Look back at Figures 1a and 1b, which show the costs and benefits to voters Adams, Benson, and Conrad of two different public goods that the government will produce if a majority of Adams, Benson, and Conrad support them. Suppose that Adams, Benson, and Conrad have decided to have one single vote at which the funding for both of those public goods will be decided simultaneously. 

a. Given the $300 cost per person of each public good, what are Adams’ net benefits for each public good individually and for the two combined? Will he want to vote yes or no on the proposal to fund both projects simultaneously?

b. What are Conrad’s net benefits for each public good individually and for the two combined? Will he want to vote yes or no on the proposal to fund both projects simultaneously?

c. What are Benson’s net benefits for each public good individually and for the two combined? Will he want to vote yes or no on the proposal to fund both projects simultaneously-or will he be indifferent?

d. Who is the median voter here? Who will the two other voters be attempting to persuade?