1. (5 points) Take the standard Cournot model with 2 firms, I={1,2}, linear inverse demand P(Q)= 2aQ (note it's slightly different from class), but with a quasi-fixed cost of (2Fi)2 if any production takes place, that is iI : ci(q)={cq+(2Fi)20ifqi>0ifqi=0. Assume that (F1)2>(F2)2>0. (d) On a separate graph, draw both best-responses under the previous assumptions about F1 and F2. Also indicate all Nash Equilibria under these assumptions. 1. (5 points) Take the standard Cournot model with 2 firms, I={1,2}, linear inverse demand P(Q)= 2aQ (note it's slightly different from class), but with a quasi-fixed cost of (2Fi)2 if any production takes place, that is iI : ci(q)={cq+(2Fi)20ifqi>0ifqi=0. Assume that (F1)2>(F2)2>0. (d) On a separate graph, draw both best-responses under the previous assumptions about F1 and F2. Also indicate all Nash Equilibria under these assumptions