Tony Y. Maroun (Maroun) was employed by Amkor when he accepted an offer to work for Wyreless, a startup company. On November 20, 2000, a letter was sent from Bradley C. Robinson, president of Wyreless, to Maroun setting forth the terms of their employment agreement. The pertinent portions of the letter were as follows:

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• Annual salary of $300,000.
• $300,000 bonus for successful organization of Wyreless Systems, Inc.
• 15% of the issued equity in Wyreless Systems, Inc.
• The equity and ‘‘organization bonus’’ will need to be tied to agreeable milestones (e.g., acquisition of Matricus, organization of management team, etc).
• Full medical benefits.
• Position of Chief Executive Officer, President and a position on the Board.
• Bonuses and incentives will need to be determined by the Board and you after the business plan has been agreed by all parties.

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   I would like you to have an understanding of the fund raising status. I was able to get a commitment from two investors today for a minimum of $250,000 for arrival into the WSI bank account early next week. I believe we will be able to raise an additional $350,000 during the following week. * * * If we are not successful in raising the required capital for the business the funds remaining in the account on May 1, 2001 will be release[d] to you and Jen Gadelman (sic) as compensation beyond salaries and expenses for your efforts in developing the business.

   I anticipate a starting date of employment of December 1, 2000 or as soon you (sic) can reasonably and professional (sic) resolve your responsibilities with Amkor.

   Thereafter, Maroun started working for Wyreless but his employment was terminated in February 2001. Maroun then filed suit (the Wyreless suit), alleging he had not received two salary payments totaling $23,077, had not received 15% of issued equity and had not received the remainder of the $600,000 in bank account funds, alleged to be a balance of $429,145. * * * Maroun also claimed Wyreless’ corporate shell should be set aside and the shareholders of Wyreless should be jointly and severally liable for any damages Wyreless caused to him. * * * After Maroun filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Wyreless on the basis that there was no dispute Maroun was owed $23,077 in unpaid wages, the parties stipulated to entry of a judgment in favor of Maroun in the amount of $23,077.

   In the fall of 2002, * * * Wyreless filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining portions of Maroun’s wage claim, which included the claim for 15% of Wyreless shares and the alleged $429,145 balance of the Wyreless fund account. The district court granted the motion. * * * Maroun appealed.

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   Maroun argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Robinson on the fraud claim. Fraud requires: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker’s intent that there be reliance; (6) the hearer’s ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. [Citation.] In opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Maroun filed an affidavit that stated Robinson made the following representations to Maroun:

(1) That Wyreless was to be a corporation of considerable size, with initial net revenues in excess of several hundred million dollars. (2) That Robinson would soon acquire one and one half million dollars in personal assets, which Robinson would make available to personally guaranty payment of my compensation from Wyreless. (3) That he would have no difficulty in obtaining the initial investments required to capitalize Wyreless as a large, world leading corporation with initial net revenues in excess of several hundred million dollars. (4) That he had obtained firm commitments from several investors and that investment funds would be received in Wyreless’ bank account in the near future.

   ‘‘An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future events.’’ [Citation.] ‘‘[T]here is a general rule in [the] law of deceit that a representation consisting of [a] promise or a statement as to a future event will not serve as [a] basis for fraud.…’’ [Citation.] Statements numbered one and two both address future events. Robinson allegedly stated Wyreless ‘‘was to be’’ and that he ‘‘would soon acquire.’’ ‘‘[T]he representation forming the basis of a claim for fraud must concern past or existing material facts.’’ [Citation.] Neither of these statements constitutes a statement or a representation of past or existing fact. A ‘‘promise or statement that an act will be undertaken, however, is actionable, if it is proven that the speaker made the promise without intending to keep it.’’ [Citation.] There is no indication in the record that Robinson did not intend to fulfill those representations to Maroun at the time he made the statements.

   ‘‘Opinions or predictions about the anticipated profitability of a business are usually not actionable as fraud.’’ [Citation.] Statement number three appears to be merely Robinson’s opinion. As to statement number four, no evidence was submitted that Robinson had not received commitments at the time he made the statement to Maroun. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Maroun on the fraud claim is affirmed.

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   [The district court’s ruling on this issue is affirmed.]