The first space shuttle flight occurred on February 18, 1977, with the launch of Enterprise. It was a proud day for NASA and the beginning of a new age in space exploration. Less than nine years later, on January 28, 1986, the nation was stunned when the space shuttle Challenger disintegrated seventy-three seconds after launch. All seven crew members perished. The technical explanation for this disaster was the “O-ring” problem—a crucial shuttle component was compromised by the cold weather on that launch day. Subsequently, it became clear that there were voices speaking against the launch because of worries about the O-ring problem. However, there were pressures to launch and a belief in the infallibility of the decision-making process. Thus, the voices speaking against launch were silenced. During the late 1980s and 1990s, there were a plethora of studies considering the Challenger disaster, and many pointed to the organizational culture at NASA as a crucial contributing factor leading to the launch decision (McCurdy, 1992). For example, in 1990, the U.S. government issued the “Augustine Report” on the future of the U.S. space program (U.S. Advisory Committee, 1990). This report was built largely on the premise that organizational culture directly contributes to organizational performance. The report notes that “[t]he most fundamental ingredient of a successful space program … is the culture or work environment in which it is conducted” (U.S. Advisory Committee, p. 16). This committee also worked from the assumption that the culture at an organization like NASA needs to be fundamentally different from that at many organizations. NASA works with the most complex of technologies, and the stakes are incredibly high. As McCurdy notes, “[e]rrors that might be forgotten in other government programs can produce in NASA a myopic space telescope or an exploding space shuttle” (McCurdy, 1992, p. 190). Given these assumptions, the report pointed to many specific aspects of organizational culture at NASA and made recommendations regarding cultural beliefs and assumptions that should characterize a successful space program. These include the beliefs that: 

• The success of a mission should take precedence over cost and deadlines. Mission success is more important than the role of any individual or group. 

• Space flight requires open communication in which individuals are encouraged to report on problems or anomalies. Issues need to be “put on the table” for consideration. 

• The space program cannot succeed in an environment where “avoiding failure” is seen as an important goal. Instead, the risky nature of the operation must be acknowledged. 

• The space program should not get “spread too thin” by working simultaneously on different projects, such as flight, research and development, and design. “Either operations dominates to the detriment of research and development, or employees working on new projects neglect operations” (McCurdy, 1992, p. 190).

CASE ANALYSIS QUESTIONS 

1. What factors in NASA’s culture contributed to the Challenger and Columbia shuttle disasters? Using Schein’s “onion model” of culture, is it possible to show how basic assumptions are linked to beliefs and values and then to potentially fateful behaviors? 

2. Cultural change was obviously difficult at NASA. Can you think of specific things that could have been done to make cultural changes more lasting or more effective? 

3. Are there particular aspects of NASA that might make cultural change particularly challenging? Are bureaucracies particularly susceptible to these difficulties of cultural change? How does the concept of a “high reliability culture” contribute to the challenges facing NASA throughout the years?