# 1. Consider two firms engaging in sequential Stackelberg competition. Suppose firm 1 decides its quantity x1 first and firms 2 follows after observing x1. The demand function of the market is x(p) = 100 - 0.1p and the cost function for both firms are c(x) = FC + 5 x^2(a) Suppose first that FC = 0. Derive firm 2's best

1. Consider two firms engaging in sequential Stackelberg competition.

Suppose firm 1 decides its quantity x1 first and firms 2 follows after observing x1. The demand function of the market is x(p) = 100 - 0.1p and the cost function for both firms are c(x) = FC + 5 x^2

(a) Suppose first that FC = 0. Derive firm 2's best response function to observing firm 1's output level x1.

(b) What output level will firm 1 choose?

(c) What output level does that imply firm 2 will choose?

(d) What is the equilibrium Stackelberg price?

(e) Now suppose FC is not zero. What is the lowest FC at which firm 1 does not have to engage in strategic entry deterrence in order to keep firm 2 out of the market?

Suppose firm 1 decides its quantity x1 first and firms 2 follows after observing x1. The demand function of the market is x(p) = 100 - 0.1p and the cost function for both firms are c(x) = FC + 5 x^2

(a) Suppose first that FC = 0. Derive firm 2's best response function to observing firm 1's output level x1.

(b) What output level will firm 1 choose?

(c) What output level does that imply firm 2 will choose?

(d) What is the equilibrium Stackelberg price?

(e) Now suppose FC is not zero. What is the lowest FC at which firm 1 does not have to engage in strategic entry deterrence in order to keep firm 2 out of the market?

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## Microeconomics An Intuitive Approach with Calculus

1st edition

Authors: Thomas Nechyba

ISBN: 978-0538453257