1. The concept of imposing liability on the employer for the fault of an employee is known as vicarious liability. When may an employer be vicariously liable under Title VII for an employee’s unlawful harassment?

2. Assuming a harasser is not a supervisor, can a plaintiff still prevail in a lawsuit contending that the employer was negligent in failing to stop the harassment once it was brought to the employer’s attention?

Maetta Vance sued her employer Ball State University (BSU) alleging that a fellow employee Saundra Davis, created a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The trial court dismissed the case because Davis was not a “supervisor,” and the matter progressed to the U.S. Supreme Court for resolution.

JUDICIAL OPINION

ALITO, J.…

I.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer … to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). This provision obviously prohibits discrimination with respect to employment decisions that have direct economic consequences, such as termination, demotion, and pay cuts. But not long after Title VII was enacted, the lower courts held that Title VII also reaches the creation or perpetuation of a discriminatory work environment.…

II.

We hold that an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s unlawful harassment only when the employer has empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”

Ellerth, supra, at 761, 118 S. Ct. 2257. We reject the nebulous definition of a “supervisor” advocated in the EEOC Guidance and substantially adopted by several courts of appeals. Petitioner’s reliance on colloquial uses of the term “supervisor” is misplaced, and her contention that our cases require the EEOC’s abstract definition is simply wrong.…

III.

In any event, the dissent is wrong in claiming that our holding would preclude employer liability in other cases with facts similar to these. Assuming that a harasser is not a supervisor, a plaintiff could still prevail by showing that his or her employer was negligent in failing to prevent harassment from taking place. Evidence that an employer did not monitor the workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a system for registering complaints, or effectively discouraged complaints from being filed would be relevant. Thus, it is not true, as the dissent asserts, that our holding “relieves scores of employers of responsibility” for the behavior of workers they employ.…

Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice BREYER, Justice SOTOMAYOR, and Justice KAGAN join, dissented.