1. What is the significance of the court’s requirement that there must be proof of market power before tying an unpatented product to a patented product as an antitrust violation?

2. What will Independent need to establish once the case is remanded?

3. Explain when and how you could tie a product to one of your other products without running afoul of the federal antitrust laws.

Trident, Inc., and its parent, Illinois Tool Works Inc. (petitioners), manufacture and market printing systems that include: (1) a patented piezoelectric impulse ink jet printhead, (2) a patented ink container, consisting of a bottle and valve cap, which attaches to the printhead, and (3) specially designed, but unpatented, ink. These products are sold to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) who are licensed to incorporate the printheads and containers into printers that are in turn sold to companies for use in printing barcodes on cartons and packaging materials. The OEMs agree that they will purchase their ink exclusively from Illinois, and that neither they nor their customers will refill the patented containers with ink of any kind.

Independent Ink, Inc. has developed an ink with the same chemical composition as the ink sold by Illinois. Independent Ink filed suit, alleging that Illinois’s agreements with customers constituted an illegal tying and monopolization in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2.

The federal district court granted summary judgment for Illinois, and Independent appealed. The appellate court reversed the decision and Illinois appealed.

JUDICIAL OPINION

STEVENS, Justice … As we explained in Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S., at 12, 104 S.Ct. 1551, “[o]ur cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller’s exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.”

Over the years, however, this Court’s strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substantially diminished.

Rather than relying on assumptions, in its more recent opinions the Court has required a showing of market power in the tying product. Our early opinions consistently assumed that “[t]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”

In Jefferson Parish, we unanimously reversed a Court of Appeals judgment holding that an alleged tying arrangement constituted a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 466 U.S., at 5, 104 S.Ct. 1551. The tying product in Jefferson Parish—hospital services—was unpatented, and our holding again rested on the conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to prove sufficient power in the tying product market to restrain competition in the market for the tied product— services of anesthesiologists.

In rejecting the application of a per se rule that all tying arrangements constitute antitrust violations, we explained: “[W]e have condemned tying arrangements when the seller has some special ability—usually called ‘market power’—to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market ....”