03 Question (5 points) Ia See page 532 Consider a market served by two rms: rm Aand rm B. Demand forthe good is given (in inverse form) va(Q] = 300 1.00Q,where Q is total quantity in the market {and is the sum ofrm A's output. (La, and rm B's output, (:3) and P is the price of the good. Each rm has a cost function of C(q) = 60.001}, which implies marginal cost of $60.00 for each rm, and the goods sold byrmsA and B are identical. 15t attempt Part 1 (2 points) 0 See Hint lfthe two rms compete in price {Bertrand competition] then each of them will set price of $ and earn prot of $ .{Give your answers to two decimal places.) Part 2 (3 points) 0 See Hint Now suppose that the two rms compete by setting quantities (Cournot competition). In equilibrium they will each produce units and the price of the good will be 5' .Eachrm will earn prot of $ . (Give your answers to two decimal places.)