In April 2015, Elvis, Edison, and Romi Mirzaie filed an action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against the Monsanto Company for allegedly violating California’s False Advertising Law. The plaintiffs claimed the label on a weed killing product, Roundup, was false and misleading.
On Roundup’s label, it states “Glyphosate targets an enzyme found in plants but not in people or pets.” However, the plaintiffs allege that because glyphosate targets EPSP synthase, it kills human gut bacteria in addition to weeds. Furthermore, because plants absorb glyphosate through topical exposure, human consumption of crops treated with the chemical cause the chemical to build up in human tissue, thereby disrupting the gut bacteria.
The plaintiffs claimed that they were injured because of the mislabeling because they bought Roundup under the assumption that they would not be affected by the glyphosate. Monsanto moved to dismiss the complaint, raising a threshold issue concerning preemption of California’s False Advertising Law by FIFRA.
JUDGE PREGERSON Defendants contend, as a threshold issue, that Plaintiffs’ claims, which revolve around a request for injunctive relief, are preempted by the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). “The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that any state law conflicting with federal law is preempted by the federal law and is without effect.” Courts must look to congressional intent to determine whether state law is preempted by a federal statute.
FIFRA, originally enacted in 1947, was amended in 1972 to convert it “from a labeling law into a comprehensive regulatory statute.” “As amended, FIFRA regulate[s] the use, as well as the sale and labeling, of pesticides; regulate[s] pesticides produced and sold in both intrastate and interstate commerce; [and]
provide[s] for review, cancellation, and suspension of registration.” FIFRA addresses the authority of states to regulate pesticides as follows:

(a) In general A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.

(b) Uniformity Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.
In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, the Supreme Court addressed whether 7 U.S.C. § 136v preempted certain state law claims, including tort claims, fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The Court held that state law rules, whether statutory or derived from common law, is preempted if two conditions are met. “First, [the state law] must be a requirement for labeling or packaging… Second, it must impose a labeling or packaging requirement that is in addition to or different from those required under [FIFRA].” FIFRA forbids pesticide labels from bearing any statement that is “false or misleading in any particular.”
There can be no dispute that Plaintiffs seek to impose a labeling requirement different or in addition to that required under FIFRA, as the Roundup label to which Plaintiffs object, and which Plaintiffs seek to alter, was approved by the Environmental Protection Agency in 2008. The only question, therefore, is whether the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek would constitute a requirement for labeling or packaging. The Ninth Circuit, even prior to Bates, answered this question in the affirmative in Nathan Kimmel. There, the court held that “an injunction imposed against a manufacturer to change its [EPA-approved] label would represent a state-mandated labeling requirement and would therefore be preempted.” The court reasoned that the injunction would be “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting FIFRA.” As further explained in Bates, “the term ‘requirements’ in § 136v

(b) [FIFRA] reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to embrace common-law duties.”
Here, because the injunction Plaintiffs seek under Section 17500 would require Defendant to alter its label, Plaintiffs’ request falls squarely within the definition of “requirements.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims are preempted by FIFRA.
CRITICAL THINKING:
What kind of argument did the court make in this case? Why was there no need to cite evidence at this stage?
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING:
What value preferences are evident in the Bates and Kimmel opinions by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court, respectively?