In October 2005, Blatt was diagnosed with “Gender Dysphoria, also known as Gender Identity Disorder,” which she argues substantially limits one or more of her major life activities, including, but not limited to, interacting with others, reproducing, and social and occupational functioning. Blatt alleges that shortly after she was hired by Cabela’s in September 2006, Cabela’s began to discriminate against her on the basis of her sex and her disability, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the ADA, and that Cabela’s retaliated against her for opposing this discrimination, also in violation of these statutes. Blatt further alleges that in February 2007, Cabela’s terminated her employment based on her sex and disability. The stated purpose of the ADA is to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." Congress opted to define the scope of the statute’s coverage by means of a flexible and broad definition of “disability,” namely, “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” Standing in contrast to this broad definition of disability, there are a few exceptions to the ADA’s coverage. The provision at issue in this case excludes from ADA coverage approximately one dozen conditions, including gender identity disorders. Cabela contends that the statute’s reference to gender identity disorders applies to Blatt’s condition and that the provision, therefore, excludes her condition from the ADA’s scope and that the court should grant defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims. Should the court grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss? Should gender identity disorder be considered a disability under the ADA?