In January 1983, Margaret Kawaauhau was treated by Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury. After examining Kawaauhau, Geiger prescribed oral penicillin to her despite his knowledge that intravenous penicillin would be more effective in fighting a potential infection. Geiger testified that he prescribed the oral penicillin because he knew that Kawaauhau was concerned about costs. Geiger then left town and placed Kawaauhau in the care of another physician, who transferred Kawaauhau to an infectious disease specialist. When Geiger returned, he canceled the transfer to the specialist and stopped Kawaauhau’s antibiotic treatment.
However, Kawaauhau’s infection continued, and three days later, her leg was amputated below the knee.
Kawaauhau sued Geiger for malpractice and received a jury award for $355,000. Geiger, who did not carry malpractice insurance, moved to Missouri and filed for bankruptcy. Kawaauhau requested that the court refuse to discharge the malpractice judgment because the judgment was for a “willful and malicious injury” and was thus exempt from discharge. The bankruptcy court, finding that Geiger’s treatment fell far below the standard of care, ruled that the debt was non-dischargeable. The district court affirmed the ruling. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that malpractice was conduct that was negligent or reckless rather than intentional. Kawaauhau appealed.
JUSTICE GINSBURG Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:

(a) A discharge … does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt … (6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.
The Kawaauhaus urge that the malpractice award fits within this exception because Dr. Geiger intentionally rendered inadequate medical care to Margaret Kawaauhau that necessarily led to her injury. According to the Kawaauhaus, Geiger deliberately chose less effective treatment because he wanted to cut costs, all the while knowing that he was providing substandard care. Such conduct, the Kawaauhaus assert, meets the “willful and malicious” specification of § 523(a)(6).
We confront this pivotal question concerning the scope of the “willful and malicious injury” exception: Does § 523(a)(6)’s compass cover acts, done intentionally that cause injury (as the Kawaauhaus urge), or only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury (as the Eighth Circuit ruled)? The words of the statute strongly support the Eighth Circuit’s reading.
The word “willful” in (a)(6) modifies the word “injury,” indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. Had Congress meant to exempt debts resulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead “willful acts that cause injury.” … The Kawaauhaus’ more encompassing interpretation could place within the excepted category a wide range of situations in which an act is intentional, but injury is unintended, i.e., neither desired nor in fact anticipated by the debtor. Every traffic accident stemming from an initial intentional act —for example, intentionally rotating the wheel of an automobile to make a left-hand turn without first checking oncoming traffic—could fit the description.
Furthermore, “we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.” Reading §
523(a)(6) as the Kawaauhaus urge would obviate the need for § 523(a)(9), which specifically exempts debts “for death or personal injury caused by the debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance.” 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(9)
Finally, the Kawaauhaus maintain that, as a policy matter, malpractice judgments should be excepted from discharge, at least when the debtor acted recklessly or carried no malpractice insurance. Congress, of course, may so decide. But unless and until Congress makes such a decision, we must follow the current direction § 523(a)(6) provides.
We hold that debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6). For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is affirmed.
CRITICAL THINKING:
Justice Ginsburg used an analogy: traffic accidents. Does this analogy possess relevant similarities and lack relevant differences as compared to the case at hand?
Does this analogy provide valuable insights that warrant the Justice’s conclusion?
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING:
What are the consequences of this decision for the parties involved as well as other individuals who might bring similar cases? Who is benefiting from the ruling in this case?