Question: Two major networks are competing for viewer ratings in the 8:00ï9:00 pm and 9:00ï10:00 pm slots on a given weeknight. Each has two shows to
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a. Find the Nash equilibria for this game, assuming that both networks make their decisions at the same time.
b. If each network is risk averse and uses a maximin strategy, what will be the resulting equilibrium?
c. What will be the equilibrium if Network 1 makes its selection first? If Network 2 goes first?
d. Suppose the network managers meet to coordinate schedules and Network 1 promises to schedule its big show first. Is this promise credible? What would be the likely outcome?
Network 2 First 20, 30 15, 15 Second 18, 18 30, 10 3 First Network 1 ali Second
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a A Nash equilibrium exists when neither party has an incentive to alter its strategy taking the oth... View full answer
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