Filene’s Basement, Inc. hired Kathleen Mason as president of Filene’s Basement Division and chief merchandising officer in May 1999. Mason left a high-paying position as president of Home Goods, Inc. to join Filene’s at a time when it was already experiencing financial difficulty. The parties signed an employment agreement that provided, among other things, that Mason would receive three years’ salary and other fringe benefits in the event she was terminated without cause. Filene’s filed for relief under Chapter 11 in August 1999. After the filing, Mason continued to provide services pursuant to the prepetition employment agreement and received the salary and benefits specified in the agreement. According to Mason, she was induced to remain with the company by the DIP’s postpetition promise that her employment agreement was in effect and would be honored. She also spoke with her attorney about the status of the agreement, and he recommended that the DIP seek formal bankruptcy approval of the agreement. Meanwhile, Filene’s operations were quickly downsized: thirty-five of its fifty-five stores were closed shortly after the petition date, and on November 9, 1999, Mason was notified that she was being put on “administrative leave,” with pay, pending a motion by the DIP to reject her employment agreement. In February 2000, the bankruptcy court granted the motion to reject the employment agreement; Mason was terminated four days later. Mason then filed a “Request for Payment of Chapter 11 Expenses,” in which she claimed that her termination benefits specified in the employment agreement were entitled to first priority as administrative expenses because she was terminated after rendering postpetition services. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors opposed the request. What will Mason argue in support of her claim for termination benefits? What will the committee argue in opposition? Who wins and on what basis? What, if anything, could have been done to avoid this dispute? [In re FBI Distribution Corp. v. Mason, 330 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2003).]