1. Did the district court determine that the decision to rescore the components of the exam was not a race- and gender-conscious act?
2. How did the Commission’s decision to rescore the components of the exam unnecessarily trammel the interests of non-minorities?
3. Was the City’s obligation under the consent decree not to practice racial or sexual discrimination applicable to white male police officers?

[The city and county of San Francisco (City) and the Civil Service Commission (Commission) entered into a consent decree that required the City to employ good faith efforts to achieve particular goals for employment of women and minorities. The Police Officers' Association (POA) intervened in those actions and agreed to the consent decree. The consent decree specifically prohibited the City from unlawfully discriminating in any manner on the basis of sex, race, or national origin. In 1983, the City administered selection procedures for the positions of assistant inspector and sergeant. The promotional examinations had three parts: a multiple-choice test, a written examination, and an oral examination. Partway through the examination, the Commission set the weights for all three components. When the examinations were scored, the results showed an adverse impact on minorities in both ranks and a slight adverse impact on women for the assistant inspector examination. This adverse impact led the Commission to revise the scoring procedures for the examinations. The Commission regarded the multiple-choice and written examination components on a pass-fail basis and used the oral examination as the sole criterion for ranking candidates who passed the multiple-choice and written examinations. The police union brought suit, objecting to the new grading procedures. The district court ruled in favor of the City, and the union appealed.]
WIGGINS, C. J.…
The critical issue in this case is whether the Commission acted lawfully in reweighing the examination components. The district court viewed this question in terms of fairness and held a fairness hearing in order to determine if the Commission's decision to reweigh was a valid affirmative action plan under United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).

In Weber, the Supreme Court identified four criteria that make an affirmative action plan valid under Title VII: (1) it is designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy; (2) it does not create an absolute bar to the advancement of nonminority employees; (3) it is a temporary measure, "not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance";
and (4) it does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of non-minority employees. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. Weber did not hold that these criteria were absolute requirements, but did hold that these aspects of the plan in Weber placed it on the permissible side of the line between permissible and impermissible plans. Here, the district court found that reweighing fit all four Weber criteria and was therefore permissible. We reverse the district court because reweighing the examination unnecessarily trammeled the interests of the non-minority police officers.

In analyzing whether the interests of nonminorities were unnecessarily trammeled, the district court focused on what rights the candidates possessed and how those rights were affected by reweighing. It determined that the City did not overtly take into account race or sex in the decision to reweigh….

We find that the district court clearly erred when it determined that the decision to reweigh was not a race and gender conscious act….

Reweighing unlawfully displaced candidates on the basis of their race and gender. The information about the candidates' performance on the individual components led the Commission to choose the oral component as the sole ranking device. If the results of the examinations had been different, the written component or the multiple-choice component might have been the new ranking device. Without readministering the test, the Commission examined the results from each component based on race and gender criteria and rescored the test to achieve specific and identified racial and gender percentages. This type of result-oriented scoring is offensive.

Candidates who participate in promotional examinations expect to have an equal opportunity to score well and to achieve promotion. This neutrality cannot exist if the City can rescore the examinations to achieve a particular race and gender balance after it analyzes the results. Permitting an employer to rescore examinations with knowledge of the ultimate results undermines the integrity of the examination process.

Moreover, candidates for promotion should be on notice of how their performance will be evaluated in order to prepare themselves effectively for an examination….
… Here … the Commission's decision to reweigh unlawfully restricted the promotional opportunities of non-minority candidates because the tests were scored to achieve a particular racial result. It trammeled the interests of non-minorities, in that the candidates were led to believe that the promotions would be based on merit alone. This harm to non-minorities was unnecessary because a less burdensome alternative, such as administering a new selection procedure, would have better achieved the goals of the consent decree without violating Title VII.

The City was obligated under the consent decree to administer an examination that would not have an adverse effect on minorities and women. When it failed in its first attempt to achieve that goal, the City inappropriately attempted to take short-cuts to meet its obligations. It did so in order to save time. Although we are sympathetic to the City's time dilemma, using an unlawful procedure is not acceptable. The City was required either to validate its initial examination or, if it could not, to devise and administer an alternative selection procedure that did not have an adverse impact.
The City was additionally obligated under the consent decree not to practice racial or sexual discrimination-
no more against white males than against others. The POA was a party to the consent decree. The POA has a right to insist that this unequivocal renunciation of all discrimination means what it says. The reweighing as practiced here violated the consent decree.
The judgment is reversed and remanded.