Ricardo Infante was charged with interstate stalking. After the preliminary hearing, Infante requested dismissal of the complaint. The District Court of Arizona dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.

Whenever a man does a thoroughly stupid thing, it is always from the noblest motives.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Request for Dismissal of Complaint, Discharge of Defendant pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 5.1(f). Defendant argues that the Government has not established probable cause that Defendant committed the crime of Interstate Stalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefing on the issue. The Court finds insufficient evidence was presented at the March 12, 2010 preliminary hearing to hold all Defendant to answer to the Western District of New York for trial on the crime charged.

I. Background The Government alleges that on or about February through February 10, 2010, Defendant committed the crime of Interstate Stalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. . . . In June 2009, L.B., the alleged victim, met Defendant at Arizona State University. They attended the same course, which included a three week trip to Russia which they both attended. L.B. and Defendant had coffee one time, and L.B.

determined she was not interested in him. L.B. returned home to New Jersey after the conclusion of the course at A.S.U.
While in New Jersey, on August 28, 2009, Defendant contacted L.B. via her internet Facebook account. In September 2009, L.B. returned to the University of Rochester, located in Rochester, New York. On February 6, 2010, Defendant sent L.B. an e-mail and several others between February 6 and 8, 2010. In one e-mail, Defendant stated that he had a “powerful longing” for L.B. He also stated, in a text message, that he wanted L.B.’s forgiveness for having been “a jerk, a masochist and even a criminal all this time. . ..”
On February 8, 2010, L.B. received two phone messages from Defendant in which he said he was in Rochester and wanted to see her. On February 8, 2010, L.B. received an e-mail from the University of Rochester Common Connection, advising her that a florist had flowers for her to pick up. L.B. called the florist and learned that the flowers were from Defendant. On February 11, 2010, the flower shop advised Investigator Lafferty that Defendant personally came into the shop on February 5, 2010 and ordered the flowers for L.B.
On February 9, 2010, . . .Defendant stated that he flew to Rochester on February 4, 2010, and went to the University of Rochester’s campus trying to find L.B. Defendant explained how he tried to contact L.B. through e-mails, phone messages, through Professor Laura Givens, and through flowers and gifts. He indicated that he saw L.B. during his weekend in Rochester, including one occasion in the library.
He stated that he did not get any closer to her than 10 to 15 feet, and did not want to make eye contact with her. L.B. told the police that she suffered substantial emotional distress as a result of Defendant traveling to Rochester and trying to contact her.

*** Interstate Stalking, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A Title 18 U.S.C. § 2261A provides, in relevant part, that: Whoever-(1) travels in interstate ... commerce ... with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate or to place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass or intimidate another person, and in the course of, or as a result of, such travel places that person in reasonable fear of the death, or serious bodily injury to, or causes substantial emotional distress to that person, a member of the immediate family ... of that person, or the spouse or intimate partner of that person ... shall be punished as provided in section 2261(b).
Section 2261A has three elements: (1) interstate travel occurred; (2) a defendant’s intent was to injure or harass another person; and (3) the person defendant intended to harass or injure was placed in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury to herself or a member of her family as a result of that travel. Defendant does not dispute the first and third elements. Rather, Defendant argues that the Government has not established probable cause that his interstate travel was done with the “intent to harass” or with the “intent to place under surveillance with the intent to harass,” the alleged victim, L.B.
Mens Rea of Intent to Harass The Interstate Stalking Statute does not clearly articulate the state of mind required to satisfy the “intent to harass” element of the offense. Defendant argues that the legislative history indicates that the Government “must establish that the defendant’s state of mind was of a purposeful intent to create a severe adverse reaction in the victim.” Relying on Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 252 (1976), the Government argues that the general rule in criminal cases is that intent will be inferred from objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. The Government further argues that circumstantial evidence establishes that Defendant’s purpose for traveling to Rochester was to harass L.B.
. . . Based on the foregoing, the [court] concludes that the “intent-to-harass” element of the Interstate Stalking Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, requires that a defendant act with the purpose to harass.
. . . Defendant’s alleged acts here show that he was trying to get a second romantic chance with L.B. and earn her forgiveness. Although he did travel to Rochester to locate L.B. to “woo” her back, he never sent her any threatening messages before or after his travels, did not try to contact her in person on the one occasion he thought he saw her on campus. Defendant simply tried to send her flowers and small gifts, typical gestures of affection, that were left for L.B. at a flower shop for her to pick up. No evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing that after he returned from Rochester to Arizona, Defendant had any further direct or indirect contact with L.B.
. . . From the express language used by Congress in adopting 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, the issue is not whether the Government presented sufficient evidence that a reasonable person would find Defendant’s conduct constituted harassment of L.B.; rather, the issue is whether the Government presented sufficient evidence to show that Defendant’s conduct was done with “the intent and purpose” to harass L.B. The Court finds that “a person of ordinary prudence and caution [would not]
conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief” that Defendant’s travel and conduct in Rochester, New York was with “the intent and purpose” to harass L.B. Coleman, 477 F.2d at 1202.
In conclusion, the Complaint should be dismissed . . . because the Government has failed to establish probable cause exists that Defendant had the requisite intent to harass, a necessary element to the federal Interstate Stalking Statute, 18 U.S.C. 2261A.

Questions:-

1. What are the elements necessary to convict a defendant under the federal stalking statute, 18 U.S.C. 2261A?
2. What is defendant’s legal argument? Do you think the defendant acted with the “intent to harass” L.B.?