This case arose when Kimberly Jasper was terminated from her employment as the director of a child care facility in Johnston, Iowa, called Kid University. The center was owned by H. Nizam, Inc. Mohsin Hussain was the president of the corporation. Zakia Hussain was the vice president. The Hussains were married. Mohsin Hussain was a special education teacher for the Des Moines School District and was not involved in the day-to-day operation of the center.

   Jasper began her employment as director of the center in late August 2003. She was paid an hourly wage. There was no specific term of employment. A few weeks after Jasper started her employment, she and her husband agreed to rent a home owned by the Hussains. The Jaspers had moved to Des Moines from Arizona and were looking for housing at the time. Jasper learned the Hussain house was available to rent when she and Hussain went to the house to retrieve some equipment to use at the day care center that was stored in the house. The house had four bedrooms and two bathrooms, but had sustained substantial water damage and was in a general state of disrepair. The agreed monthly rent was $10, plus utilities, and the Jaspers were required to make all repairs to the house at their own expense.

   Within a short time after Jasper started her employment, Hussain told her the center was not making enough money to justify the size of the staff. He also encouraged Jasper to attract more children to the center. Jasper responded by telling Hussain that any staff cuts would place the center in jeopardy of violating state regulations governing the minimum ratios between staff and children. [Citation.] Hussain was generally aware of the staffing requirements imposed by state regulations through his contact with a consultant and compliance official from the Iowa Department of Human Services. The consultant dealt with licensing and regulatory compliance of child care facilities. She would periodically stop by the center to determine if the facility was being operated in compliance with all regulations. Hussain had also hired a private consultant prior to employing Jasper. The private consultant also informed Hussain of the necessity to comply with the state ratio requirements. Within a month after Jasper started her employment, Hussain was again told of the staffing ratios at a meeting with both consultants and Jasper.

   The staff-to-child ratio became a frequent subject of conversation, and friction, between Hussain and Jasper. Hussain was persistent in his desire to reduce staff to decrease expenses, and Jasper was adamant that the current staff was necessary to meet the minimum staffing ratios under the state regulations. During one meeting with the Hussains and Jasper in early November, staff reductions were again discussed. Jasper claimed Zakia Hussain said, ‘‘What [the department of human services consultant] doesn’t know won’t hurt her.’’ Hussain made no response to the statement. In fact, Hussain never specifically told Jasper to violate or ignore the staffing regulations.

   At a meeting between Hussain and Jasper later in November, Hussain proposed that Jasper and her assistant director begin to work as staff in the classrooms occupied by the children as a means to cut staff and reduce expenses. Jasper objected to the plan as unreasonable. She believed it would prevent her from performing her duties as director of the center and risk placing the center in violation of the ratio regulations.

   On December 1, 2003, Hussain terminated Jasper from her employment with Kid University shortly after she arrived for work at the center in the morning. She was handed a written letter listing the reasons for the termination and was escorted outside the building. A confrontation followed after she was told she could not return to the building to remove her children from the day-care center, and police were called.

   Hussain also brought a forcible entry and detainer action against the Jaspers for failing to pay the December rent. Jasper and her family subsequently moved from the house, and she obtained new employment with another child care facility in April 2004.

   Jasper brought a wrongful discharge action against the corporation and Hussain individually. She claimed Hussain terminated her employment because she refused to violate the staff-to-child ratios, in violation of public policy of this state. She sought damages for lost earnings, emotional pain and suffering, and punitive damages. She also sought damages relating to the termination of the rental agreement and for unreimbursed expenses relating to improvements made to the center. At trial, Jasper presented testimony that the center violated the staff-to-child ratios shortly after she was terminated. This violation occurred when one staff member was left in a 920 Part 9 Regulation of Business classroom to supervise five or more children between the ages of one and two years old. The regulations promulgated by the department of human services required one staff member for every four children under the age of two. However, the district court refused to permit Jasper to present evidence that a second day care facility owned by Hussain had been cited by the state for violating the staff-to-child ratios.

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    The jury returned a verdict for Jasper against the corporation and Hussain individually, based solely on the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The jury awarded Jasper lost wages of $26,915 and past pain and suffering of $100,000. It awarded her $39,507.25 for expenses relating to the house and additional services and expenses. The district court refused to submit the punitive-damage claim to the jury.

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   Jasper appealed, * * *. The court of appeals determined a clear public policy existed in Iowa that child care centers be adequately staffed. It also found Jasper presented substantial evidence to support a finding that she refused to reduce staff below the minimum ratios and that this conduct was the cause of her termination. The court of appeals then determined the district court did not err in finding the $100,000 award for emotional distress was excessive and in setting aside the award of $39,507.25 for additional services and housing expenses.

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   We adhere to the common-law employment-at-will doctrine in Iowa. [Citation.] However, we joined the parade of other states twenty years ago in adopting the public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. [Citation.] In doing so, we recognized a cause of action in Iowa for wrongful discharge from employment when the reasons for the discharge contravene public policy. [Citation.] Since the adoption of this exception, we have identified and explained the elements of the cause of action. [Citation.] These elements are: (1) existence of a clearly defined public policy that protects employee activity; (2) the public policy would be jeopardized by the discharge from employment; (3) the employee engaged in the protected activity, and this conduct was the reason for the employee’s discharge; and (4) there was no overriding business justification for the termination. [Citation.]

   This case primarily focuses on the public-policy element of the tort and ultimately requires us to decide if the source of public policy can be derived from administrative regulations. Yet, the case also requires us to consider the parameters of the public-policy element and to dig into the element to unearth and identify the often difficult distinction between a claim based on public policy and a claim based on a private dispute between an employer and employee. In this way, we must also consider the element of the tort that requires the employee to establish that the discharge was caused by the employee’s participation in an activity protected by public policy.

   Sources of Public Policy. The concept of public policy generally captures the communal conscience and common sense of our state in matters of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. [Citation.] Although public policy can be an elusive concept, once recognized, it becomes a benchmark in the application of our legal principles. [Citation.] * * * Thus, the public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine carries forward a hallmark concept of this state; that the rights of each individual in a civilized society are ultimately ‘‘limited by the rights of others and of the public at large’’ and that the delicate balance between these rights is what helps hold us together as a society. [Citations.] When a contract violates public policy, including a contract of employment, the entire community is damaged.

   In each case we have decided since adopting the public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, we have relied on a statute as a source of public policy to support the tort. * * * In fact, consistent with other states, our wrongful-discharge cases that have found a violation of public policy can generally be aligned into four categories of statutorily protected activities: (1) exercising a statutory right or privilege, [citations]; (2) refusing to commit an unlawful act, [citations]; (3) performing a statutory obligation [citation]; and (4) reporting a statutory violation, [citations].

   Our adherence in our prior cases to identifying statutes as a source of public policy is consistent with our earlier pronouncement that the tort of wrongful discharge should exist in Iowa only as a narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. [Citations.] The use of statutes as a source of public policy also helps provide the essential notice to employers and employees of conduct that can lead to dismissal, as well as conduct that can lead to tort liability. [Citation.] The public-policy exception was adopted merely to place a limitation on an employer’s discretion to discharge an employee when the public policy is so clear and well-defined that it should be understood and accepted in our society as a benchmark. [Citation.] * * *

   While we have justifiably relied on statutes, we have not closed the door to using other sources as a means to derive public policy to support the tort. We have repeatedly observed that our constitution is a proper source of public policy. [Citation.] Moreover, we have recognized that other jurisdictions have used administrative regulations as a source of public policy, yet we have not had the occasion to decide the issue until today. [Citations.]

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   In deciding whether administrative regulations may be used as an additional source of public policy to support the tort of wrongful discharge, we generally observe a strong fundamental congruence between statutes and administrative regulations. Administrative agencies have become an important component of our modern world of governance as a means for our legislature to better deal with the array of complex and technical problems it faces. [Citation.] Thus, our legislature often delegates its rulemaking authority to administrative agencies as a means to better accomplish its objectives in dealing with these problems. [Citation.] The administrative regulations ultimately adopted are necessarily tied to the broad directives of the legislature and effectuate the intent of the enabling legislation. [Citation.] Administrative regulations have the force and effect of a statute. [Citation.] Moreover, the regulations are required to be consistent with the underlying broader statutory enactment. [Citation.]

   These observations reveal that administrative regulations can be an important part of a broader statutory scheme to advance legislative goals. They can reflect the objectives and goals of the legislature in the same way as a statute. Consequently, the justification for relying on statutes as a source of public policy can equally apply to administrative regulations. * * * Consequently, we are satisfied that administrative regulations can be used as a source of public policy to support the tort of wrongful discharge when adopted pursuant to a delegation of authority in a statute that seeks to further a public policy. We also recognize this position is consistent with most jurisdictions that have considered the question. [Citations.]

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    Public Policy Derived From Administrative Rules Governing Staff Ratios of Child Care Facilities. Our legislature has chosen to regulate child care facilities under chapter 237A of the Code. The regulatory agency is the department of human services. [Citation.] Specifically, this statute authorizes the department to ‘‘adopt rules setting minimum standards to provide quality child care in the operation and maintenance’’ of child care facilities. [Citation.] The legislature specifically authorized the department to adopt rules regulating ‘‘[t]he number … of personnel necessary to assure the health, safety, and welfare of children in the facilities.’’ 

   [Citation.] 

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   From the beginning of our adoption of the public-policy exception, we have emphasized that the public policy must be both well recognized and clearly expressed. * * *

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   In this case, the legislature clearly delegated authority to the department of human services to promulgate specific rules concerning the proper staff-to-child ratios as a means ‘‘to assure the health, safety, and welfare of children’’ in child care facilities. [Citation.] Without question, the protection of children is a matter of fundamental public interest. [Citations.] These factors satisfy the goal that the regulation affect the public interest.

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   We conclude the particular administrative rule at issue in this case supports a clear and well-defined public policy that gives rise to the tort of wrongful discharge. The ratios were implemented at the specific direction of the legislature to protect the health, safety, and welfare of those children in Iowa who attend day care facilities. Additionally, the legislature intended for the ratios to be an important component of the larger public policy to protect children and, in turn, established a basic, important component of the operation of a day care center in Iowa. These factors transform the ratios into a public policy and satisfy the element of the tort that a clear and well-defined public policy that relates to public health, safety, or welfare be identified.

   Employee Participation in the Protected Activity as a Cause of the Discharge. In addition to the existence of a public policy to create a protected activity, the tort of wrongful discharge requires proof that the discharge was a result of the employee’s participation in the protected activity. * * *

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   We readily recognize the tort of wrongful discharge is not intended to interfere with legitimate business decisions of an employer. Yet, staffing a child care facility below the minimum requirements established by an administrative rule is not a legitimate business concern.

   In this case, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that Kid University wanted Jasper to reduce staff below the minimum state requirements. * * *

   This same evidence supports a finding by the jury that Jasper was discharged because she refused to violate the state requirements.

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   We affirm the district court in part and reverse in part. We remand for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.