Instructions:

1. You must write the title of the case and the bibliographic record. 2. Mention the parties involved in the case, duly identified as plaintiffs or defendants, etc. 3. What is the main controversy that arises in the case. (The controversy It is always that question that the court asks itself to which it must respond to solve the problem at hand). 4. It needs a summary of the facts that led to the case reaching court. (Those particularities that gave rise to the conflict between the parties). 5. It needs a summary of the legal reasoning that the court used to resolve the controversy. 6. Indicate what the verdict was, that is, what was the final disposition made by the court supreme on the case. 7. What effect does that verdict or sentence have?

1. Rules of Civil Procedure--Scope--Application and Interpretation--In General.

When interpreting the Rules of Civil Procedure, it must be kept in mind, as a guiding principle, that they do not have a life of their own; They only exist to make viable the achievement of the substantive right of the parties.

2. Id.--Id.--Purpose and Effect.

To achieve justice in resolving the parties' claims, the court must strike an equitable balance between the conflicting interests, exercising special care in interpreting the procedural rules so that they guarantee a fair, rapid and economical resolution of the dispute.

3. Courts--Nature, Extent and Exercise of Jurisdiction--Case Resolution--In General.

There is a judicial policy that cases are heard on their merits.

4. Rules of Civil ProcedurePretrial ProceduresSummarily JudgmentMotion and ProcedureDispute of Facts...

A court--in the exercise of its discretion and in view of the important interest that every litigant have his day in court and that the party not be prejudiced by the acts and omissions of his attorney--must reconsider a summary judgment dismissing a plaintiff's cause of action when said cause is supported by the plaintiff's failure to timely object to the motion for summary judgment, when it appears that the plaintiff filed a motion for extension that was never brought to the attention of the court, and when the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration plaintiff--with the opposition to the summary judgment--establishes the existence of a factual controversy that must be elucidated in a plenary trial.

5. Damages and Losses--General Principles--Nature and Fundamentals--Nature and Theory of Compensation for Damages--In General--Absolute Liability--Manufacturer...

In Puerto Rico the rule of absolute liability of the manufacturer of defective products governs.

6. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

The rule of absolute liability of the manufacturer of defective products establishes that a manufacturer or manufacturer is absolutely liable for damages when an article that it puts on the market, knowing that it will be used without an inspection of defects, shows a defect that causes damage to a human being. Liability is not governed by the law of contractual guarantees, but by the law of absolute liability for damages.

7. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

The public policy reason behind the rule of absolute liability of the manufacturer of a defective product is to ensure that the cost of damages resulting from that product is borne by the manufacturers who sent it to the market, and not by the injured people, who are powerless to protect themselves.

8. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

Under the rule of absolute liability of the manufacturer of defective products, the plaintiff only has to establish the existence of the defect in the product and that the defect was the legal cause of the damages or injuries suffered by him. You do not have to prove negligence on the part of the manufacturer or seller.

9. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

The manufacturer of defective products is not the insurer of all damages that may be caused.

their products. The manufacturer or seller is responsible for defects in its product, as long as the injured party uses it for a use that is reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer.

10. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

In the field of absolute liability of the manufacturer of defective products, there are three (3) types of defects that give rise to the application of such doctrine, namely: (1) manufacturing defects; (2) design defects, and (3) defects due to insufficient warnings or instructions.

11. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

Under the doctrine of absolute liability of the manufacturer of defective products, a defective product is one that fails to match the average quality of similar products. This is the manufacturing defect that makes the manufacturer responsible for damages resulting from deviations from the standard.

12. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

In a design defect case, the plaintiff will prevail if he shows that: (1) the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary user would have expected when using the product for its intended use or for the use for which it was foreseeable could give you, or (2) the design of the product was the proximate cause of the damages and the defendant did not prove that, on the balance of interests, the benefits of the design in question outweigh the risks of danger inherent in the design. Under this second alternative, the burden of proof is transferred to the manufacturer that the benefits of the design used outweigh the risks inherent to it.

13. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

Even if a product does not suffer from manufacturing or design defects, it is considered defective if the manufacturer or seller does not provide the user or consumer with such warnings or instructions that are adequate to warn of the dangers or risks inherent in handling or use. of the product. Such duty extends to all uses of the product that are reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. Failure to give warnings exposes the manufacturer to liability if the manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger or risk involved, and of the need to give the warning to ensure the safest use of the product.

14. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

The Federal Flammable Fabrics Act statute does not provide a private cause of action to

victims for damage resulting from burns suffered due to the flammability of clothing or clothing; Nor does it necessarily prevent flammable clothing from being put on the market.

15. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

The Federal Flammable Fabrics Act prohibits the introduction of flammable fabrics (fabrics) into the interstate commerce, which do not meet or satisfy the flammability standards established by the Consumer Products Safety Commission; Such prohibited transactions constitute a method of unfair competition and also constitute unlawful practices under the Federal Frade Commission Act.

16. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

Under the Federal Flammable Fabrics Act, states are not limited to applying only the criminal provisions and regulatory standards of the federal statute to those civil cases involving the flammability of clothing or fabrics. On the contrary, states can impose liability under their products liability laws on manufacturers or sellers, even if they comply with the minimum standards of the federal statute.

17. Rules of Civil ProcedurePretrial ProceduresSummarily JudgmentMotion and ProcedureDispute of Facts...

Rule 36.3 of Civil Procedure, 32 L.P.R.A. App. III, provides that a summary judgment will be issued if the documents submitted demonstrate that there is no real substantial controversy regarding any material fact.

18. Id.--Id.--Id.--In General.

The cardinal purpose of Rule 36.3 of Civil Procedure, 32 L.P.R.A. App. III, is to promote a fair, quick and economical solution to the dispute, shortening the disposition of lawsuits that, because they do not involve a genuine controversy of material facts, make it unnecessary to hold a trial on its merits.

19. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

Rule 36.3 of Civil Procedure, 32 L.P.R.A. App. III, used with wise discernment, is a valuable mechanism to decongest judicial calendars.

20. Id.--Id.--Id.--Motion and Procedure--Dispute of Facts.

The party seeking summary judgment in a lawsuit is required to demonstrate beyond a doubt the absence of an actual dispute over any relevant fact that, in light of substantive law, would determine a judgment as a matter of law.

21. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--AffidavitsIn General.

To defeat a request for summary judgment, the opposing party must present, as a general rule, counter-affidavits and counter-documents that dispute the facts presented by the movant. If you cross your arms you run the risk of having a judgment handed down against you without the declaration of the trial in its substance.

22. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Controversy of Facts.

Summary judgment should only be entered in clear cases, and any doubt should be resolved against the party seeking judgment.

23. Damages--Fault or Negligence--Liability of the Employer--Co-employees--Coemployee Doctrine in This Jurisdiction...

An injured employee may sue a co-employee for damages as a result of the negligent or wrongful acts committed personally by the co-employee. The term "co-employee" includes supervisors, officers, shareholders and any other employees of equal rank. The negligence of the co-employee must arise from the failure to perform a duty that exists independently of the employer-employee relationship. This duty arises from Art. 1802 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. sec. 5141.

24. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

The rule that allows an injured party to sue a co-employee is limited to cases in which the duty of care breached by the co-employee constitutes a personal breach of an obligation arising from Art. 1802 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. sec. 5141.

25. Id.--Id.--Id.--Implements, Machinery, Appliances and Work Sites-- Defects in Work Sites--In General...

The legal obligation to provide a safe place of employment falls on the employer. It has a non-delegable duty to provide a risk-free workplace for its employees, in accordance with the provisions of the Occupational Health and Safety Law.

26. Id.--Id.--Id.--Nature and ExtentFailure to Comply with the Duties Imposed on the Employer by Law.

The term "non-delegable" means that there are some obligations that an employer owes to its employees that prevent the employer from being able to escape liability to the injured worker by delegating that function to other employees.

27. Id.--Id.--Id.--Implements, Machinery, Appliances and Work Sites-- Defects in Work Sites--In General...

Within the corporate structure, the employer discharges its obligation to provide a safe place

of employment through its agents, employees or corporate officers.

28. Id.--Id.--Id.--Coemployees--Coemployee Doctrine in This Jurisdiction.

When the negligence of the supervisor or corporate officer arises from the failure to provide a safe place of employment to the worker, the injured worker cannot sue the co-employee. While the employee or officer is discharging the general responsibilities of his position, any violation of this duty is exclusively attributable to the employer. In such cases, the injured employee can only resort to the State Insurance Fund, if it is an insured employer.

29. Labor Law--Laws on Labor Relations--Statutory Precepts--Law on Compensation for Workplace Accidents.

The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act was not to transfer the burden of industrial accidents from one employee to another. Therefore, allowing injured workers to sue corporate officers would violate and disrupt the statutory scheme that was designed to impose certain exclusive obligations on employers whenever employees are injured on the job.

30. Damages and Losses--Fault or Negligence--Liability of the Employer--Nature and Extent--In General...

Under our workers' compensation scheme, an employee - whether an officer, shareholder or supervisor - is protected by employer immunity when the co-employee's alleged negligence consists of violating the corporation's non-delegable duty to provide a safe place of employment.

31. Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.--Id.

If employer immunity covers a co-employee - officer, shareholder or supervisor - when there has been an intentional act or an act of gross negligence on his part, and in contravention of the employer's duty to provide a safe place of employment, quaere.

32. Labor Law--Laws on Labor Relations--Statutory Precepts--Law on Compensation for Workplace Accidents.

Under Art. 31 of the Workplace Accident Compensation Law, 11 L.P.R.A. sec. 32, an officer, agent or employee will be responsible for damages suffered by a fellow employee when the negligent act, causing them, is distinct and independent of the employer's duty to provide a safe place of employment.

Partial Summary Judgment of Luis Mojica Sandoz, J. (Humacao), granting certain motion for partial summary judgment filed by co-defendant Steri-tech, Inc. and another filed by co-defendant Manuel Borrero, whereby the complaint is dismissed against the first. That part of the judgment dismissing the complaint in favor of co-defendant Steri-tech, Inc. is revoked and the case is returned to the trial court for continuation of the proceedings in accordance with the opinion. Secondly, that part of the ruling that dismisses the claim in favor of the co-defendant Mr. Borrero is confirmed.

Alvaro R. Caldern, Jr. and Ariel O. Caro Prez, of the Alvaro R. Caldern, Jr.Law Firm, attorneys for the appellants; Leonardo Andrade Lugo and Jorge Segurola, of Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer & Hertell, lawyers for respondent Manuel Borrero; Carlos C. Santiago, of Muoz, Boneta, Gonzlez, Arbona, Bentez & Peral, attorney for respondent Steri-tech, Inc.; Charles P. Adams, of Brown, Newsom & Crdova, amicus curiae attorney.

Associate Judge Rebollo Lpez issued the opinion of the Court.

On February 27, 1987, Francisco Rivera Pastrana was working at the pharmaceutical plant owned by Squibb Manufacturing, Inc., in Humacao, Puerto Rico. Mr. Rivera had been working as a chemical operator since 1976 and, as part of his duties, he was required to prepare chemical solutions, apply them, clean dryers, work areas and other equipment, and carry out any other work assigned to him by his supervisors.

On the day of the events that give rise to this appeal, Mr. Rivera was assigned to clean a drying machine and its immediate area, including the walls and floor of the room where it was located. [FN1] To carry out the cleaning, Mr. Rivera was given a solution containing methanol and sodium hydroxide. Additionally, Mr. Rivera was provided with the equipment he needed to carry out the cleanup, including safety shoes, gloves, and a uniform that covered his body.

FN1. Mr. Rivera was sharing the cleaning duties with the employee Gabriel Soto Machuca. The purpose of cleaning the dryer area was to change the product code of

according to the company's requirements so that a new product could be processed in the dryer. (Second Amended Complaint, p. 4.) Request for review, exhibit XV, p. 4.

While Mr. Rivera was cleaning the room, a static spark caused an explosion and a flash fire, which caused him serious burns. [FN2] Eventually, Mr. Rivera died, some forty-nine (49) days later, due to complications from the burns. Subsequently, Mr. Rivera's children and companion filed a lawsuit for damages before the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Humacao Chamber, against the officers and directors of Squibb Manufacturing, Inc., alleging their negligence in regarding the security measures applied, and against several manufacturing and product distributing corporations that allegedly contributed to the explosion, the fire, and the damage suffered by the deceased.

FN2. Mr. Gabriel Soto Machuca was not in the dryer room at that time because he went to look for his respirator to protect himself from the gases emanating from said room. (Second Amended Complaint, p. 5.)

Request for review, exhibit XV, p. 5.

Once the lawsuit was filed, the majority of the co-defendants filed, among others, motions for dismissal and summary judgment. The trial court, in order to facilitate the economy and lightness of the process, proceeded to consider the briefs submitted by each of the co-defendants, and by Resolution of September 28, 1989, resolved them. Regarding the appeal of the heading, the trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment filed by co-defendant Steri-tech, Inc. and co-defendant Manuel Borrero, respectively. The plaintiff appealed to us from that final partial ruling through the corresponding review document.

As for co-defendant Steri-tech, Inc., the appellants allege that the court erred in granting summary judgment because there was a real dispute over material facts and in disregarding a motion for extension that he had filed to oppose the request for summary judgment. Likewise, the appellant points out that the court erred in issuing a partial summary judgment dismissing the lawsuit against Manuel Borrero, president of Squibb Manufacturers, Inc., by ruling that he is not the third party that can be responsible to the worker under the Accident Compensation Law. from work.

After examining the appeal for review, we granted co-defendant Steri-tech, Inc. a term to

show cause why we should not issue the requested order and revoke the appealed judgment "because in relation to the claim against said codefendant there is a controversy over essential facts that must be elucidated in a plenary trial...". Resolution of December 14, 1989. Likewise, we granted co-defendant Manuel Borrero time to show cause why we should not issue the order and revoke the appealed sentence "in view of what was resolved in the case of Lpez Rodrguez v. Delama, 102 D.P.R.

254 (1974)". Id.

Having appeared the co-defendant Steri-tech, Inc. and the co-defendant Manuel Borrero in compliance with the aforementioned resolution and being in a position to resolve the appeal, we proceed to do so.*123

I

On July 12, 1989, co-defendant Steri-tech, Inc., moved for summary judgment. Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 8.4 of Civil Procedure of 1979 (32 L.P.R.A. App. III), the appellant plaintiff had ten (10) days, from the notification of the motion, to oppose it. Pursuant to said Rule 8.4, the plaintiff, on July 21, 1989, requested the court for an extension of thirty (30) days to oppose the motion for summary judgment. For some reason, the aforementioned motion for extension did not come to the attention of the court and, therefore, it was never resolved. On the other hand, the plaintiff did not make any additional arrangements regarding the status of its extension motion. The court, on September 28, 1989, issued a partial summary judgment dismissing the case, [FN3] based on the fact that the plaintiff "has not answered the request for sentencing."

summary possession, nor has it requested an extension to do so." (Emphasis supplied.)

FN3. The aforementioned sentence was filed in records dated October 10, 1989.

The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on October 13, 1989, attaching a copy of a motion in opposition to the summary judgment. It is in said motion of

reconsideration that, for the first time, the appellant points out to the trial court that he had requested an extension to oppose the motion for summary judgment and, in addition, explains to the court the difficulties that occurred in opposing it. In summary, he argued that he attempted to obtain a sworn statement from one of his experts, Dr. Edwin Smith, who resided in the state of Ohio; that, due to unknown reasons, he never received the affidavit, so he had to obtain a second one that was sent to him on September 30, *124 1989. The trial court dismissed the motion for reconsideration.

[1][2][3] We begin by reiterating that "[w]hen interpreting the Rules of Civil Procedure it is necessary to

keep in mind, as a guiding principle, that these do not have a life of their own, they only exist to enable the achievement of the substantive right of the parties. To achieve justice in resolving the claims of the parties, the court must strike an equitable balance between the conflicting interests, exercising special care in interpreting the procedural rules so that they guarantee a fair, rapid and economical resolution of the dispute." (Emphasis in the original suppressed.) Dvila v. Hosp. San Miguel, Inc., 117 D.P.R. 807, 816 (1986). Service Sta., 117 D.P.R. 729 (1986);

[4] Concerning the instant case, the court was apparently not aware of the

filing of the motion for extension and the efforts that the plaintiff was carrying out to obtain the sworn statement of her expert. However, once it became aware of these facts, through the motion for reconsideration, the court, in the exercise of its discretion and in view of the important interest that all litigants have their day in court and that the party not be harmed Because of the acts and omissions of his attorney, he should have reconsidered his sentence and considered the motion in opposition to summary judgment.Nez Gonzlez v. Jimnez Miranda, 122 D.P.R. 134 (1988); Dvila v. Hosp.San Miguel, Inc., before; Garriga Gordils v. Maldonado Coln, before. Said document, as we will explain below, demonstrates that there is a dispute of facts that must be clarified in a plenary trial.

Co-defendant Steri-tech, Inc. is a Mexican corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; It is a supplier and manufacturer of "rompers or covers" to put over clothing (coveralls). The plaintiff maintains that Steri-tech, Inc. "is responsible for providing the Squibb chemical laboratory with an inherently dangerous coverall or cover, which, when caught on fire in the explosion, adhered to Rivera's body, aggravating his burns and causing his death." (Second Amended Complaint, p. 7.) Request for review, exhibit XV, p. 7. Said allegation of the plaintiff is based on the absolute liability of the manufacturer for damages caused by its defective products.

[5][6][7] Responding to the social needs of Puerto Rico, through judicial means and as a matter of public policy, we established and adopted in our jurisdiction the rule of absolute liability of the manufacturer of defective products.[FN4] Mendoza v. Cervecera Corona, Inc., 97 D.P.R. 499 (1969); Montero Saldaa v. Amer.Motors Corp., 107 D.P.R. 452 (1978). In both cases we cite with approval the rule of strict liability intorts, established by the Supreme Court of California in the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962). Presiding Judge Traynor expressed the rule this way: "[a] manufacturer is absolutely liable for damages when an article that he puts on the market, knowing that it will be used without an inspection of defects, evidence "a defect that causes damage to a human being [and that] the responsibility is not governed by the law of contractual guarantees but by the law of absolute liability for damages." (Our translation.) The public policy reason behind the rule is illustrated by the decision of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., ante, p. 901, is that "[t]he purpose of such liability is to ensure that the cost of damages resulting from defective products is borne by the manufacturers who sent such products to market rather than by injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." ". (Our translation.)

FN4. To fill a gap in our legal system, we adopted through jurisprudence the legal principles developed in the North American common law of products liability. Mendoza v. Corona Brewery, 97 D.P.R. 499 (1969). Our task over the years has been limited to developing this area of law on a case-by-case basis, however, the fact that our national law is rooted in the Civil Law system, where the positive or written norm predominates. For this reason, we understand that it is necessary for the Legislative Assembly to compile, incorporate, adopt, and develop its own right of products liability. In France, for example, efforts are being made to amend the French Civil Code to incorporate general rules governing the field of absolute liability of the manufacturer for defective products. However, until the Legislature acts, we will continue to develop this field on a case-by-case basis.

[8][9] In summary, the plaintiff must establish in a case of this nature, first, the existence of the defect in the product and, second, that said defect was the legal cause of the damages or injuries suffered by her. [FN5] Thus, under the rule of absolute liability that governs this type of case in our system, the injured party does not have to prove the negligence of the manufacturer or the seller, but they do have to prove that the product was defective. W.P. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th ed., Minnesota, Ed. West Publishing Co., 1984, Sec. 99, pp. 694-695; H. Brau del Toro, Extracontractual damages and losses in Puerto Rico, 2nd ed., San Juan, Pubs. J.T.S., 1986, pp. 896-897. It should be noted, however, "that although the consumer does not *127 have to directly establish the negligence of the manufacturer, the manufacturer is not the insurer for all damages that its products may cause." Mendoza v. Cervecera Corona, Inc., ante, p. 512. [FN6]

FN5. It should be noted that these two (2) requirements are included among those established by our Art. 1802 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. sec. 5141. In Spain it has been recognized that the civil liability of the manufacturer may always be lodged in the general terms of this article. ngel Rojo and Fernndez-Ro, The Civil Responsibility of the Manufacturer, Zaragoza, Cometa, 1974, p. 125. It is noted that for reasons of public policy the theory of absolute liability of the manufacturer omits the requirement of establishing the negligence of the defendant.

FN6. The defect from which the product suffers does not have to be one that is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or buyer as provided in Sec. 402(A) of 4 Restatement Of the Law (Second) of Torts Sec. 402A (1966). Montero Saldaa v. Amer. Motors Corp., 107 D.P.R. 452, 461 (1978). In that case, we rely on the California Supreme Court's decision in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corporation, 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972) and Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978), which rejected "the concept of the 'condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer' contained in the Restatement, [since] to apply the doctrine of absolute liability It is enough to comply with what was stated in the Greenman case transcribed above since it provides 'a clear and simple test to determine whether the injured plaintiff is entitled to compensation.'" (Emphasis in original deleted.) Montero Saldaa v. Amer. Motors Corp., ante, p. 462.

In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., sued, stated that "the manufacturer or seller was liable for design and manufacturing defects of which the injured party is not aware, which renders the product unsafe for its intended use [ or for the use for which it is manufactured or sold]". Later, in the case of Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corporation, 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972), the California Supreme Court stated that strict liability will not be imposed on a manufacturer or seller when the injuries suffered by the victim arise from a use of the product that is not reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. Consequently, the rule of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., ante, by deleting the phrase "an intended use." Finally, point out the case of Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corporation, that the manufacturer or seller is responsible for the

defects of your product, as long as the injured party uses it for a use that is reasonable.

foreseeable for the manufacturer. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corporation, before; Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Brau del Toro, op. cit., pp. 901-902. *128

[10] In the field of product liability there are three (3) types of defects that give rise to the application of the doctrine of absolute liability; These are: manufacturing defects, design defects and defects due to insufficient warnings or instructions. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 281 Cal. Reptr. 528 (1991); Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc., 157 Cal. Reptr. 142 (1979); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., ante; Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corporation, before; Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 4 Cal. Reptr. 552 (1965); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., ante; Keeton, op. cit., p. 695; Montero Saldaa v. Amer. Motors Corp., before; Brau del Toro, op. cit., p. 901.

[11] Regarding manufacturing defects, this Court adopted the definition of "defect" suggested by then-Chief Justice Traynor, in the aforementioned case of Greeman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., ante, to the effect that "a defective product may be defined as one that fails to match the average quality of similar products, and the manufacturer is then liable for damages resulting from deviations from the standard."". Mendoza v. Cervecera Corona, Inc., ante, p. 512 sc. 7; Montero Saldaa v. Amer.Motors Corp., ante, p. 462; R.J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 367 (1965). In Barker v. Lull Engineering, Co. Inc., before the California Supreme Court limited the rule proposed by the Judge

Traynor to manufacturing defect cases. [FN7] *129

FN7. For these purposes, the Court stated on page. 454:

"In general, a manufacturing or production defect is readily identifiable because a defective product is one that differs from the manufacturer's intended result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product line. For example, when a product comes off the assembly line in a substandard condition it has incurred a manufacturing defect (E.g., Lewis v. American Hoist & Derrick Co. (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 570, 580, 97 Cal.Rptr. 798.) A design defect, by contrast, cannot be identified simply by comparing the injury-producing product with the manufacturer's plans or with other units of the same product line, since by definition the plans and all such units will reflect the same design rather than applying any sort of deviation. from-the-norm test in determining whether a product is defective in design for strict liability purposes, our cases have employed two alternative criteria in ascertaining, in Justice Traynor's words, whether there is something 'wrong, if not in the manufacturer's manner of production , at least in his product'. (Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, supra, 32 Tenn.L.Rev. 363, 366)."

[12] To determine whether there is a design defect, the California Supreme Court developed an analysis, or test, of two (2) alternatives. [FN8] Thus, the plaintiff will prevail in a design defect case if he proves that: "(1) the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary user would have expected when using the product for the use for which it was intended." was intended or for which it could foreseeably be used, or if it demonstrates that, (2)... the design of the product was the proximate cause of the damages and the defendant did not prove that on the balance of interests, the benefits of the design in issue outweigh the risks of danger inherent in the design.'D' (Our translation.) Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., ante, p. 446. Under this second alternative, the burden of proof is shifted to the manufacturer. that the benefits of the design used outweigh the risks inherent to it.

FN8. The Barker v. Lull Engineering. Co., Inc., ante, combines part of the consumer expectation test and the risk/utility or benefits test. See: W.P. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th ed., Minnesota, Ed. West Publishing Co., 1984, p. 702; M. Stuart Madden, Products Liability, 2nd ed., St. Paul, Minn., Ed. West Publishing Co., 1988, Vol. I, p. 220.

FN9. In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., ante, p. 455, the California Supreme Court expressed the rule this way:

"...a product is defective in design either (1) if the product has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if, in light of the relevant factors discussed below, the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design."

Among the relevant criteria to be considered in the second alternative, the following were noted: "...the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design." Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., ante, p. 455.

[13] Thirdly, even if a product does not suffer *130 from manufacturing or design defects, it is considered defective if the manufacturer or seller does not offer the user or consumer adequate warnings or instructions regarding the dangers or risks inherent in the handling or use of the product. This duty extends to all uses of the product that are reasonably foreseeable for the manufacturer. Failure to provide warnings exposes the manufacturer to liability if the manufacturer knew, or should have known, of the danger or risk involved, and the need to provide the warning to ensure the safest use of the product. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., ante; Rosburg v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 226 Cal. Reptr. 299 (1986); De-Len v. Commercial Mfg. and Supply Co., 195 Cal. Reptr. 867 (1983); Groll v. Shell Oil Co., 196 Cal. Reptr. 52 (1983); Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc., before; 3 Am. Law Prod. Liab. 3d Sec. 32 (1987); Stuart Madden, op. cit., Chap. 10.

In the instant case, the "coverall" that the deceased was wearing on the day of the accident is composed of a material called "Tyvek", which is a registered trademark of Dupont. According to Steri-tech, Inc., the manufacturing process for "rompers" involves cutting Tyvek into patterns of different sizes and then sewing the cuts of the material together. [FN10] From the affidavit, and the documents accompanying the motion for summary judgment, Steri-tech, Inc. contends that it appears from Tyvek's technical literature that there is no real substantial dispute that the material Tyvek is neither defective nor inherently dangerous to the user. For these purposes, it points out that said material complies with all federal codes and laws regarding required flammability, and with the requirements established for general wearing apparel of the Feder- al Flammable *131 Fabrics Act. [FN11] Argues In addition, the Tyvek coverall is used as limited-use clothing for industrial and medical functions, such as, for example, being a particulate matter barrier to keep the environment clean in certain rooms (clean rooms), to protect workers from dangers of asbestos particles and for the packaging of sterile medical products. [FN12] The co-defendant also points out that said overalls are not manufactured or sold to be used as fire safety equipment, nor to be used in places where there is a foreseeable risk of fire. [FN13]

FN10. Motion for summary judgment, pp. 1-2. Request for review, exhibit II, pp. 1-2.

FN11. Motion for summary judgment, p. 2. Request for review, exhibit II, page. 2.

FN12. See Affidavit of the president of Steri-tech, Mr. Jorge Vivoni, page. 2. Request for review, exhibit II, page. 29.

FN13. Request for review, exhibit II, p. 2.

[14][15][16] First, it should be noted that the Federal Flammable Fabrics Act does not provide a private cause of action to victims for damages resulting from burns suffered due to the flammability of clothing or apparel. [FN14] Likewise, said statute does not necessarily prevent flammable clothing from being placed on the market. On the other hand, states are not limited to applying only the criminal provisions and regulatory standards of the federal statute to those civil cases dealing with the flammability of clothing or fabrics. On the contrary, states can impose liability under their products liability laws on manufacturers or sellers, even if they comply with the minimum standards of the federal statute. See: Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corporation., 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973); Simien v. S. S. Kresge Co., *132 566 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1978); Feiner v. Calvin Klein, Ltd., 549 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1990); Am. Law Prod. Liab. 3d, ante, Vol. 6, Sec. 87:2; Note, Products Liability: Flammable Clothing, 1 A.L.R.4th 251 (1980); 63 Am Juris 2d Products Liability, Sec. 96 (1984).

FN14. The Federal Flammable Fabrics Act prohibits the introduction of flammable fabrics (fabrics) into interstate commerce that do not meet or satisfy the flammability standards established by the Consumer Products Safety Commission; Such prohibited transactions constitute a method of unfair competition and also constitute unlawful practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 41 et seq.

For its part, the appellant alleges that there is a real controversy regarding the material fact of the dangerousness of the "Tyvek" product. In support of the motion opposing summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from Dr. Edwin E. Smith, professor of chemical engineering at Ohio University, in which he discusses the flammability characteristics of the "Tyvek" material. . According to Mr. Smith's affidavit, "the 'Tyvek' material is the brand name given to a woven polyethylene material, which ignites rapidly when exposed to a large ignition source. [This material, the expert adds,] It has a characteristic that makes it very dangerous when used as clothing in fire-prone situations, which is its tendency to burn and melt into liquid droplets... These liquid droplets of melted material cause serious burns when adhering to the body of the garment. burnt person, thus causing worse burns and aggravating the conditions of the person who is exposed to the fire. [FN15] (Our translation.) Request for review, exhibit VI, page. 2.

FN15. See Affidavit of expert witness Dr. Edwin E. Smith.

[17][18][19] As is known, Rule 36.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 32 L.P.R.A. App. regarding no material fact and that as a matter of law a summary judgment should be rendered in favor of *133 the moving party." The cardinal purpose of this rule is to promote a fair, rapid and economical resolution of the dispute by shortening the disposition of lawsuits that Because it does not involve a genuine controversy of material facts, it makes the holding of the trial unnecessary. Used with wise discernment, it turns out to be a valuable mechanism to decongest judicial calendars.Lugo, 87 D.P.R. 386, 392 (1963);

[20] Now, the party requesting summary judgment in a lawsuit is under the obligation to demonstrate, beyond any doubt, the nonexistence of a real controversy regarding any relevant fact that, in light of substantive law, would determine a sentence in its opinion. favor as a matter of law. Tello, Rivera v. Eastern Airlines, 119 D.P.R. 83, 86 (1987); Roth v. Lugo, ante, page. 397.

[21][22] To defeat a request for summary judgment, the opposing party must present, as a general rule, counter-affidavits and counter-documents that dispute the facts presented by the movant. If you cross your arms you run the risk of having a judgment handed down against you without the declaration of the trial in its substance. Flowers v. Municipality of Caguas, 114 D.P.R. 521 (1983). Summary judgment should only be given in clear cases, Roth v. Lugo, before, and any doubt must be resolved against the party requesting the ruling. Valcourt Questell v. Superior Court, 89 D.P.R. 827, 832 (1964); Corp. Presiding Bishop CJC of LDS v. Purcell, 117 D.P.R. 714 (1986).

After a careful study and analysis of the documents and sworn statements on record, in the most favorable manner to the plaintiff, we agree that the record reflects that the court did not have before it, in resolving the *134 motion for summary judgment, all the essential facts. In the case before us, there is factual dispute as to whether the "Tyvek" material is defective or not. The plaintiff, through expert testimony, has offered evidence tending to demonstrate that the flammability characteristic of the "Tyvek" product, that is, its tendency to melt into liquid droplets and adhere to the body, means that the product can be considered inherently dangerous or defective. [FN16]

FN16. This characteristic known as the melt-drip effect has been mentioned as one of the hazardous qualities that the commercial standard CS-191 of the Federal Flammable Fabrics Act does not adequately contemplate or measure, when establishing whether certain fabrics (fabrics) are safe to put into use. interstate commerce. A.J. Patton, Flammable Fabrics--A Hazard Evaluation, 18 (No. 4) Trial 33 (1982); 6 Am. Law Prod. Liab. 3d Sec. 87:3 (1987).

On the other hand, even if a product does not have manufacturing or design defects, it may be considered defective for failure to provide warnings or instructions about the dangers inherent in the use or handling of the product. Therefore, even if the trier of fact determines that the product does not contain any manufacturing or design defect, the manufacturer may still be liable if when selling the product he did not provide any warning about a characteristic that makes the material be dangerous when used in situations that are reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. Therefore, it would be necessary to resolve what duty, if any, would be of Steri-tech, Inc. in the present case to provide warnings or instructions regarding the flammability of the "Tyvek" material. In short, the adequacy and scope of the warnings, if any, is an essential matter of fact that must be elucidated in a plenary trial. For the reasons set forth above, the determination of the trial court that granted co-defendant Steri-tech, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment is reversed.*135

II

As we mentioned previously, in the present case the plaintiff brought an action for damages against the officers or directors of Squibb Manufacturing, Inc., in their personal capacity, for their negligence regarding the security measures applicable to the victim. . He invoked, as the source and basis of his claim for damages, Art. 31 of the Law on Compensation for Workplace Accidents, 11 L.P.R.A. sec. 32, which, as pertinent, provides:

Sec. 32. Third party liability; subrogation In cases in which the injury, occupational illness or death that gives the right to compensation to the worker, employee or their beneficiaries, in accordance with this Chapter, has occurred under circumstances that make a third party responsible for such injury, illness or death , the injured worker or employee or their beneficiaries may claim and obtain damages from the third party responsible for said injury, illness or death within the year following the date on which the resolution of the case is finalized by the Administrator of the State Insurance Fund. , and this may be subrogated to the rights of the worker, employee or their beneficiaries to bring the same action....

The appellant maintains that, according to the analysis we made of the aforementioned Art. 31 of the law in the case of Lpez Rodrguez v. Delama, 102 D.P.R. 254 (1974), employer immunity does not extend to officers, shareholders, directors or co-employees. Therefore, under Art. 31, ante, a corporate officer can be sued for his negligent acts since he is the third party referred to in the law.

For his part, co-defendant Mr. Borrero maintains that the case of Lpez Rodrguez v. Delama, ante, is distinguishable from the instant case. Firstly, it alleges that the case is limited only to co-employees, with obiter dictum regarding officers, directors or shareholders. It also points out that in said case the defendant acted as *136 a mere co-employee and not in his official functions or duties, so the obligation contravened in Lpez Rodrguez v. Delama, before, is different from that of cars. The respondent further alleges that the second amended complaint alleges that he was negligent in not providing a safe place of employment. [FN17] This duty, according to the respondent, is a non-delegable duty of the corporation and not of the corporate officer. For this reason, it is understood that, although a corporate officer may be the third party referred to in the law, this, in the instant case, is protected by employer immunity because the corporate officer does not have a pre-existing duty to maintain a place work insurance, since this duty falls exclusively on the employer.

FN17. In paragraph 35 of the Second Amended Complaint the appellant made the following allegations against the defendant officers:

"That the officers and defendants of Squibb Manufacturing, Inc., named in paragraph three of the complaint, were negligent in failing to provide a safe work site, in failing to properly instruct Rivera in the use of chemical solutions, by not providing him with the appropriate regulations and orders, by ordering him to use this solution on the walls and floors, among others, and they failed in their fiduciary duty towards their employee Rivera and for this reason they are responsible for the death of Rivera." Request for review, exhibit XV, p. 6.

In Lpez Rodrguez v. Delama, before, a corporation owned a bar that was co-managed by the codefendant, Mr. Delama, who in turn was treasurer and shareholder of the insured employer. Every night at the end of the business operations, Mr. Delama, at the request of the "employer", drove the plaintiff (a waitress) to his home. One of those days, the defendant lost control of the vehicle while speeding and hit other vehicles, causing damage to the plaintiff. They limited themselves to suing the driver of the vehicle (Mr. Delama) and his insurance company. The trial court dismissed the claim on the grounds that the immunity provided to the employer in Art. 20 of the Workplace Accident Compensation Law, *137 11 L.P.R.A. sec. 21, was extended to the employee Delama.

In revoking said determination, this Court stated that:

Although there is no unanimity of opinion, the prevailing doctrine maintains that the immunity conferred by the statute to the insured employer does not extend to the directors, officers, shareholders, administrators or co-employees of said employer. [Citations omitted.] In the absence of legislative expression on the meaning of the word "third parties" used in Art. 31 of the Law, we must give it its usual meaning assuming that it includes any person other than the injured employee and his insured employer. The reason for the immunity conferred by the statute lies in the fact that the law establishes a system of compensation for work accidents through which the worker receives compensation regardless of who is responsible for the accident. It has been considered reasonable and fair that, in reciprocity, immunity be granted to the employer, on whom the economic weight of the system falls, through the payment of annual fees. But there is certainly no justification in extending the immunity conferred by law to directors, officers or other employees of the insured employer who do not personally contribute to defray the expenses of the Fund when they have engaged in negligence and caused injury to other employees. [Citations omitted.]

As Larson explains in the work cited above on page.226.3:

"It is true that a theoretical argument can be made to justify, for example, extending immunity to co-employees, as indicated above. But this type of argument becomes superficial when faced with the practical realities involved in this type of litigation. With the exception of one or another lawsuit against a corporate director, most lawsuits against co-employees are not worth it unless they are insured against public liability if an employee is injured by negligent driving. of another employee, the real question is whether the negligent co-employee's insurance company will be allowed to enjoy unjust enrichment, at the expense of the injured employee, by raising the exclusive remedy defense. Viewed from that perspective, there appears to be little. justification for extending immunity beyond the employer itself, who is the one who assumes the actual or potential responsibility for compensating his employee through the payment of premiums." (Our translation.)

In light of the doctrine set forth, it is evident that the immunity *138 conferred by law on Caf Beaumont, Inc., an insured employer, does not extend to Mr. Delama because he is a mere management co-employee. As this person is responsible, his insurance company is also responsible.(School omitted.) Lpez Rodrguez v. Delama, ante, pp. 258-259. [FN18]

FN18.It should be noted that this doctrine that does not extend employer immunity to co-employees of a corporation has become a minority. The writer Larson states that currently only ten (10) states maintain it. The aforementioned author states that "[a] strong tide toward coemployee immunity has been running for some year. As recently as 1974, a majority of states permitted suits against coemployees.... In fourteen additional states, although coemployee liability for negligence has been abolished by statute, it has been retained either by statute or by judicial decisions, for intentional wrongs." See 2A Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation Sec. 72.11, pp. 14-68 to 14-73 and esc. 13.1 (1992).

[23] There is no doubt that in Lpez Rodrguez v. Delama, before, we literally interpret Art. 31 of the law, to the effect that the "word third parties" includes any person other than the injured employee and his insured employer. In summary, the case resolves general terms that an injured employee may sue for damages against a co-employee as a result of the negligent or wrongful acts committed personally by the co-employee. Logically, the term "co-employee" includes supervisors, officers, shareholders and any other employee of equal rank. [FN19]

FN19. As we mentioned in the footnote no. 17, most state jurisdictions that had provisions similar to our Section 31 of the law also interpreted that employer immunity did not extend to co-employees. Likewise, these courts extended said reasoning to supervisors and other corporate officers. See Larson, ante, Sec. 72.13, p. 14-75, and Sec. 72.24(a), pp. 14-134 to 14-136.

We are of the opinion, however, that the facts and circumstances of the instant case are distinguishable from those of the case of Lpez Rodrguez v. Delama, before, reason why the rule implemented there is not entirely applicable to the facts of the case today before our consideration. We explain ourselves.

In Lpez Rodrguez v. Delama, before, ruled that the "immunity conferred on the insured employer did not extend to Mr. Delama because he was a mere management co-employee." *139 Mr. Delama was liable for his personal negligence, which consisted of driving a motor vehicle in a careless manner. This unlawful conduct, naturally, is based on the pre-existing duty imposed by Art. 1802 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. sec. 5141, which requires every person to drive a motor vehicle as a prudent and reasonable man. This duty, without a doubt, exists independently of the employer-employee relationship.

[24] Clearly, in Lpez Rodrguez v. Delama, ante, there was no justification for extending employer immunity to the co-employee, since his negligent acts were not related to his corporate functions or duties. Their duty of care, and responsibility, arose from the general duty imposed by Art. 1802, ante. For this reason, we understand that the norm implemented in Lpez Rodrguez v. Delama, ante, is limited to those cases in which the duty of care breached by the co-employee constitutes a personal breach of an obligation arising from Art. 1802 of the Civil Code, ante.

In the instant case, however, Mr. Borrero's obligation as president of Squibb Manufacturing, Inc. arises from his duties as a corporate officer and not from a personal obligation. The intent is to hold the corporate officer responsible for a general duty or obligation that the employer owes its employees.

Various state and federal courts have faced controversies similar to the one raised in the proceedings. [FN20] These, the vast majority, maintain that a corporate officer is immune from liability for failing to fulfill the corporation's non-delegable duty to provide its employees with a safe place of employment. See: Porter v. *140 Nutter, 913 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1990); Tyler v. Fuller, 569 A.2d 764 (1990); Rounds v. Standex Intern., 550 A.2d 98 (1988); Allen v. Kizer, 770 S.W.2d 137 (1987); Athas v. Hill, 476 A.2d 710 (1984); Greco v. Farago, 427 A.2d 98 (1984); Santiago v. Becton Dickinson & Co., S.A., 571 F. Supp. 904 (D.P.R. 1983); State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175 (1982); Craft v. Scaman, 715 S.W.2d 531 (1986); Dawley v. Thissius, 231 N.W.2d 555 (1975); West v. Jessop, 339 So.2d 1136 (1976); Kruse v. Schieve, 213 N.W.2d 64 (1973). See, generally, Note, Workers' Compensation: Third-Party Tort Liability of Corporate Officer to Injured Workers, 76 A.L.R.4th 365 (1990).

FN20. It should be noted that some of these state or federal cases have been rendered inoperative by legislative amendments that do not currently allow injured workers to sue other co-employees for damages suffered in employment as a result of their negligent acts. Nevertheless, his analysis and reasoning remain persuasive and illustrative.

On this point, the comments made by the writer Larson are particularly illustrative:

Most courts have held that status as a corporate of ficer, director, or stockholder is not of itself a bar to liability as a coemployee, since the corporate entity is the employer.

The clearest case for such liability is that in which the corporate officer is acting in his capacity as an employee--even a managerial employee--and in which the conduct involved is merely the kind of negligence or other misconduct that would normally make any coemployee liable.

... At the other extreme, the clearest case for immunity is that in which the defendant's alleged liability is predicated entirely upon his status as stockholder, and not upon some active conduct on his part.

Between these two extremes are various shades of closer cases, turning on the extent to which the defendant is in effect the alter ego of the corporation, or is at least acting as an agent or representative of the corporation, or being charged with violations of duties that are not his personal duties, but the nondelegable duties of the corporation. Short of this, most courts will hold the defendant immune if the act with which he is charged is an act done in his official capacity as an agent or representative of the corporation. Suit is also barred if the duty allegedly violated was a nondelegable duty of the corporation, such as a duty to provide a safe place to work--as distinguished from the duty of care owed by one em *141 ployee to another. (nfasis suplido.) 2A Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation Sec. 72.13.(1992).

[25][26] In this jurisdiction, as in most state jurisdictions, the legal obligation to provide a safe place of employment rests with the employer. It has a non-delegable duty to provide a workplace free of risks for its employees. See: Occupational Health and Safety Law, 29 L.P.R.A. sec. 361(e); [FN21] Vda. De Costas v. P.R. Olefins, 107 D.P.R. 782, 788 (1978). The term "non-delegable" means that there are some obligations that an employer owes to its employees that prevent the employer from being able to escape liability to the injured worker by delegating that function to other co-employees. [FN22]

FN21. Law No. 16 of August 5, 1975, as amended, 29 L.P.R.A. sec. 361(e), provides as pertinent that:

"(a) Each employer must provide each of its employees with employment and a place of employment free from recognized hazards that are causing or may cause death or physical harm to its employees.

"(b) Each employer shall provide and ensure the use of safety devices, safeguards, and personal protective equipment, as prescribed or required by the Secretary, or as reasonably necessary, at no cost to any employee.

"(c) Each employer must comply with the occupational safety and health standards promulgated under secs. 361 to 361aa of this title and with the rules, regulations and orders issued pursuant thereto."

FN22. This concept, which precedes workers' compensation schemes, comes from North American common law and was used by the injured worker to hold the employer responsible and prevent him from asserting the defenses of negligence of the partner (fellow servant doctrine). Under common law, "the fact that a duty was non-delegable only affected the liability of the corporation and not the liability of individual officers. Corporate officers to whom that duty was delegated remained responsible for the damages suffered by the third party; the effect of the non-delegable determination is that the corporation and the officers were jointly liable for the damages 'D' 3A Fletcher Corp. Sec. 1137 (Perm. ed. 1992). common law rule does not operate in the context of workers' compensation, because under this system the employer waived the defenses of negligence of the partner, assumption of risks and others. See: Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman. 394 So. 2d 334 (1981); 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant Secs.

[27][28] Within the corporate structure, the employer discharges its obligation to provide a safe place of employment through its agents, employees or corporate *142 officers. Thus, an injured worker will always find an officer who is involved in decisions regarding employee safety, or a supervisor who is in charge of implementing the company's safety standards. We determine, for public policy reasons, that when the alleged negligence of the supervisor or corporate officer arises from a failure to comply with this obligation, the injured worker cannot sue the co-employee; The duty of adequate supervision is an obligation of the employee to his employer and not to his co-worker. While the employee or officer is discharging the general responsibilities of his position, any violation of this duty is exclusively attributable to the employer. In such cases, the injured employee can only turn to the State Insurance Fund.

Our reason for deciding is inspired by the rational purpose of the Workers' Compensation Law and the public policy that inspires it. For these purposes, in Ruiz Daz v. Vargas Reyes, 109 D.P.R. 761, 763 (1980), we express that:

The principle of exclusive insurance and immunity of the employer, anchor of the Law... emerged as a remedy of social justice for the defenselessness of the worker in a nascent industrial regime that combined free acceptance... "his poverty and not his will consented 'D'. The remedy for this situation was developed in a concept of strict or absolute liability of the employer that eliminated the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and negligence of the co-worker, in a manner of "commitment under which the worker accepts limited compensation, generally less than what a [judge] would grant for their damages, in exchange for the expanded liability of the employer, and the assurance that it would be paid" [FN23] with the corresponding *143 tive immunity of the employer covered by the statute of insurance. against the employer.(Emphasis in the original suppressed and scholia omitted.)

FN23. "Absolute liability has promoted satisfactory results in that injured workers have immediate assistance, a common source of friction between employer and employee has been eliminated, an onerous burden of costly litigation has been eliminated, and a more harmonious relationship between employers has been achieved. and employees than allowed by the old system. Prosser, op. cit., p. Ruiz Daz v. Vargas Reyes, 109 D.P.R. 761, 764 sc. 3 (1980).

[29] The purpose of our Workers' Compensation Act was not to transfer the burden of industrial accidents from one employee to another. We understand, therefore, that allowing injured workers to sue corporate officers would violate and disrupt the statutory scheme that was designed to impose certain exclusive obligations on employers whenever employees are injured on the job. Imposing liability on corporate officers for workplace accidents that are related to an unsafe condition of employment would have the undesirable consequence of discouraging the acceptance and performance of such positions by qualified persons and would require, in our opinion, employers to insure and indemnify its corporate officers or employees under another type of insurance or coverage. In addition, the co-employee would be responsible for violating a duty of the corporation that was already compensated through the payment of premiums to the State Insurance Fund.

[30][31] Consequently, we resolve that, under our workers' compensation scheme, an employee - whether an officer, shareholder or supervisor - is protected by employer immunity when the alleged negligence of the co-employee consists of allegedly violating the non-delegable duty of the corporation to provide a safe place of employment. [FN24] *144 Several state and federal courts have adopted reasoning similar to that set forth here.[FN25]

FN24. We do not resolve, because it is not raised, whether the employer's immunity covers this employee - officer, shareholder or supervisor - when there has been, on his part, an intentional act and/or an act in which gross negligence has been involved and in contravention of the employer's duty to provide a safe place of employment. We therefore reiterate what was resolved in Santiago Hodge v. Parke Davis Co., 126 D.P.R. 1 (1990); case in which we refuse to automatically extend employer immunity to third parties.

FN25. In Rounds v. Standex Intern., 550 A.2d 98, 102 (1988), the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated:

"Therefore, we now hold that the duty to maintain a safe workplace rests exclusively with the employer, not the employee. To hold otherwise would vitiate the purpose of the workers' compensation law. In executing its duties an employer must always find employees to carry them out. [Citation omitted.] To charge the employee with the same duty as the employer would effectively sidestep the workers' compensation law and hold the employee liable for breach of the same duty already compensated for through the payment of benefits. are mindful of the additional public policy concern in exposing officers and employees to personal liability with every injury caused by an unsafe workplace.... [Citations omitted.] An employee will be liable in negligence for the injuries of a fellow employee only upon breach of a duty distinct from the employer's duty to maintain a safe workplace."

In Athas v. Hill, 476 A.2d 710, 718-719 (1984), the Maryland Court of Appeals stated that: