages payable by either party for default, or any other act or omission * * * may be liquidated in the lease agreement but only at an amount or by a formula that is reasonable in light of the then-anticipated harm caused by the default or other act or omission.

   This liquidated damages provision is more flexible than that provided by its statutory analogue under Article 2, [UCC §] 2–718. The Article 2 liquidated damages section provides, in pertinent part:

(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.

[UCC §] 2–718(1). A review of these statutes reveals two major differences.

   First, the drafters of Article 2A chose not to incorporate the two tests which are required by Article 2, i.e., the difficulties of proof of loss and the inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. In fact, the official commentary to [UCC §] 2A–504 states that since ‘‘[t]he ability to liquidate damages is critical to modern leasing practice * * * [and] given the parties’ freedom to contract at common law, the policy behind retaining these two additional requirements here was thought to be outweighed.’’ [Citation.]

   Secondly, the drafters of Article 2A recognized that in order to further promote freedom of contract, it was necessary to delete the last sentence of [UCC §] 2–718(1), which provided that unreasonably large liquidated damages provisions were void as a penalty. As such, the parties to a lease transaction are free to negotiate the amount of liquidated damages, restrained only by the rule of reasonableness.

   ‘‘The basic test of the reasonableness of an agreement liquidating damages is whether the stipulated amount or amount produced by the stipulated formula represents a reasonable forecast of the probable loss.’’ [Citation.] However, ‘‘no court should strike down a reasonable liquidated damage agreement based on foresight that has proved on hindsight to have contained an inaccurate estimation of the probable loss. * * *’’ [Citation.] And, ‘‘the fact that there is a difference between the actual loss, as determined at or about the time of the default, and the anticipated loss or stipulated amount or formula, as stipulated at the time the lease contract was entered into * * *,’’ does not necessarily mean that the liquidated damage agreement is unreasonable. [Citation.] This is so because ‘‘[t]he value of a lessor’s interest in leased equipment depends upon ‘the physical condition of the equipment and the market conditions at that time.’’’ [Citation.] Further, in determining whether a liquidated damages clause is reasonable:

[A] court should keep in mind that the clause was negotiated by the parties, who are familiar with the circumstances and practices with respect to the type of transaction involved, and the clause carries with it a consensual apportionment of the risks of the agreement that a court should be slow to overturn. 

[Citation.] 

   In this case, Paragraph 13 of the lease (the liquidated damages clause) reads as follows:

13. REMEDIES If an event of default shall occur, Lessor may, at its option, at any time (a) declare the entire amount of unpaid rental for the balance of the term of this lease immediately due and payable, whereupon Lessee shall become obligated to pay to Lessor forthwith the total amount of the said rental for the balance of the said term, and (b) without demand or legal process, enter into the premises where the equipment may be found and take possession of and remove the Equipment, without liability for suit, action or other proceeding, and all rights of Lessee in the Equipment so removed shall terminate absolutely. Lessee hereby waives notice of, or hearing with respect to, such retaking. Lessor may at its option, use, ship, store, repair or lease all Equipment so removed and sell or otherwise dispose of any such Equipment at a private or public sale. In the event Lessor takes possession of the Equipment, Lessor shall give Lessee credit for any sums received by Lessor from the sale or rental of the Equipment after deduction of the expenses of sale or rental and Lessor’s residual interest in the Equipment.

   * * * Lessor and Lessee acknowledge the difficulty in establishing a value for the unexpired lease term and owing to such difficulty agree that the provisions of this paragraph represent an agreed measure of damages and are not to be deemed a forfeiture or penalty. * * *

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  After a careful review, we conclude the liquidated damages clause is a reasonable estimation of the then-anticipated damages in the event of default because it protects plaintiff’s expectation interest. The liquidated damages clause places plaintiff in the position it would have occupied had the lease been fully performed by allowing it to accelerate the balance of the lease payments and repossess the equipment. Therefore, since there is no evidence that plaintiff exercised a superior bargaining position in the negotiation of the liquidated damages clause, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to its reasonableness, and the trial court did not err by enforcing its provisions.