ITS operates a container terminal through which imports and exports pass continuously.
Through its membership in the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA), the company indirectly employs longshoremen represented by local unions affiliated with the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU). ITS directly employs its office clerical workers, a bargaining unit represented by the Office Clerical Unit (the union) of ILWU. The company also employs a single "payroll and billing representative." When ITS hired Deanna Tartaglia as the payroll and billing representative, the union was not authorized to bargain on her behalf. The union presented ITS with a letter demanding recognition as the bargaining representative of a single-employee unit consisting of Tartaglia. ITS rejected the demand and refused to recognize the union as Tartaglia's bargaining representative. Two union representatives and Tartaglia immediately responded by picketing. No other ITS employees joined the picket line, but many ILWU-affiliated employees ceased working. The work stoppage, having brought the terminal to a halt, prompted ITS to request expedited arbitration with ILWU through the PMA. Within a few hours, the arbitrator concluded that the picket line was not bona fide and ruled in the company's favor, allowing ITS to refuse to pay employees who honored the picket line. Although not subject to the arbitration, the union and Tartaglia ended the picket line following the ruling. Because her actions triggered delays and a loss of revenue for ITS, it fired Tartaglia. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against ITS for Tartaglia's termination. An ALJ found that ITS had committed an unfair labor practice by discharging Tartaglia for picketing. The NLRB adopted the ALJ's ruling, which held on two alternative grounds that Tartaglia had engaged in protected activity.
ITS petitioned for review of the Board's decision. Did the court determine that Tartaglia's actions were protected? Why? International Transportation Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 449 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2006).