Question: Two major networks are competing for viewer ratings in the 8:00ï­9:00 pm and 9:00ï­10:00 pm slots on a given weeknight. Each has two shows to

Two major networks are competing for viewer ratings in the 8:009:00 pm and 9:0010:00 pm slots on a given weeknight. Each has two shows to fill these time periods and is juggling its lineup. Each can choose to put its €œbigger€ show first or to place it second in the 9:00€“10:00 pm slot. The combination of decisions leads to the following €œratings points€ results:
Two major networks are competing for viewer ratings in the

a. Find the Nash equilibria for this game, assuming that both networks make their decisions at the same time.
b. If each network is risk averse and uses a maximin strategy, what will be the resulting equilibrium?
c. What will be the equilibrium if Network 1 makes its selection first? If Network 2 goes first?
d. Suppose the network managers meet to coordinate schedules and Network 1 promises to schedule its big show first. Is this promise credible? What would be the likely outcome?

Network 2 First 20, 30 15, 15 Second 18, 18 30, 10 3 First Network 1 ali Second

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