Not yet answered Marked out of 27.00 Flag question Assume two individuals, Joe on the left...

  

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Not yet answered Marked out of 27.00 Flag question Assume two individuals, Joe on the left Time left 0:44:03 the top just met one another and are thinking or becoming friends. They plan to behave in the respective ways to one another: nice, indifferent (don't care), and mean. "I know, very strange but this is what happens when you are an Economist!" Assume that the payoff will be how good they feel after these particular strategies are followed through with a positive number being good and negative being bad. First number being the left player's decision payoff and second number being the top player's decision payoff. Figure out the game below in a onetime game (Happens only once). Strategies Be Nice Be Nice Be Indifferent Be Mean 0,1 B/600, B/200,2 B/600 Be Indifferent 2, B/200 B-A, B-A 0,0 Finish attempt Conditions: B<A; B is greater or equal to 600 Please state the Nash equilibrium(s) and Pareto Optimal(s) under the two different scenarios (No Explanation; No Marks) Hint: (Copy and paste the Chart Below and draw out the stars). (12) a. b. How does an increase in B in this game change the results of the two players? Why does this happen? Explain. (10) Is there ever a world where being mean to one another will be a good thing to both individuals in this game? Explain (5) C. Not yet answered Marked out of 27.00 Flag question Assume two individuals, Joe on the left Time left 0:44:03 the top just met one another and are thinking or becoming friends. They plan to behave in the respective ways to one another: nice, indifferent (don't care), and mean. "I know, very strange but this is what happens when you are an Economist!" Assume that the payoff will be how good they feel after these particular strategies are followed through with a positive number being good and negative being bad. First number being the left player's decision payoff and second number being the top player's decision payoff. Figure out the game below in a onetime game (Happens only once). Strategies Be Nice Be Nice Be Indifferent Be Mean 0,1 B/600, B/200,2 B/600 Be Indifferent 2, B/200 B-A, B-A 0,0 Finish attempt Conditions: B<A; B is greater or equal to 600 Please state the Nash equilibrium(s) and Pareto Optimal(s) under the two different scenarios (No Explanation; No Marks) Hint: (Copy and paste the Chart Below and draw out the stars). (12) a. b. How does an increase in B in this game change the results of the two players? Why does this happen? Explain. (10) Is there ever a world where being mean to one another will be a good thing to both individuals in this game? Explain (5) C.