The narrow issue on this appeal is who should bear the loss of a truck and an attached haystack mover that was destroyed by fire while in the possession of the plaintiff, Israel Martin (Martin), but after certificate of title had been delivered to the defendant, Melland’s Inc. (Melland’s). The destroyed haymoving unit was to be used as a trade-in for a new haymoving unit that Martin ultimately purchased from Melland’s. Martin appeals from a district court judgment dated September 28, 1978, that dismissed his action on the merits after it found that at the time of its destruction Martin was the owner of the unit pursuant to [UCC Section 2–401]. We hold that Section 2–401 is inapplicable to this case, but we affirm the district court judgment on the grounds that risk of loss had not passed to Melland’s pursuant to [UCC Section 2–509].

   On June 11, 1974, Martin entered into a written agreement with Melland’s, a farm implement dealer, to purchase a truck and attached haystack mover for the total purchase price of $35,389. Martin was given a trade-in allowance of $17,389 on his old unit, leaving a balance owing of $18,000 plus sales tax of $720 or a total balance of $18,720. The agreement provided that Martin ‘‘mail or bring title’’ to the old unit to Melland’s ‘‘this week.’’ Martin mailed the certificate of title to Melland’s pursuant to the agreement, but he was allowed to retain the use and possession of the old unit ‘‘until they had the new one ready.’’ The new unit was not expected to be ready for two to three months because it required certain modifications. During this interim period, Melland’s performed minor repairs to the trade-in unit on two occasions without charging Martin for the repairs.

   Fire destroyed the truck and the haymoving unit in early August, 1974, while Martin was moving hay. The parties did not have any agreement regarding insurance or risk of loss on the unit and Martin’s insurance on the trade-in unit had lapsed. Melland’s refused Martin’s demand for his new unit and Martin brought this suit. * * *

   The district court found ‘‘that although the Plaintiff [Martin] executed the title to the * * * [haymoving unit], he did not relinquish possession of the same and therefore the Plaintiff was the owner of said truck at the time the fire occurred pursuant to Section 2–401.’’ [Martin appealed.]

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   * * * the concept of title under the UCC is of decreased importance.

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   No longer is the question of title of any importance in determining whether a buyer or seller bears the risk of loss. [Citation.]

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   Thus, the question in this case is not answered by a determination of the location of title, but by the risk of loss provisions in [UCC §2–509]. Before addressing the risk of loss question in conjunction with [UCC §2–509], it is necessary to determine the posture of the parties with regard to the trade-in unit, i.e., who is the buyer and the seller and how are the responsibilities allocated. It is clear that a barter or trade-in is considered a sale and is therefore subject to the Uniform Commercial Code. [Citations.] It is also clear that the party who owns the trade-in is considered the seller. [UCC §2–304] provides that the ‘‘price can be made payable in money or otherwise. If it is payable in whole or in part in goods each party is a seller of the goods which he is to transfer.’’ [Citations.]

   Martin argues that he had already sold the trade-in unit to Melland’s and, although he retained possession, he did so in the capacity of a bailee (apparently pursuant to [UCC §2–509(2)]). White and Summers in their hornbook on the Uniform Commercial Code argue that the seller who retains possession should not be considered bailee within Section 2–509.

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   The courts that have addressed this issue have agreed with White and Summers. [Citations.]

   It is undisputed that the contract did not require or authorize shipment by carrier pursuant to Section [2–509(1)]; therefore, the residue section, subsection 3, is applicable:

In any case not within subsection 1 or 2, the risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery.

   Martin admits that he is not a merchant; therefore, it is necessary to determine if Martin tendered delivery of the trade-in unit to Melland’s. * * *

   It is clear that the trade-in unit was not tendered to Melland’s in this case. The parties agreed that Martin would keep the old unit ‘‘until they had the new one ready.’’

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   We hold that Martin did not tender delivery of the trade-in truck and haystack mover to Melland’s pursuant to [UCC §2–509]; consequently, Martin must bear the loss.

   We affirm the district court judgment.