Two major networks are competing for viewer ratings in the 8:009:00 pm and 9:0010:00 pm slots on a given weeknight. Each has two shows to fill these time periods and is juggling its lineup. Each can choose to put its €œbigger€ show first or to place it second in the 9:00€“10:00 pm slot. The combination of decisions leads to the following €œratings points€ results:

a. Find the Nash equilibria for this game, assuming that both networks make their decisions at the same time.
b. If each network is risk averse and uses a maximin strategy, what will be the resulting equilibrium?
c. What will be the equilibrium if Network 1 makes its selection first? If Network 2 goes first?
d. Suppose the network managers meet to coordinate schedules and Network 1 promises to schedule its big show first. Is this promise credible? What would be the likely outcome?

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Network 2 First 20, 30 15, 15 Second 18, 18 30, 10 3 First Network 1 ali Second