1. How did the Supreme Court majority respond to the court of appeals’ determination that the EEOC’s remedy options were limited to injunctive relief in a situation where an employee signed a mandatory arbitration agreement?
2. Is it possible for the EEOC to pursue entirely victim-specific relief and yet be seeking to vindicate a public interest? Explain.
3. Comment on the dissent’s view that “Baker waived his right to seek relief for himself in a judicial forum by signing an arbitration agreement.”

[Like all prospective employees of Waffle House, Inc., Eric Baker signed an employment application that stated, "the parties agree that any dispute or claim" concerning his employment would be "settled by binding arbitration." Baker was hired as grill cook on August 10, 1994. Some 16 days later he suffered a seizure at work, and soon thereafter he was discharged by the employer. Baker filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that his discharge was a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Baker did not initiate arbitration proceedings. After investigating and attempting without success to conciliate the charge of discrimination, the EEOC filed an enforcement action in a U.S. district court, asserting that the employer discharged Baker "because of his disability" in violation of his federal rights, and it sought specific relief designed to make Baker whole, including reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. The employer filed a petition with the district court to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, which was denied by the court. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the arbitration agreement signed by Eric Baker barred the EEOC from seeking victim-specific relief for Mr. Baker. The Fourth Circuit determined that the EEOC's remedy options were limited to injunctive relief in a situation where an employee has signed a mandatory arbitration agreement. The matter was appealed to the Supreme Court.]
STEVENS, J….
I.
… The FAA was enacted in 1925, 43 Stat. 883, and then reenacted and codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code. It has not been amended since the enactment of Title VII in 1964. As we have explained, its "purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). The FAA broadly provides that a written provision in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract … shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Employment contracts, except for those covering workers engaged in transportation, are covered by the FAA. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
The FAA provides for stays of proceedings in federal district courts when an issue in the proceeding is referable to arbitration, and for orders compelling arbitration when one party has failed or refused to comply with an arbitration agreement. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4. We have read these provisions to "manifest a 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.'"… Absent some ambiguity in the agreement, however, it is the language of the contract that defines the scope of disputes subject to arbitration…. For nothing in the statute authorizes a court to compel arbitration of any issues, or by any parties, that are not already covered in the agreement. The FAA does not mention enforcement by public agencies; it ensures the enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate, but otherwise does not purport to place any restriction on a nonparty's choice of a judicial forum.

II.
The Court of Appeals based its decision on its evaluation of the "competing policies" implemented by the ADA and the FAA, rather than on any language in the text of either the statutes or the arbitration agreement between Baker and respondent. 193 F.3d, at 812. It recognized that the EEOC never agreed to arbitrate its statutory claim, id., at 811 ("We must also recognize that in this case the EEOC is not a party to any arbitration agreement"), and that the EEOC has "independent statutory authority" to vindicate the public interest, but opined that permitting the EEOC to prosecute Baker's claim in court "would significantly trample" the strong federal policy favoring arbitration because Baker had agreed to submit his claim to arbitration. Id., at 812. To effectuate this policy, the court distinguished between injunctive and victim-specific relief, and held that the EEOC is barred from obtaining the latter because any public interest served when the EEOC pursues "make whole" relief is outweighed by the policy goals favoring arbitration. Only when the EEOC seeks broad injunctive relief, in the Court of Appeals' view, does the public interest overcome the goals underpinning the FAA…

If it were true that the EEOC could prosecute its claim only with Baker's consent, or if its prayer for relief could be dictated by Baker, the court's analysis might be persuasive. But once a charge is filed, the exact opposite is true under the statute-the EEOC is in command of the process. The EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim for 180 days. During that time, the employee must obtain a right-to-sue letter from the agency before prosecuting the claim. If, however, the EEOC files suit on its own, the employee has no independent cause of action, although the employee may intervene in the EEOC's suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994 ed.). In fact, the EEOC takes the position that it may pursue a claim on the employee's behalf even after the employee has disavowed any desire to seek relief. Brief for Petitioner 20. The statute clearly makes the EEOC the master of its own case and confers on the agency the authority to evaluate the strength of the public interest at stake. Absent textual support for a contrary view, it is the public agency's province-not that of the court-to determine whether public resources should be committed to the recovery of victim-specific relief. And if the agency makes that determination, the statutory text unambiguously authorizes it to proceed in a judicial forum….
… Rather than attempt to split the difference, we are persuaded that, pursuant to Title VII and the ADA, whenever the EEOC chooses from among the many charges filed each year to bring an enforcement action in a particular case, the agency may be seeking to vindicate a public interest, not simply provide make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely victim-specific relief.
To hold otherwise would undermine the detailed enforcement scheme created by Congress simply to give greater effect to an agreement between private parties that does not even contemplate the EEOC's statutory function….
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, Dissenting…
The Court holds today that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) may obtain victim-specific remedies in court on behalf of an employee who had agreed to arbitrate discrimination claims against his employer. This decision conflicts with both the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and the basic principle that the EEOC must take a victim of discrimination as it finds him. Absent explicit statutory authorization to the contrary, I cannot agree that the EEOC may do on behalf of an employee that which an employee has agreed not to do for himself. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals….