1. A game that is represented in a tree-form is called a:

A. Extensive Form game

B. Normal Form game

2. Which of the following is true:

A. A Nash Equilibrium exists when no actor has an incentive to unilaterally cooperate.

B. A Nash Equilibrium exists when no actor has an incentive to unilaterally switch strategies.

C. A Nash Equilibrium exists when no actor has an incentive to conceal information about his or her true preferences.

3. Backward Induction is the process by which:

A. we can induce a solution to the game but only when it is played backwards

B. we can restructure the game from the inside out

C. we can solve complete information games by working from the terminal nodes backward

4. Outcomes can be turned into payoffs by:

A. ranking outcomes from most preferred to least preferred

B. completing the game and observing how much each player receives

C. understanding the context

Answer rating: 100% (QA)

1 A Extensive Form game 2 B A Nash Equilibrium exists ... View the full answer