In order to learn how people actually play in game situations, economists and other social scientists frequently
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In this problem we will deal with a two-player version of the voluntary public goods game. Two players are put in separate rooms. Each player is given $10. The player can use this money in either of two ways. He can keep it or he can contribute it to a “public fund.” Money that goes into the public fund gets multiplied by 1.6 and then divided equally between the two players. If both contribute their $10, then each gets back $20 × 1.6/2 = $16. If one contributes and the other does not, each gets back $10 × 1.6/2 = $8 from the public fund so that the contributor has $8 at the end of the game and the non-contributor has $18–his original $10 plus $8 back from the public fund. If neither contributes, both have their original $10. The payoff matrix for this game is:
(a) If the other player keeps, what is your payoff if you keep? $10.
If the other player keeps, what is your payoff if you contribute? $8.
(b) If the other player contributes, what is your payoff if you keep? $18. If the other player contributes, what is your payoff if you contribute? $16.
(c) Does this game have a dominant strategy equilibrium? Yes. If so, what is it? Both keep.
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