Question: 15. Same as Problem 14, except now the payoff values of each person are a. If Smith and Jones are payoff maximizers and make their

15. Same as Problem 14, except now the payoff values of each person are

Smith Early Late Jones: 30 Jones: 50 Early Smith: 30 Smith: 20

a. If Smith and Jones are payoff maximizers and make their decisions individually, what will they do?

b. If Smith and Jones can make binding agreements with each other, what will they do?

c. How do your answers differ from Problem 14 and why?

Smith Early Late Jones: 30 Jones: 50 Early Smith: 30 Smith: 20 Jones Jones: 20 Jones: 10 Late Smith: 60 Smith: 10

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