1. Would Trinity’s case against OSHA have been stronger if the inspectors showed up with the marshals and forcibly searched the premises without first attempting to inspect without a war-rant? Why or why not?

2. What are some examples of situations in which the probable cause standard for administrative warrants would not be met?

3. Should the standards for warrants be different for different companies? Does that raise any constitutional concerns?

Compliance officers from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)¹⁰ arrived at the facilities of Trinity Marine Products to conduct an inspection pursuant to their authority under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Trinity’s managers turned the OSHA inspectors away, so OSHA obtained an administrative warrant and returned with federal marshals. After the threat of arrest by the marshals, Trinity officials allowed the search under protest. Trinity later brought an action against OSHA, contending that the warrant had been issued without probable cause and that administrative warrants could not be legally executed by using force against nonconsenting parties. Trinity argued that refusal by a party to honor an administrative warrant should trigger a contempt-of-court proceeding to determine the validity of the warrant and that the government may not use force or arrest to enforce an administrative warrant.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of OSHA, reasoning that the standards for prob-able cause were lower for administrative warrants than for criminal warrants and that federal statutes and case law allowed administrative warrants to be executed using a reasonable degree of force. In this case, the government had shown that it had sufficient information to justify an inspection and, because Trinity would not honor the warrant, that use of the marshals to gain entry was appropriate and consistent with the statutory intent that allows OSHA to “investigate and inspect without delay.”

“[A]dministrative warrants are distinguishable from traditional criminal warrants in a number of ways. They have, for instance, a different—linguistically idiosyncratic—‘probable’ cause standard: Probable cause may be based either on specific evidence of an existing violation, as in the traditional criminal context, or on a lesser showing that ‘reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment.’”