Beginning in 1977, the city of Cleveland entered into a consent decree to recruit more minority firefighters. It admittedly had discriminated in hiring minority candidates in the past, and its minority hires were only 4% of the department, but a much larger percent of the population. The court retained jurisdiction for purposes of supervision and monitoring. By 2000, the city had improved minority recruiting to 24%. The consent decree was amended in 2000, with the goal of raising the percentage of new hires to 33%. But white applicants who had applied between 2000 and 2002, and not hired, sued on the basis of discrimination because of the consent decree’s race-based hiring requirements. 

1. What were the issues before the courts in these two decisions? What did the appeals court (“Cleveland Firefighters (I)” decide? What did the district court (Cleveland Firefighters II”) decide? 

2. What did the consent decree, as amended, require of the city? Why was a consent decree needed in the first place?

3. Why did the district court conclude that the race-conscious measures called for by the consent decree were no longer constitutional? Why did the district court’s analysis not end with that finding?

4. What are the six factors that the district court considered in reaching its decision that the consent decree, in its totality, would not be extended? How did the district court apply those factors?

5. Would the city have made as much progress as it did without the legal challenges and consent decree? Why or why not? Should we be concerned that, despite this progress, 24 percent of firefighters are minority group members in a city with a nearly 60 percent minority population – and that this figure has not grown for over a decade? Why or why not? How likely is it that, released from monitoring for compliance with the consent decree, the city will backslide? Why do you say that?