1. Summarize the essential facts of the case.
2. Did the city’s action add restrictions where Congress intended that none should exist?

[While Golden State’s application to renew its franchise to operate 400 Yellow Cab taxis in the city of Los Angeles was pending before the City Council, the taxi drivers represented by the Teamsters went on strike. At the Council meeting that evening and at later meetings, Teamster representatives argued against renewal because of the labor dispute. Thereafter the Council conditioned renewal of the franchise on settlement of the labor dispute by March 31. When the dispute was not settled by this date, the franchise expired. Golden State filed suit against the city, contending that the city’s action of conditioning the franchise renewal on settlement of the labor dispute was preempted by the NLRA, a position rejected by the district court and affirmed by the court of appeals.]

BLACKMUN, J.…

There is no question that the Teamsters and Golden State employed permissible economic tactics. The drivers were entitled to strike—and to time the strike to coincide with the council’s decision—in an attempt to apply pressure on Golden State.... And Golden State was entirely justified in using its economic power to withstand the strike in an attempt to obtain bargaining concessions from the union....

The parties’ resort to economic pressure was a legitimate part of their collective bargaining process But the bargaining process was thwarted when the city in effect imposed a positive durational limit on the exercise of economic self-help. The District Court found that the council had conditioned the franchise on a settlement of the labor dispute by March 31. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this finding is amply supported by the record. The city’s insistence on a settlement is pre-empted if the city “[entered] into the substantive aspects of the bargaining process to an extent Congress has not countenanced.”

That such a condition—by a city or the Labor Board—contravenes congressional intent is demonstrated by the language of the NLRA and its legislative history. The NLRA requires an employer and a union to bargain in good faith, but it does not require them to reach agreement. Section 8(d) as amended … (duty to bargain in good faith “does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession”) … (“The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation ….. may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel”).

The Act leaves the bargaining process largely to the parties…. It does not purport to set any time limits on negotiations or economic struggle. Instead, the Act provides a framework for the negotiations; it “is concerned primarily with establishing an equitable process for determining terms and conditions of employment.” … See also § 1, as amended, of the NLRA … (Act achieves national policy “by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining”)

… “[F]ederal law intended to leave the employer and the union free to use their economic weapons against one another.” Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. at 500. We hold, therefore, that the city was preempted from conditioning Golden State’s franchise renewal on the settlement of the labor dispute....

The summary judgment entered for the city is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.