In Figure 5.2b, we saw that traditional one-person-one-vote (1p1v) majority voting results in an inefficient majority Yes vote (two in favor, one opposed). Let’s see whether the outcome is better under quadratic voting.

a. How much will Garcia be willing to spend on votes?

b. How much each will Johnson and Lee be willing to spend on votes?

c. How many votes will Garcia purchase? How many will Johnson and Lee each purchase?

d. What is the total number of votes cast for No? For Yes?

e. Approval of this project requires a 50-percent-plus-1 majority.

Will the project be approved?

f. Does quadratic voting lead to the economically efficient outcome here?

Figure 5.2b:

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Benefit; Tax $300 0 Total benefit = $800 Total cost = $900 $300 per- person tax $100 Garcia (No) $350 Johnson $350 Lee (Yes) (b) Inefficient majority "yes" vote (Yes)