China has become increasingly dominant in international trade over the last 30 years and is revered as the flagship emerging economy. Much of this growth has been based on inward FDI and over the past decade outward FDI has also grown, signalling the country’s ambition to expand internationally. In the latest line of expansionist policies, President Xi launched an unprecedented global infrastructure development project, the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI). The BRI is a $1 trillion project designed to connect Asia with Europe that was unveiled by the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, in 2013. The concept itself is not new; the origins of modern trade can be traced back to the Silk Road, a series of trading routes connecting the East with the West, facilitating the exchange of commodities across borders through merchants who travelled its routes, beginning the process of globalisation that is ongoing to this day. The BRI effectively recreates the ancient route of the Silk Road through its land-based developments (the Road), while also creating a new maritime trading network (the Belt). The aims of the mega-project are fivefold: to increase policy coordination; to provide increased connectivity between facilities; to facilitate trade; to increase financial connectivity; and to forge and strengthen people-to-people bonds. According to Chinese rhetoric, this is a project designed to enhance transcontinental connectivity and in turn reduce the cost of trading, but pessimists have questioned the extent to which this is really an exercise in selfless global development, or a strategic initiative to enhance China’s political influence. The scope of the BRI is vast; its activities involve 65 other countries who collectively account for 30 per cent of the world’s GDP and 65 per cent of its population. Within these nations, China is investing to build ports, high speed railroads and oil and gas pipelines among other infrastructure as over 1,700 projects have been associated with the BRI to date. Although the development of routes between Europe and Asia is at its core, the BRI is by no means limited by these geographical boundaries. In 2018, countries within Latin America and the Caribbean were invited to partake in the initiative at the China–Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Ministerial Forum, which resulted in the signing of 16 BRI-related Memoranda of Understanding by smaller Latin American and Caribbean countries and China, paving the way of business deals between the related parties. Due to its extensive reach, although China’s state-owned enterprises are heavily involved with the projects, they are not exclusively responsible for their delivery; rather, China is urging private Chinese firms to play their part in the development of the ‘One Belt One Road’ by forging transnational relationships through mergers and acquisitions. In 2017, there were 109 M&As involving China in BRI nations which had a total value of $31 billion; however, the momentum gained by the BRI is evident as this value was surpassed within the first eight months of 2018, demonstrating that ever more valuable deals are being struck to contribute to China’s vision. To facilitate BRI projects, China has founded the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank and the Silk Road Fund, but as of the end of 2016, 51 per cent of BRI funding was provided by the big four Chinese state-owned banks with a further 31 per cent coming from China Development Bank. With such a vast scope and scale, risk is inevitable in a project the size of the BRI. However, analysts have questioned the economic wisdom of some of China’s investment decisions, which appear to be driven by political rather than commercial motives. Of the nations involved in the BRI, the Sovereign Debt Funds of 27 are classified as ‘junk’, denoting very high-risk investments with the strong chance of payment default. Furthermore, another 14 nations have no rating at all. This is a major concern for external observers; as Chinese financial institutions bankroll these huge investments in infrastructure, it is necessary to question the ability of host nations to repay their investors, particularly as China is quick to stress that the BRI is not an exercise in foreign aid. So why are Chinese institutions so willing to engage in such risky deals? To answer this question, it’s interesting to look at the case of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka which was built at a cost of $1.3 billion by China Harbor Engineering Company, a state-owned enterprise. From the beginning, this was a commercially questionable venture and was not confined to hard infrastructural development. In fact, the funding for the port was diverted to campaign activities for Mr Rajapaksa, the then-President of Sri Lanka, and in turn, Mr Rajapaksa became an important ally for China by increasing its local influence, to rival that of India within the region. In seeking to build the Hambantota Port, Sri Lanka had turned to other nations for financial support, but due to feasibility concerns India was unwilling to finance the venture; China, however, did not appear as concerned over the financial viability of the project and pledged its support. Although its origins predate the BRI, it was quickly enveloped into the megaproject’s portfolio. Over time, the viability of the port became evident; it was used by a very small number of ships and Sri Lanka was left unable to service its huge debt to China. In renegotiating the terms of the loan, Sri Lanka agreed to lease the port to China for 99 years in exchange for approximately $1 billion, which would in turn be used to pay its debts. Desperate to avoid defaulting on their loan, Sri Lanka was also forced to hand over 15,000 acres of land surrounding the port for the development of a new industrial zone. The Hambantota Port provides China with a strategic asset in the Indian Ocean and serves as a key point in its new maritime trading route. Aside from that, it is a key point of intelligence for China as it strives to keep abreast of global trade; however, the location has even greater potential for the Chinese. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka has struggled to manage its sovereign debt, which stood at 77.6 per cent of its GDP in 2017. It remains in debt to China and is grappling with rates that are less favourable than those of other international lenders. Although the initial renegotiation forbids foreign countries from using the Hambantota port and associated land for military purposes unless special permission is granted from the Sri Lankan government, onlookers speculate that such a concession may be made if the host country is forced to once again renegotiate with China to avoid defaulting. This case, although perhaps the most infamous of the BRI, is not necessarily unique. The credit ratings of the countries hosting BRI projects suggest that the debts being incurred by many hosts are unserviceable, paving the way for Chinese negotiations and future relinquishments of control. As yet, however, the BRI remains in its infancy and the sheer number of projects in development make it difficult to assess the overall risk and impact. All that can be said for certain is that the hard infrastructure developments are reshaping soft infrastructure worldwide and political allegiances globally, and such developments will continue as the project has been enshrined in China’s constitution. Although it has been promoted as a venture to develop global integration and harmony, the BRI has been seen by some as a strategic tool for the expansion of Sino-power beyond national borders and a means for China to assert its dominance on the geopolitical stage.